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CDS Spreads: An Empirical Analysis of European Countries 
Kai Lisa Lo 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates how credit default risk as reflected in credit default swap (CDS) 
spread is transferred in the European countries. The first part observes the default risk 
transfer between the sovereign debt and the domestic financial institutions of the 
European countries during the European sovereign debt crisis. The previous literature 
indicates that a "two-way feedback" effect exists between the two sectors. In this part, the 
bailouts by the European Financial Stability Facility are used as breakpoints to examine 
the changes in the default risk transfer between the two sectors. The results suggest that 
the two-way feedback effect does not exist after the first Greek bailout. The shocks in the 
financial sector transmitting to the sovereign debts become either negative or 
insignificant in both the short and the long runs. Subsequent to the first Greek bailout, the 
private-to-public risk transfer no longer exerts significant impacts, regardless of later 
bailouts issued to the other countries. 
The second part further examines the structural regimes in the cointegration relationship 
of default risk between the two sectors. The empirical results indicate that the 
private-to-public risk transfer becomes stronger in the 'atypical' regimes, which covers 
the crisis periods. The approach of identifying changes in regime is robust, and the 
detected thresholds also confirm that it is reasonable using the EFSF bailout events as 
breakpoints.  
The final empirical chapter focuses on the cross-country cointegration of sovereign 
default risk, and takes note of the role of investor sentiment in explaining the risk transfer. 
The findings show that investor sentiment is capable to predict regimes in the sovereign 
default risk in the short run. During crisis periods, the trench of the sovereign default risk 
is wider, but the elasticity is smaller, indicating more difficulties for the countries to close 
the gap of the default risk. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
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1. Introduction 
"For well-being and health, again, the homestead should be airy in summer, and 
sunny in winter. A homestead possessing these qualities would be longer than it is 
deep; and its main front would face the south." 
Aristotle, Economics, 1.1345a, trans. Tredennick and Armstrong 
The Greek philosopher and economist Aristotle wrote in his book Economics that for 
the storage of crops and of clothing and for the living of people, a stable homestead 
should have such qualities, 'airy in summer, and sunny in winter' (Aristotle, 
Economics, 1.1345a, trans. Tredennick and Armstrong). For the European Union, 
especially for the Eurozone, the member countries are compared to the individuals 
who share the entire 'homestead'. Within the financial system of the European 
Commission, member countries have been sharing benefits from each other to some 
extent, for example, a stable currency for the Eurozone. However, there are also 
barriers to the financial system meantime, such as different national standards for 
financial institutions, the exchange controls and the cost of entering the market 
(Dixon (1991)). When the economic environment is 'in summer', the market is more 
liquid ('airy'); when the economic environment is 'in winter', the guiding policies are 
constructive and efficient ('sunny' and 'its main front would face the south'). This 
suggests that a healthy and stable financial system should possess such qualities. 
The European sovereign debt crisis developed from early 2010 in some European 
countries. The unsustainable Greek sovereign debt came to a brink of imminent 
default in early 2010. Propagated by the European banks’ significant holdings in 
Greek sovereign debt, and the countries having fewer monetary controls such as free 
exchange rate, the “Greek crisis” contagiously affected the financial sectors and 
sovereign debts in the other European countries. On 9 May 2010, the European 
3 
 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) issued its first bailout package worth €750 billion 
to ensure the financial stability of the EU countries, and more measures were taken 
thereafter by the governments to prevent the collapse of the financial system across 
Europe. Since then, concerns have been raised on the effects of the bailouts to 
relieve the stress of default in the sovereign and the financial sectors, and on how to 
improve the intervention by the governments in order to better prevent and control 
the crisis. These concerns become the motivation of this research. 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has been founded by 17 Eurozone 
countries.
1
 The EFSF issued its first rescue package on 9 May 2010 for up to €750 
billion to ensure the financial stability of Greece (G1). This is then followed by the 
rescue packages for Ireland on 25 January 2011 (I), Portugal on 15 June 2011 (P) 
and second bailout to Greece on 21 July 2011 (G2).
2
 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to understand the ways by which default risk is transferred, 
if any, between the sovereign countries and the domestic financial institutions after 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) bailouts starting with the first 
Greek bailout in May 2010. This study assesses the effectiveness of a large scale 
government bailout which aims at preventing a financial crisis from being further 
propagated into a systemic risk. Previous studies have been focused on the other 
financial crises before 2010. Increases in sovereign default risk may reduce foreign 
credit to the domestic private sectors via a decline in credit supply and cause a 
decrease in aggregate demand of credit, since investors’ perceptions to the country 
default risk increase (Drudi and Giordano (2000), Dooley and Verma (2001) and 
Tomz and Wright (2008)). On the other hand, the performance of financial sector 
may reflect the outlook of economic growth and influence the public finances. An 
increase in the default risk of a financial institution augments the probability that the 
institution cannot fulfil its payments to other financial counterparties, thus a systemic 
                                                             
1
 See Appendix 1 for details of the EFSF guarantees. 
2
 See Appendix 2 for the settlements of the bailout packages for these countries. 
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financial crisis may arise. Acharya et al. (2011) use CDS spreads of the Eurozone 
countries for 2007-2010 and provide evidence that “two-way feedback” 
interdependencies exist between the sovereign and financial default risks. 
Furthermore, Alter and Schüler (2012) analyse the impacts of bank bailouts during 
the period 2007-2010 on the interdependencies between the sovereign and banking 
sectors, and conclude that the contagion disperses into different directions after the 
bank bailouts. 
In order to assess the effect of the EFSF bailouts, two approaches are used to identify 
the breakpoints of the time-series of the credit default swap (CDS) spread. First, the 
study applies a commonly adopted method of observing the occurrences of historical 
events (see, for example, Acharya et al. (2011) and Alter and Schüler (2012)). 
Second, the breakpoints are further identified through applying the models of 
Gregory and Hansen (1996a and 1996b) to test cointegration with regime and trend 
shifts 
The analysis in Chapter 3 focuses on ten European (Eurozone) countries, namely 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. The study uses daily CDS spreads to capture default risk, and analyses the 
risk transfer between the sovereign debts and the domestic financial institutions in 
each country from Nov 2007 to Oct 2012. The dynamic short- and long-term 
interdependencies are examined between the CDS series of sovereign debts and 
financial institutions, using impulse response functions (IRFs) from bivariate vector 
autoregressive (VAR) and bivariate vector error correction (VEC) models (see Alter 
and Schüler (2012)).  
The findings of Chapter 3 are twofold. First, the findings show that, prior to the first 
Greek bailout, positive interdependencies exist between the default risk of the 
sovereign and financial institutions. Specifically, a shock in the sovereign CDS 
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spread of a country is followed by increases in the CDS spread of the financial 
institutions in that country, and vice versa. Importantly, after the first Greek bailout, 
the default risk of the financial institutions loses its positive impacts on the sovereign 
default risk, while the strong and positive influences of the sovereign default risk on 
their domestic financial institutions remain. The results suggest that the bailout 
relieves the default risk of the financial institutions but increases the debt burdens of 
the government. 
The strength of such effect varies across countries. The effect is most significant in 
countries that have high sovereign default risk such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain during the ongoing Eurozone crisis. This pattern of the results 
indicates that the risk transfer occurs based on the current financial situations of the 
governments and the domestic financial sectors of the countries. Since the sovereign 
default risk increases with the default risk of financial sector in the long term, the 
increased debt burdens of the government further weaken the private sector in the 
long term. 
Second, for later bailouts in Greece (second bailout), Ireland and Portugal, the 
findings show that the default risk transfer from the financial sector to the 
government becomes insignificant. This indicates that the first Greek bailout was 
successful in stopping risk transfer from the financial to the sovereign sector, not 
only for Greece, but also for the other countries. The policy implication from the 
evidence is that a determined large bailout, such as the first Greek bailout, is indeed 
capable of preventing the exaggeration of risk transfer from the financial to the 
sovereign sector. 
Following Chapter 3, Chapter 4 further examines the structural regimes in the 
cointegration relationship between default risk of sovereign debt and the debt of 
domestic financial institutions in the European countries, specifically Greece, Ireland, 
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Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). The study endogenously identifies typical and 
atypical regimes where these relationships differ, and examines whether the atypical 
regimes are prelude to financial crisis. The Hansen and Seo's (2002) methodology is 
applied to identify the two-regime threshold cointegration in bivariate vector 
error-correction (VEC) models of the sovereign default risk and the default risk of 
domestic financial institutions for the GIIPS countries. The study defines the regime 
containing higher percentage of observations as the typical regime, and the other one 
as the atypical regime. The aim is to understand how the default risk is transferred, if 
any, between the sovereign and domestic financial institutions in different regimes, 
i.e., typical and atypical regimes. The dynamic short- and long-term 
interdependencies are also examined between the credit default swap (CDS) series of 
the sovereign debts and financial institutions in the two regimes by using impulse 
response functions (IRFs) from bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) models as 
proposed by Alter and Schüler (2012). The empirical analysis uses daily CDS 
spreads to capture default risk, and examines the risk transfer between the sovereign 
debts and the domestic financial institutions in the GIIPS countries from June 2007 
to July 2013. 
Chapter 4 focuses on detecting structural breaks in the cointegration relationship 
between the default swap rates of the sovereign and financial sectors. The atypical 
regimes identified are mainly located around the global credit crunch period 
(2007-2008) and the European sovereign debt crisis (Eurozone crisis since early 
2010) for the GIIPS countries. The approach of detecting regime change is robust, 
since the structure breaks are suggested by data rather than by subjective time-period 
selections. Importantly, the findings show that the responses between the sovereign 
and financial sectors change from one regime to the other. Previous research, Alter 
and Schüler (2012) for example, does not detect regime changes and find mixed 
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results with their hypotheses.
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Second, in the typical regime for the countries except Greece, positive 
interdependencies exist between the default risk of the sovereign and financial 
sectors. Specifically, a shock in the sovereign daily CDS spread of a country is 
followed by increases in the daily CDS spread of the financial institutions in that 
country, and vice versa. Importantly, in the atypical regime, the impacts magnitude 
in positive interdependencies between the default risk of the public and financial 
sectors are generally much larger than that in the typical regime. This is consistent 
with the intuition that during the credit crunch and the Eurozone crisis periods, the 
financial sectors are more sensitive to the credit health of their governments. A 
decline in the default risk of the financial sector often leads to declines in the 
sovereign CDS spreads. The sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to the financial 
institutions’ default risk is also increased. 
In a sharp contrast, the interdependent relationship between the sovereign and 
financial sectors is different for Greece. In the typical regime, only the impacts of 
sovereign default risk on the default risk of the domestic financial sector are 
positively significant, the impacts of the other way are insignificant. In the atypical 
regime for Greece however, the impacts of the sovereign default risk on the default 
risk of the financial institutions are reduced to either zero or negative. More 
importantly, the default risk of the financial sector exhibits strong and negative 
impacts on the sovereign default risk during the credit crunch or the Eurozone crisis. 
Default probabilities and recovery capability of economies vary through business 
cycles (Acharya et al. (2011)). Following Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that detect the 
changes and regime shifts in the default risk transfer within individual countries, the 
main objective in Chapter 5 is to investigate the functional cointegrated relationship 
                                                             
3 It is important to note that setting sample sub-periods by events is different from the approach identifying 
structural breaks. 
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between two series of sovereign default risk of the Eurozone countries via a 
functional coefficient. This functional coefficient is the difference between the 
investor sentiment indices in the two countries, since investor sentiment is the most 
important determinant of default risk (Tang and Yan (2010)).  
Recent literature on the dynamics of countries' default risk and other financial 
variables has focused on nonlinear regime models with parametric specifications 
such as threshold models and others with structural breaks. In this chapter however, 
an alternative model is used by allowing the coefficients of linear structures to be 
functional following the methodology by Banerjee and Pitarakis (2013). Such 
models with semiparametric specifications are generally referred as functional 
coefficient models, which can avoid the problematic nature of the nonparametric 
structures such as spurious correlation (see Granger and Newbold (1974)). 
The meaning of cointegration is that the linear combination of the non-stationary 
variables is stationary, which indicates that the variables involved in the regression 
do not drift apart through time, and that the cointegrating vector reveals the long-run 
relationship of the variables (see Engle and Granger (1987)). Furthermore, it is 
possible that there are shifts in the cointegrating vector, which means the long-run 
relationship changes, and non-linear regime models have been introduced with one 
or more structural breaks in cointegration (see Gregory and Hansen (1996a) and 
Hatemi-J (2008)). However, for the semiparametric model, the functional 
coefficients within the simple linear structure are able to capture more specifications 
such as regime shifts. 
To capture the sovereign default risk, Chapter 5 uses sovereign credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads of ten European countries, namely Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), 
Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Netherland (NL), Spain 
(ES), Sweden (SE), and the United Kingdom (UK) from January 2004 to September 
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2013. Germany CDS spreads are used as the benchmark default risk, since German 
financial performance has been relatively more stable than other European countries, 
especially than other Eurozone countries, and German government has been the 
main contributor of the bailouts during the global financial crisis and the recent 
European sovereign debt crisis. The study tests the cointegration of sovereign default 
risk between Germany and one of the other European countries, and the functional 
coefficients are regressions of the investor sentiment. 
For countries' investor sentiment, three measures are applied, which are Consumer 
Confidence Indicator (CCI), put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) and put-call open 
interest ratio (PCO). Behavioural theories suggest that market optimism or 
pessimism or fluctuations in the economic environment could cause asset prices 
deviate from their intrinsic values (see Chung et al. (2012), De Long et al. (1990) 
and Kumar and Lee (2006)). For the application of the model, in other words, the 
gap of the default risk between the benchmark country and the other European 
country changes during the crises, and the functional coefficients of the investor 
sentiment measure the mispricing of the default risk of the underlying country and 
the adjustment speed for the country to close this gap. 
The findings show that, investor sentiment predicts jumps or regimes in countries' 
default risk in the short-run. The long-run relationship of countries' default risk 
changes in different regimes. When the economic environment is stable, the gap 
between two countries' default risk is small, and it is easier for one country to close 
the gap of default risk towards the other. During crisis time, however, the trench of 
default risk between the countries is larger, and the elasticity of the countries' default 
risk is smaller, indicating more difficulties to drive the two countries' default risk 
back towards the normal status. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a general 
10 
 
review of the literature on default risk transfer and the main measures. Chapter 3 
empirically examines the default risk transfer between the sovereign and financial 
sectors of the European countries. Following Chapter 3, Chapter 4 focuses on the 
regime shift in the cointegration relationship, and the thresholds of the regimes 
further confirm the findings in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 uses investor sentiment indices 
as functional coefficients to explain the cointegration relationship of the sovereign 
default risk of the countries. Chapter 6 concludes the main findings of the empirical 
chapters, and briefly proposes avenues of future investigation. The figures and the 
tables are at the end of each chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
Through this chapter, the most important literature related to the main topics of this 
thesis is discussed and also compared to the main findings of this research.  
Section 2.2 presents a review on the literature on default risk transfer between public 
and financial sectors. Firstly, in Section 2.2.1, the risk transfer mechanism is 
classified according to the recent research on sovereign or corporate default risk. 
More specifically, the concept of “two-way feedback” initially introduced by 
Acharya et al. (2011) is highlighted. Section 2.2.2 explains the reasons behind the 
risk transfer mechanism why default risk could transfer from the public sector to the 
private sector or even across countries. The reasons include foreign and domestic 
credit imbalance, changes in global and domestic economic environments, 
government and corporate borrowing behaviours. In Section 2.2.3, the literature on 
the exposure of the financial sector to the sovereign default risk is further revealed. 
Following these, the measures of the default risk are displayed in Section 2.2.4, and 
different measures mainly used by the recent researchers are compared. Section 2.2 
covers the main literature related to the empirical chapters 3 and 4, in which 
domestic default risk transfer between sovereign and financial sectors are 
investigated using different models. 
The default risk transfer across countries is estimated in Chapter 5. Since the 
mispricing of two countries' default risk is measured by investor sentiment, Section 
2.3 explains how the concept of investor sentiment is introduced to this topic, and 
lists the relative articles considering the importance of investor sentiment to changes 
in default risk. Moreover, this section also reviews the different measures of investor 
sentiment used for different countries. 
13 
 
Section 2.4 concludes the above literature and compares the main findings of this 
research to the literature. 
2.2. Default Risk Transfer between Sovereign and Financial Sectors 
2.2.1. Risk Transfer Mechanism 
When a country faces financial distress, for example, high public deficit or heavy 
debt burdens, the sovereign default risk of this country raises and the sovereign debt 
devalues. In the short run, (i) for the domestic financial institutions the cost of 
holding the sovereign debt is higher, which changes the balance sheet of the financial 
institutions; (ii) for other governments that support the financially distressed country 
by providing bailout packages, the sovereign and financial sectors of the supporting 
countries also faces higher default risk for holding the devaluated sovereign debt. 
The financial systemic risk, which is the impacts of macroeconomic factors on 
banking credit risk, is procyclical to the business cycle or macroeconomic 
environment (Borio et al. (2002), Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009) and Festic, et al. 
(2011)). In the long run, sovereign debt crises are followed by reduction in foreign 
capital inflows as investors’ awareness to the sovereign default risk increases, and 
the domestic credit becomes more expensive, which negatively affect the domestic 
economy and hence increase the default risk of the domestic financial institutions.  
When a financial institution faces financial distress, the default risk of the financial 
institution is higher. This increases the probability that it cannot fulfil the obligations 
to other financial counterparties, thus the financial counterparties could face funding 
difficulties, and their default risk is higher. Thereafter, a systemic financial crisis 
might arise and hamper the whole economy, which also deteriorate public finances, 
thus the sovereign default risk is higher. 
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Acharya et al. (2011) document a “two-way feedback” effect between the financial 
sector and the sovereign sector, suggesting positive interdependences between the 
default risks of the two sectors. The theoretical explanation is that the government 
can issue a bailout via increase in taxation or dilution of existing government debt. 
However, such bailouts are costly, and the increased taxation could aggregate the 
default risk transfer from the public to the private sectors. This means domestic 
bailouts can drive the public-to-private risk transfer into a vicious two-way feedback 
loop. In this thesis the findings show that, before the first Greek bailout issued by the 
EFSF, the responses of sovereign default risk to the shocks in the financial sectors 
are positive, and vice versa. 
After the government intervenes, government guarantees to the financial sector 
increase, thus changes in the sovereign default risk have direct impact on the 
perceived default risk of the financial sector. Also because the financial institutions 
might receive rescue capital from their governments, the financial sector is more 
sensitive to the credit health of their governments. Hence, the sensitivity of the 
financial institutions’ default risk to the sovereign default risk is expected to increase. 
On the other hand, the default risk is transferred from the financial sector to the 
government sector when the government has taken over the debt burdens of the 
financial institutions. In the long run, a decline in the default risk of the financial 
sector may result in healthier economy and improve the public finances; in the short 
run, however, the relieved default risk of the financial institutions may lead to higher 
probability of government default in the future.  
The findings of the thesis also observe that after the first Greek bailout, in general, 
while the default risk transfer from the public to the private sectors remain positive, 
the private-to-public risk transfer becomes either negatively negative or 
insignificant.  
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Acharya et al. (2011) indicate that in order to get rid of the two-way feedback loop, 
the government can take strategic default, which means that the government 
sacrifices its credit rating to maintain the economic growth and stability of the 
financial sector. In case of the Eurozone crisis, after a country, such as Greece, starts 
the application of the EFSF bailouts, the bailouts issued to maintain that country’s 
financial sector are actually shared by other EFSF guarantees, such as Germany, or 
even by the whole Eurozone in the short run. The Greek government has received 
the bailout from the EFSF guarantees without sacrificing its own sovereign debt or 
increasing taxation. Thus, instead of Greece taking over the debt of the financial 
sector, the default risk gets transferred to other Eurozone countries. Hence, the 
bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in this two-way feedback loop breaks down after the 
EFSF bailouts issued. From Figure 3.1, it is obvious to see that the sovereign CDS 
spreads for all the ten Eurozone countries increase in a few days just after the first 
Greek bailout. This is defined as the “Greek effect”. 
It is expected that the outcome of the bailouts is heterogeneous among the European 
countries. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) report that the states of the financial system 
at the beginning of the financial crisis have strong explanatory power for the 
private-to-public risk transfer, and that an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
member is more sensitive to the health of its pre-crisis financial system. So the 
private-to-public transfer was influenced in Ireland, Portugal and Spain during the 
first Greek bailout, but not in other countries such as Germany and France which 
have more stable financial system. 
The result of this Greek effect is the vanishing two-way feedback effect which is not 
observed when Ireland and Portugal received bailouts from the EFSF later. This is 
because the default risk had already been priced during the first Greek bailout. This 
reflects the perception of market participants that these countries may also request 
and would be granted bailouts from the EFSF in the future. Thus the price of the 
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default has been adjusted after the first Greek bailout. 
2.2.2. Risk Transfer from Sovereign to Financial Sector 
Many studies have found that sovereign debt crisis may reduce foreign credit to the 
domestic firms via a decline in supply and cause a decrease in aggregate demand of 
credit as investors’ perceptions to the country default risk increase (Drudi and 
Giordano (2000), Dooley and Verma (2001) and Tomz and Wright (2008)). A large 
amount of empirical work has found that the credit patterns in the private sector 
change after the financial crises (Eichengreen et al. (2001), Desai et al. (2008), 
Pasquariello (2008) and Blalock and Simon (2009)).  
Sovereign debt crises, associated with a decline in foreign credit, may hamper 
production in the private sector and therefore deteriorate future economic growth. 
Arteta and Hale (2008) investigate the role of foreign credit to emerging countries’ 
private sector during the sovereign debt crises, and they find that the external 
borrowing to domestic private firms declines during debt renegotiations and 
afterward restructuring agreements, and this effect is more significant in the 
non-financial sector. In addition, only large firms which have direct access to foreign 
capital are considered. However, the credit to smaller firms from domestic banks is 
also deteriorated, since the credit from domestic banks becomes more competitive 
according to less foreign credit to large firms. A decline in foreign credit as the 
impact of sovereign debt crisis may harm the total credit to the private sector in the 
economy. 
It is generally believed that improving a country’s financing costs and sovereign risk 
level conduces to increasing foreign capital inflows and improving the development 
in the private sector through domestic credit markets. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
assert that the foreign capital flows are influenced by sovereign default risk, which is 
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typically indicated by sovereign CDS spreads. Recent studies have also found that 
sovereign default risk can capture various fundamentals of a country’s debt solvency 
and macroeconomic environment such as debt outstanding, economic growth, etc., 
(Cantor and Packer (1996), Afonso (2003) and Mora (2006)). 
Kim and Wu (2008) analyse the impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial 
market developments and foreign capital inflows in emerging markets. The results 
for long-term and short-term ratings are quite different. Both foreign and domestic 
currency long-term ratings stimulate the developments of domestic stock and 
banking sectors, but only foreign currency long-term ratings have positive influence 
on foreign capital inflows, such as FDI. On the other hand, short-term ratings in both 
foreign and local currency deteriorate foreign capital inflows and domestic financial 
markets, since the improvement in short-term ratings prevent holding more costly 
long-term sovereigns which represent long-term financial stability. The authors 
further indicate that sovereign credit ratings are not used in this study to measure the 
impacts of sovereign default risk on the credit risk of the banking sector, considering 
the ambiguous impacts on domestic credit markets. 
On the other hand, Harrison and McMillan (2003) argue that although foreign direct 
investment brings more capital to the economy, domestic firms may be more credit 
constrained if foreign firms crowd local firms in the domestic credit markets. The 
reason is that foreign firms are more liquid, and domestic banks might invest them 
more as they are less risky investors. Although Harrison and McMillan's (2003) data 
from Ivory Coast might be an exceptive case, their research shows that when 
domestic credit markets are expanded, banks are encouraged to allocate credit to less 
risky firms when foreign direct investment increases. This means that banks take less 
risk when there are more foreign inflows, and they tend to expand their credit that 
may enlarge domestic credit markets. 
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Government borrowing behaviour is also an important reason that causes changes in 
the domestic and foreign credit inflows. Gelos et al. (2011) examine the factors that 
may influence the ability of government borrowing by developing countries from 
international credit markets. Except for international bonds, they also measure 
market access including syndicated bank loans, which is another form of sovereign 
borrowing in developing markets. Their empirical work covers 150 developing 
countries between from 1980 to 2000 with data from the World Developing 
Indicators (WDI) database. Their results indicate that countries with larger 
population and GDP tend to have more access to international credit markets. 
Financial vulnerability of one country is measured by average income and proportion 
of agriculture in GDP, and it is negatively correlated to the ability of access to 
international credit markets. Frequency of defaults does not significantly influences 
the access to international credit markets, but defaults have significantly negative 
impacts on market access. They also assert that larger proportion of FDI in GDP, as a 
measure of economic links with international credit markets, is generally related to 
higher sovereign access, but their empirical result that the ratio of FDI to GDP 
positively affects market access is not significant. They regard the ratio of FDI to 
GDP as the cause that affect sovereign default cost and borrowing ability, however, 
the changes in FDI generally follow the changes in sovereign default risk, which is 
the measure of government borrowing capabilities, according to the large amount of 
literature (Drudi and Giordano (2000), Arteta and Hale (2008) and Kim and Wu 
(2008)). 
2.2.3. Exposure of Financial Sector to Sovereign Default Risk 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) indicate that 
the common creditor is the main transmission channel of spillover effects of 
sovereign defaults. When the sovereign default risk is higher in one country, banks 
have to adjust the credit expansion, recapitalise and lend less according to the lower 
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equity. This can deteriorate the financial condition of other countries that borrow 
from the same creditors. From the opposite, when a sovereign has higher credit 
ratings, banks of that country are more willing to allocate more credits to the 
borrowers from other countries, and the financial position of other countries can be 
improved. These increased credits can make the sovereign debt even more 
competitive and further reduce the sovereign default risks. 
The performance of banking sector may reflect the outlook of economic growth. 
Changes in the macroeconomic environment may turn into changes in performance 
of private sector, thus cause changes in banking loans and banking credit risk. 
Indicators of sovereign default risk, such as sovereign CDS spreads and government 
bond yields, have impacts on expectation of foreign investors and cause changes in 
foreign capital inflows and domestic credit markets, thus influence the fund 
sufficiency and performance of domestic private sectors. Favourable macroeconomic 
environment is followed by higher quality of bank loans indicated by better solvency 
of bank loans, less non-performing loans and lower probability of default, etc. If 
macroeconomic growth slows down, the increasing indebtedness of private sector 
could cause banking performance worse and cause banking credit risk higher. 
Banking performance is one of the important factors in the risk transfer mechanism 
as discussed in Section 2.2.1. According to the study of Festic et al. (2011), the 
performance of the banking sector is procyclical to the economic growth, 
representing the overheating of the economy. When there is a slowdown in economic 
activity, the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, which demonstrates the quality of 
bank loans, is likely to increase. In their empirical results, economy activity such as 
export and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is negatively correlated to future 
NPL ratio of banks. FDI in non-financial sector is positively correlated to economic 
activity, since a decline in FDI in non-financial sector may deteriorate the production 
of private sector and therefore slow down the economic growth rate, and it is likely 
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to be positive correlated to the NPL ratio of banks. In addition, foreign direct 
investment in financial sector and real estate, as the opposite side, is tested to be 
positively related to future NPL ratio. Changes in the macroeconomic environment 
can be translated into changes in the private sector. Favourable macroeconomic 
environment conduces to decreasing the indebtedness of the private sector, which 
lowers the probability of default and the share of non-performing loans (NPL) to 
total loans in the banking sector. 
Banking default risk increases when firms borrowing from banks may not fulfil their 
payment to the banks. General default risk, or systemic risk, refers to the risk 
generated from macroeconomic conditions. Insfrán Pelozo (2008) indicates that 
governments can make positive efforts on reducing the systemic risk faced by banks. 
Increasing government investments can reduce the overall risk of the whole 
economy and increase the probability of repayment of domestic firms, and thus the 
problem of credit crunch can be relieved. Credit crunch arises especially when 
foreign credit investments decrease sharply and domestic financial system cannot 
supply sufficient funds to domestic investors or firms. On the other hand, when the 
government has large debt burdens and high default risk, its capability is low to 
reduce market failures in providing investments in the financial markets and improve 
solvency for the financial sector. 
Recent banking studies research on the relation between banking credit risk and the 
business cycle for purpose of analysing macro financial stability, and banks’ 
portfolio riskiness is procyclical. Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009) examine the 
asymmetric behaviour of procyclical banking credit risk over different phases of the 
business cycle. Festic et al. (2011) assume that banks’ credit expansion and the NPL 
ratio are procyclical within a business cycle. Banks tend to have credit expansion 
and have lower capital ratio during economic upturns. Banks take precautionary 
measures when they expect the possibility of write-offs and provisions and have 
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higher capital ratio. 
Risk is accumulated during economic upturns but realised during downturns (Borio 
et al. (2002)). The macroeconomic environment can be described by GDP growth, 
exports, asset prices, foreign investment, and unemployment rate, etc. Economic 
booms are accompanied by rapid credit expansion, excessive capital inflows and 
high levels of investment and export growth, and credit risk is accumulated to be 
higher during upturns. From the demand side, firms raise credit demand from the 
banking sector to enlarge production, and households want to borrow more to 
purchase more goods. From the supply side, banks expand more credits to the firms 
and households. But during economic recessions, banks tend to prepare more capital 
for the possibility of loan defaults by the private sector. For this reason, the impacts 
of macroeconomic factors on banks’ credit expansion and loan performance are 
procyclical (Kiss et al. (2006) and Sirtaine and Skamnelos (2007)). Domestic banks 
may face the liquidity problems when there is a sudden withdrawal of deposits. 
Economic recessions can be caused by sudden decrease in foreign capital inflows 
according to changes in domestic interest rates, financial market balance or investors’ 
confidence. If domestic banks borrow in foreign currency and lend in local currency, 
a sudden depreciation may lead to higher debt burdens for domestic firms that can 
increase the credit risk and deteriorate the performance of the banking sector (Borio 
et al. (2002)). 
Maltritz (2010) investigates the interrelation between banking crises and country 
defaults using the case of Hungary. His research indicates that the banking crises 
arise because of the shortage of the government funds for debt service payments and 
the high outstanding debt burdens, rather than problems in the domestic banks. The 
problems in the domestic banks only influence the crises marginally, since compared 
to the debt service payments for the whole economy, and the payments for 
bailing-out the banking sector are unconsidered.  
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In the thesis, the interrelation between country default risk and banking default risk 
is analysed for the European countries. The reason of the contagious effect during 
the European sovereign debt crisis may not be from the domestic country, but spilled 
over from the country that has severe debt burdens such as Greece. The research of 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) also convince this reason. They analyse the spillover 
effects of credit rating announcements, and asserts that the level of spillover effect of 
positive announcements is influenced by non-event countries’ credit ratings, and the 
level of spillover effect of negative announcements is influenced by the event 
country’s credit rating. Moreover, Durbin and Ng (2005) investigate the question of 
“sovereign ceiling”, which considers whether government bonds are creditworthy 
than firm bonds. The results show that several firms’ bonds are traded at lower 
spreads than government bonds, indicating that investors do not apply the “sovereign 
ceiling” all the time. Those firms that do not apply the “sovereign ceiling” tend to 
generate substantial export earnings or have close relationships to foreign firms or to 
the government. Corporate risk is more correlated to government risk in markets that 
have higher overall default risk. Their research analyses how government risk affects 
the firms’ asset pricing in emerging markets. Firms of the private sector constitute a 
major portion of economic growth, thus it is extremely necessary to research on the 
factors that drive firms’ risk, such as financial distress or government default risk. 
Recently, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) analyse both sovereign and bank CDS premia 
after the bailout packages were announced by the euro area governments in 2008. 
They get to the conclusion that government CDS spreads increased and bank CDS 
spreads decreased, indicating that the bailout packages relieved the banking crises 
for the moment but increased the government debt burdens. 
2.2.4. Measures of Default Risk 
Studies have shown that sovereign CDS spreads can measure foreign investors’ risk 
preference and domestic economic environment. According to Ismailescu and 
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Kazemi (2010), investors can make decisions according to the same public 
information that would lead to the changes in CDS spreads prior to a rating 
announcement. The authors examine the response of sovereign CDS spreads to the 
announcements of credit ratings using data from emerging countries, and an 
asymmetric response is found. Announcements of improvement in credit ratings 
contribute more information than announcements of deterioration, and this indicates 
the anticipation effect of negative announcements that causes CDS market prior to 
credit ratings. Investors may use adjustments in sovereign CDS spreads to estimate 
the rating announcements, especially the negative announcements. 
Hull et al. (2004) analyse the relationship between the CDS market and rating events. 
Their empirical research indicates that CDS spread changes conditional on rating 
events, and downgrade announcement and negative outlooks do not have helpful 
information. On the other hand, both changes and levels of CDS spread contain 
significant information in estimating the probability of negative rating events. They 
also reach the less significant results on positive rating announcements, and the fact 
is likely to accounts for the results that positive rating events are far fewer than 
negative rating events. 
Banks’ CDS spreads may indicate banking credit risk from three risk sources 
including idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and liquidity risk. Düllmann and 
Sosinska (2007) explore the CDS spreads of the German banks, and their empirical 
analysis exhibits significant results that banks’ CDS spreads can reflect the three 
sources of banking credit risk. Particularly, systematic risk accounts for higher 
percentage of the explained variation of CDS spreads than the other two risk sources. 
The market index and the swap spread
4
 are considered to measure systematic risk. 
Systematic risk, or market risk, is the risk associated with aggregate market returns. 
Higher market returns are generally associated with declining risk premia, and 
                                                             
4
 The swap spread is a proxy for the credit risk-free interest rate which is measured by the difference 
between the European interest rate swap rate and German government zero-bond rate. 
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reflect investors’ higher expectations of economic environment and lower levels of 
risk aversion. Thus smaller CDS spreads indicate lower levels of systematic risk. 
To conclude, CDS spreads are preferred by most researchers, and in this thesis, 
series of CDS spreads of sovereign countries and financial institutions are applied as 
well, in order to capture the default risk of the public and financial sectors. 
2.3. Investor Sentiment 
Following the above literature, it is found that default probabilities and recovery 
capability of economies vary through business cycles (Acharya et al. (2011)). 
Changes in sovereign default risk of countries could have contagious influence on 
each other via changing the supply and demand of foreign credit, since investors' 
perceptions are responsive to market instability (Drudi and Giordano (2000), Dooley 
and Verma (2001) and Tomz and Wright (2008)). It is essential to investigate the 
interactions of countries' default risk so that to foresee the risk transmission 
cross-country and to prevent further deterioration. 
The main objective in the final empirical chapter is to investigate the functional 
cointegrated relationship between two series of sovereign default risk of the 
Eurozone countries via a functional coefficient, which is the investor sentiment in 
the two countries, since investor sentiment is the most important determinant of 
default risk (Tang and Yan (2010)).  
Previous research has employed the composite index of investor sentiment, the 
Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index or the University of Michigan's 
Consumer Sentiment Index when analysing the U.S. market (see Baker and Wurgler 
(2006), Chung et al. (2012), Ho and Hung (2012), Mclean and Zhao (2012) and Tang 
and Yan (2010)), however, such indices are not available for the European market. 
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Ho and Hung (2012) apply Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) developed by the 
European Commission for the European countries, and the final empirical chapter of 
this thesis also uses CCI as one of the sentiment measures. The CCI is based on 
harmonised surveys for different sectors of the countries in the European Union 
(EU). 
For the high frequency data, the put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) and the put-call 
open interest ratio (PCO) are also used, which are introduced in the work of Wang et 
al. (2006). PCV is the ratio of trading volume of put options to call options, and PCO 
is the ratio of open interest of put to call options. Since market participants buy put 
options when they are pessimistic of the market, the PCV or the PCV ratio goes up 
indicating higher mispricing of the assets. 
Recent literature on the dynamics of countries' default risk and other financial 
variables has focused on nonlinear regime models with parametric specifications 
such as threshold models and others with structural breaks. This study however, uses 
an alternative model by allowing the coefficients of linear structures to be functional 
following the methodology by Banerjee and Pitarakis (2013). Such models with 
semiparametric specifications are generally referred as functional coefficient models, 
which can avoid the problematic nature of the nonparametric structures such as 
spurious correlation (see Granger and Newbold (1974)). 
For countries' investor sentiment, the study applies three measures, which are 
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) and 
put-call open interest ratio (PCO). Behavioural theories suggest that market 
optimism or pessimism or fluctuations in the economic environment could make 
asset prices deviate from their intrinsic values (see Chung et al (2012), De Long et al 
(1990) and Kumar and Lee (2006)). Recent financial economists have indicated that 
investor sentiment is an important factor which affects the returns and volatility of 
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assets, especially for the stock market. Previous research has shown that the 
mispricing is corrected when the economic fundamental are revealed and is reflected 
in sentiment directly. This suggests the predictive power of investor sentiment for 
pricing correction. 
When recent European sovereign debt crisis develops, more and more attention has 
been concentrated at the pricing correction power on credit spreads, as credit default  
swap spreads measure the default risk of an entity. Tang and Yan (2010) have 
concluded through empirical analysis on corporate CDS spreads that investor 
sentiment is the most important determinant of default risk. 
The investigation in the final empirical chapter contributes to the application of 
investor sentiment in analysing the pricing correction of sovereign default risk. More 
specifically, for the application of the model, the gap of the default risk between the 
benchmark country and the other European country changes during the crises, and 
the functional coefficients of investor sentiment measure the mispricing of the 
default risk of the underlying country and the adjustment speed for the country to 
close this gap. The results show that, during crisis periods, the pricing correction 
power of the sovereign default risk is weaker for most countries towards a relatively 
stable level. 
2.4. Conclusion 
Overall, this chapter reviews the literature looking at the link between the countries' 
default risk and the default risk of the domestic financial sector, and on the reasons 
why countries' default risk is contagious across countries.  
Firstly, the literature developed on default risk transfer between public and financial 
sectors has been reviewed. The risk transfer mechanism is explained, and more 
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specifically, the concept of “two-way feedback” is highlighted. The chapter further 
explains the reasons behind the risk transfer mechanism why default risk could 
transfer between the public and private sectors or even across countries. The reasons 
include foreign and domestic credit imbalance, changes in global and domestic 
economic environments, government and corporate borrowing behaviours. The 
chapter also reviews the literature on applying the concept of investor sentiment in 
this area. Moreover, different measures of default risk and investor sentiment are 
introduced. 
Recent literature has constructed models that are able to capture the risk transfer 
mechanism, most important, the research by Acharya et al. (2011) defines the 
concept of feedback effect, which indicates that default risk is able to transfer among 
sector. However, there are limitations to these researches. One is that the data periods 
used by the literature are before the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis 
(Eurozone crisis). Due to the specific characters of the Eurozone, patterns observed 
from the previous crises in other countries are not applicable anymore, suggesting 
that the Eurozone countries need different rescue policies to survive the Eurozone 
crisis. 
According to this, the main objective of this thesis is to detect the pattern of risk 
transfer among sectors. Is there any risk transfer among sectors? Furthermore, are 
there any changes in the pattern of risk transfer after certain bailout is issued? In 
Chapter 3 and 4, these questions are explored using different methodologies, and 
briefly, the main findings confirm theses questions, and also find different pattern of 
risk transfer compared to the previous literature. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE GREEK EFFECT: DEFAULT RISK TRANSFER BETWEEN 
EUROZONE SOVEREIGN AND FINANCIAL SECTORS 
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3. The Greek Effect: Default Risk Transfer between Eurozone Sovereign and 
Financial Sectors 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to understand the ways by which default risk is transferred, 
if any, between the sovereign countries and the domestic financial institutions after 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) bailouts starting with the first 
Greek bailout in May 2010. The study assesses the effectiveness of a large scale 
government bailout which aims at preventing a financial crisis from being further 
propagated into a systemic risk.  
The unsustainable Greek sovereign debt came to a brink of imminent default in early 
2010. Propagated by the Eurozone banks’ significant holdings in Greek sovereign 
debt, the “Greek crisis” contagiously affected the financial sectors and sovereign 
debts in the other Eurozone countries. Subsequently complicated by the public debt 
crises of Ireland, Portugal and Spain
5 , the “Greek crisis” was rolled into a 
fully-fledged European sovereign debt crisis (Eurozone crisis). The unprecedented 
Eurozone crisis has caused significant concerns to the policymakers. A new 
institution called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has since been 
founded by 17 Eurozone countries.
6
 The EFSF issued its first rescue package on 9 
May 2010 for up to €750 billion to ensure the financial stability of Greece (G1). This 
is then followed by the rescue packages for Ireland on 25 January 2011 (I), Portugal 
on 15 June 2011 (P) and second bailout to Greece on 21 July 2011 (G2).
7
 
                                                             
5
 The sovereign debt crisis in Ireland was triggered by Irish previous banking crisis in 2008, that the 
six state guaranteed banks financed a property bubble. The Portugal crisis was caused by the 
increased public expenses, such as high management cost and increased bonuses and wages to the 
government officers. Spain also had a housing bubble, and as the housing bubble burst out, the 
banking crisis transferred to the sovereign debt. 
6
 See Appendix 1 for details of the EFSF guarantees. 
7
 See Appendix 2 for the settlements of the bailout packages for these countries. 
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In order to assess the effect of the EFSF bailouts, the study uses two approaches to 
identify the breakpoints of the time-series of the credit default swap (CDS) spread. 
First, a commonly adopted method of observing the occurrences of historical events 
is applied (see, for example, Acharya et al. (2011) and Alter and Schüler (2012)). 
The breakpoints are identified by applying the models of Gregory and Hansen 
(1996a and 1996b) to test cointegration with regime and trend shifts. 
The analysis focuses on ten Eurozone countries including Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The study uses 
daily CDS spreads to capture default risk, and analyses the risk transfer between the 
sovereign debts and the domestic financial institutions in each country from Nov 
2007 to Oct 2012. The study examines the dynamic short- and long-term 
interdependencies between the CDS series of sovereign debts and financial 
institutions, using impulse response functions (IRFs) from bivariate vector 
autoregressive (VAR) and bivariate vector error correction (VEC) models (see Alter 
and Schüler (2012)).  
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, we use the four bailouts by the EFSF 
as the breakpoints for all the countries and investigate the changes in the default risk 
transfer in the pre- and post-bailout periods. The findings show that, prior to the first 
Greek bailout (G1), positive interdependencies exist between the default risk of the 
sovereign and financial institutions. Specifically, a shock in the sovereign CDS 
spread of a country is followed by increases in the CDS spread of the financial 
institutions in that country, and vice versa. Importantly, after G1, the default risk of 
the financial institutions loses its positive impacts on the sovereign default risk, 
while the strong and positive influences of the sovereign default risk on their 
domestic financial institutions remain. The results suggest that since the G1 bailout 
is supported by the EFSF guarantee countries, the bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in 
the two-way feedback breaks down, and the sovereign risk is transferred to the other 
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bailout guarantees. 
The strength of such effect varies across countries. The effect is most significant in 
countries that have high sovereign default risk such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). This pattern of the results indicates that the risk transfer 
occurs based on the current financial situations of the governments and the domestic 
financial sectors of the countries. Since the GIIPS countries are the main 
beneficiaries of the bailouts, the bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in the GIIPS 
countries breaks down after the bailouts, while the other bailout guarantees are still 
in the two-way feedback loop. And we call this the "Greek effect". 
Second, for later bailouts in Greece (second bailout), Ireland and Portugal, the 
findings show that the default risk transfer from the financial sector to the 
government becomes insignificant. This indicates that the first Greek bailout was 
successful in stopping risk transfer from the financial to the sovereign sector, not 
only for Greece, but also for the other countries. The policy implication from the 
evidence is that a determined large bailout, such as the first Greek bailout, is indeed 
capable of preventing the exaggeration of risk transfer from the financial to the 
sovereign sector. 
Previous studies have been focused on the other financial crises before 2010. 
Increases in sovereign default risk may reduce foreign credit to the domestic private 
sectors via a decline in credit supply and cause a decrease in aggregate demand of 
credit, since investors’ perceptions to the country default risk increase (Drudi and 
Giordano (2000), Dooley and Verma (2001) and Tomz and Wright (2008)). Kim and 
Wu (2008) analyse the impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial market 
developments, and show that the rating events stimulate the developments of 
domestic stock markets and banking sectors. On the other hand, the performance of 
financial sector may reflect the outlook of economic growth and influence the public 
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finances. An increase in the default risk of a financial institution augments the 
probability that the institution cannot fulfil its payments to other financial 
counterparties, thus a systemic financial crisis may arises. Acharya et al. (2011) use 
CDS spreads of the Eurozone countries for 2007-2010 and provide evidence that 
“two-way feedback” interdependencies exist between the sovereign and financial 
default risks. Furthermore, Alter and Schüler (2012) analyse the impacts of bank 
bailouts during the period 2007-2010 on the interdependencies between the 
sovereign and banking sectors, and conclude that the contagion disperses into 
different directions after the bank bailouts. 
The remaining part of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 explains the 
mechanism of risk transfer between the sovereign and banking sectors. Section 3.3 is 
the data description. Section 3.4 explains the estimation methodology. Section 3.5 
analyses the results of the Greek first bailout by the EFSF, and compares the results 
to the later bailouts in Greece (second bailout), Ireland and Portugal. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
3.2. Mechanism of Risk Transfer 
When a country faces financial distress, for example, high public deficit or heavy 
debt burdens, the sovereign default risk of this country raises and the sovereign debt 
devalues. In the short run, (i) for the domestic financial institutions the cost of 
holding the sovereign debt is higher, which changes the balance sheet of the financial 
institutions; (ii) for other governments that support the financially distressed country 
by providing bailout packages, the sovereign and financial sectors of the supporting 
countries also faces higher default risk for holding the devaluated sovereign debt. 
The financial systemic risk, which is the impacts of macroeconomic factors on 
banking credit risk, is procyclical to the business cycle or macroeconomic 
environment (Borio et al. (2002), Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009) and Festic, et al. 
33 
 
(2011)). In the long run, sovereign debt crises are followed by reduction in foreign 
capital inflows as investors’ awareness to the sovereign default risk increases, and 
the domestic credit becomes more expensive, which negatively affect the domestic 
economy and hence increase the default risk of the domestic financial institutions.  
When a financial institution faces financial distress, the default risk of the financial 
institution is higher. This increases the probability that it cannot fulfil the obligations 
to other financial counterparties, thus the financial counterparties could face funding 
difficulties, and their default risk is higher. Thereafter, a systemic financial crisis 
might arise and hamper the whole economy, which also deteriorate public finances, 
thus the sovereign default risk is higher. 
Acharya et al. (2011) document a “two-way feedback” effect between the financial 
sector and the sovereign sector, suggesting positive interdependences between the 
default risks of the two sectors. The theoretical explanation is that the government 
can issue a bailout via increase in taxation or dilution of existing government debt. 
However, such bailout is costly, and the increased taxation could aggregate the 
default risk transfer from the public to the private sectors. This means domestic 
bailouts can drive the public-to-private risk transfer into a vicious two-way feedback 
loop. In the research the findings show that, before the first Greek bailout issued by 
the EFSF, the responses of sovereign default risk to the shocks in the financial 
sectors are positive, and vice versa. 
After the government intervenes, government guarantees to the financial sector 
increase, thus changes in the sovereign default risk have direct impact on the 
perceived default risk of the financial sector. Also because the financial institutions 
might receive rescue capital from their governments, the financial sector is more 
sensitive to the credit health of their governments. Hence, the sensitivity of the 
financial institutions’ default risk to the sovereign default risk is expected to increase. 
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On the other hand, the default risk is transferred from the financial sector to the 
government sector when the government has taken over the debt burdens of the 
financial institutions. In the long run, a decline in the default risk of the financial 
sector may result in healthier economy and improve the public finances; in the short 
run, however, the relieved default risk of the financial institutions may lead to higher 
probability of government default in the future.  
The research also observes that after the first Greek bailout, in general, while the 
default risk transfer from the public to the private sectors remain positive, the 
private-to-public risk transfer becomes either negatively negative or insignificant.  
Acharya et al. (2011) indicate that in order to get rid of the two-way feedback loop, 
the government can take strategic default, which means that the government 
sacrifices its credit rating to maintain the economic growth and stability of the 
financial sector. In case of the Eurozone crisis, after a country, such as Greece, starts 
the application of the EFSF bailouts, the bailouts issued to maintain that country’s 
financial sector are actually shared by other EFSF guarantees, such as Germany, or 
even by the whole Eurozone in the short run. The Greek government has received 
the bailout from the EFSF guarantees without sacrificing its own sovereign debt or 
increasing taxation. Thus, instead of Greece taking over the debt of the financial 
sector, the default risk gets transferred to other Eurozone countries. Hence, the 
bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in this two-way feedback loop breaks down after the 
EFSF bailouts issued. From Figure 3.1, it is obvious to see that the sovereign CDS 
spreads for all the ten Eurozone countries increase in a few days just after the first 
Greek bailout. This is defined as the “Greek effect”. 
It is expected that the outcome of the bailouts is heterogeneous among the European 
countries. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) report that the states of the financial system 
at the beginning of the financial crisis have strong explanatory power for the 
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private-to-public risk transfer, and that an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
member is more sensitive to the health of its pre-crisis financial system. So the 
private-to-public transfer was influenced in Ireland, Portugal and Spain during the 
first Greek bailout, but not in other countries such as Germany and France which 
have more stable financial system. 
The result of this Greek effect is the vanishing two-way feedback effect which is not 
observed when Ireland and Portugal received bailouts from the EFSF later. This is 
because the default risk had already been priced during the first Greek bailout. This 
reflects the perception of market participants that these countries may also request 
and would be granted bailouts from the EFSF in the future. Thus the price of the 
default has been adjusted after the first Greek bailout. 
3.3. Data Description 
The analysis uses CDS spreads to capture credit default risk of an institution, or the 
government. Studies have shown that CDS spreads can measure investors’ risk 
preference. According to Hull et al. (2004), both changes and levels of CDS spread 
contain significant information in estimating the probability of rating events, but 
CDS spread changes conditional on rating events, and downgrade announcements 
and negative outlooks do not have helpful information. Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010) analyse the relationship between the sovereign CDS spreads and the 
sovereign credit ratings, and show that investors can make decisions according to the 
same public information that would lead to the changes in CDS spreads prior to a 
rating announcement. Düllmann and Sosinska (2007) analyse the CDS spreads of 
banks, and document that banks’ CDS spreads indicate banking credit risk from three 
risk sources including idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and liquidity risk. 
The daily data of CDS spreads is collected from Thomson Reuters CDS. The 
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selection of financial institution and sovereign CDS series was restricted by data 
availability. 10 Eurozone countries are analysed, including Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands 
(NL), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES) (see Panel A of Appendix 3)
8
, together with 
their domestic financial institutions (40 financial institutions in total, see Panel B of 
Appendix 3). The CDS series of the financial institutions are chosen according to the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of the institutions (major groups 60-67, 
including Finance, Insurance, and Real Estates), respectively. Most of the financial 
sector constituents of the iTraxx Europe index (13 out of 25) are covered by the data 
set, which indicates that the financial institutions chosen are representative of the 
financial sectors of these Eurozone countries.  
The study uses five-year CDS, since it is the largest and the most liquid constituent 
of the CDS markets. The restructuring type of the sovereign CDS series is Complete 
Restructuring (CR), as it is the only restructuring clause applied by the sovereign 
CDS series. The restructuring type of the financial institutions is 
“Modified-Modified” (MM) Restructuring. The former restructuring clause, 
Modified Restructuring (MR), had been too severe in its limitation of 60-month 
deliverable obligations, and the MM restructuring clause has been introduced and 
applied by the European market participants since 2003. 
The data set used to test the first Greek bailout starts from 13 November 2007 until 
17 February 2012. The Greek CDS series stops on 17 February 2012, after Greek 
debt restructuring triggered approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection payout on 
Greek sovereign debt in early March 2012. The CDS series for other countries 
extends until 08 October 2012. 
                                                             
8
We intend to cover the 17 Eurozone guarantees of the EFSF, from which Cyprus, Estonia, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia are excluded because of no data of corporate CDS series available, Luxemburg is 
excluded as no data of sovereign CDS series provided, Malta is excluded as neither corporate nor 
sovereign CDS series available, and Finland is excluded because of no CDS series data of financial 
institutions available. 
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The study investigates the interdependence of the sovereign and the financial 
institution CDS series in two sub-periods. The first stage starts from 13 November 
2007 until 7 May 2010 and contains 649 observations for each CDS series. On 9 
May 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) set out the first bailout 
package to Greece worth up to €750 billion aimed at rescuing financial stability 
across the European countries. The second stage starts from 10 May 2010 after the 
first rescue package set out, and it ends on 17 February 2012 before the second 
bailout package worth €130 billion approved by the Eurozone countries together 
with the IMF and the Institute of International Finance. 
The dataset has been separated into two groups. One group includes the countries 
that have requested for the bailout funding from the EFSF or have been facing severe 
default risk, i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). The other group 
is constituted of the other guarantees of the EFSF that have contributed the most to 
the bailouts, i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands (non-GIIPS). 
Figure 3.1 shows the sovereign CDS spreads for each of the ten countries in the 
sample. The bailout periods for Greece (first (G1) and second (G2) bailouts), Ireland 
(I) and Portugal (P) are displayed. Before February 2010, the sovereign CDS spreads 
of all the countries remain low and stable. The sovereign CDS spreads of the GIIPS 
countries continue to increase after the first Greek bailout (G1). But since the second 
Greek bailout (G2), except the Greek sovereign CDS spreads remaining high, the 
sovereign CDS spreads of the other four countries have started to come down. 
[Insert Figure 3.1] 
Panel A, B and C of Figure 3.2 visually display the co-movement of the sovereign 
CDS spreads and the CDS spreads of domestic financial institutions in Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, respectively. The CDS spreads of the institutions increase after 
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the Greek first bailout (G1) reaching the peak at the second Greek bailout (G2). 
[Insert Figure 3.2] 
Appendix 4 shows the summary statistics of the CDS spreads of the sovereign debts 
and the financial institutions for the ten countries. In general, the sovereign CDS 
spreads of the GIIPS countries are much higher than the sovereign CDS spreads of 
non-GIIPS countries, which indicates that the GIIPS countries have been suffering 
severe sovereign default risk during the Eurozone crisis. 
3.4. Estimation Methodology 
This part first explains the method by Gregory and Hansen (1996a and 1996b), 
which is used in the research to select break points for the whole dataset. Next the 
study constructs bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) and bivariate vector error 
correction (VEC) models as proposed by Alter and Schüler (2011) in order to 
examine the dynamic short- and long-run interdependency of the sovereign and 
financial institutions' CDS series. Except for the cointegration analysis, impulse 
response functions (IRFs) are also included to capture the dynamic relationship 
between the CDS series. 
3.4.1. Determining Break Points 
The study carries out the empirical analysis in two sub-periods: before and after the 
EFSF bailouts. Prior to the VAR and VEC model analyses, the study applies the 
models of Gregory and Hansen (1996a and 1996b) to check the rationality to set 
sub-periods according to certain bailouts. 
The model by Gregory and Hansen (1996a and 1996b) treats the timing of a 
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structural change as unknown. The structural change would be reflected in changes 
in the intercept and /or the slope coefficients, and a dummy variable is defined to 
model the structural change: 

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where the unknown parameter )1,0(  denotes the timing of the break point, and 
[ ] denotes integer part. Structural change can take several forms where the intercept, 
slope, and/or trend coefficients change at unknown timing: 
Model 1: Level shift (C) 
.,,1,,21, ntecdscds ttSovttFi 
                        (3.1) 
Model 2: Level shift with trend (C/T) 
.,,1,,21, ntecdstcds ttSovttFi 
                    (3.2) 
Model 3: Regime shift (C/S) 
.,,1,,2,121, ntecdscdscds tttSovtSovttFi 

            (3.3) 
Model 4: Regime and trend shift (C/S/T) 
.,,1,,2,12121, ntecdscdsttcds tttSovtSovtttFi 

     (3.4) 
where cdsj,t with j ∈ (Sov, Fi) is CDS spreads in log-levels of institution j at day t, i.e. 
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the logarithmised CDS spreads of the government (in short ‘Sov’) or a financial 
institution (in short ‘Fi’). The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration 
between the two variables in the presence of a regime shift at unknown timing. The 
ADF-, Zα-, and Zt-type tests are taken to test the null hypothesis, and the critical 
values are calculated by simulation methods. 
3.4.2. VAR and VEC Models 
Prior to estimation of the VAR and VEC models, the study tests the unit roots of the 
log-level CDS spreads and the first differences of the log levels using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with 12 lags included for the two sub-samples, 
respectively (see Appendix 5). Both trends and intercepts are included when the 
ADF tests are carried out for the log-level CDS spreads, but only intercepts are 
included when testing the first difference of the log-level variables, since a trend in 
levels turns into a constant in first differences. If the variable in log-levels is I(1), i.e., 
reject null hypothesis of unit roots in first differences and cannot reject in log-levels, 
the cointegration of the VEC framework is carried out for the variable; if the variable 
in log-levels is stationary I(0), i.e., reject null hypothesis of unit roots in log-levels, a 
VAR model for the log-level variable is applied, as the variable cannot be 
cointegrated with another stationary or non-stationary variable. 
To test the cointegration of the I(1) variables for each bivariate model, Johansen's 
trace tests are applied except for the ADF tests (see Appendix 6). If the variable in 
log-levels can be cointegrated, i.e., reject maximum rank at 0 or 1, the study 
proceeds to estimate the VEC. Moreover, the optimal lag order p in the VAR and the 
VEC models is determined by, on the one hand, minimising the common information 
criteria in the underlying VAR model of the log-levels, and on the other hand 
considering autocorrelations of the residuals and joint tests of reducing unnecessary 
lags in the models. The VEC model is estimated via Johansen's maximum likelihood 
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method and the VAR model via ordinary least squares. 
After determination of the sub-periods according to the breakpoints found and the 
actual bailout events, the study estimates the following VAR and VEC models with a 
sovereign CDS spreads (in short ‘Sov’) and a domestic financial institution's CDS 
spreads (in short ‘Fi’): 
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where cdsj,t with j ∈ (Sov, Fi) is the CDS spread in log-level of institution j at day t, 
i.e. the logarithmised CDS spread of the government or the financial institution. 
∆cdsj,t refers to the first difference of cdsj,t. v is a vector of constants. After the VEC 
model estimated, short-run Granger causality tests are taken in order to check the 
general direction of the short-run risk transfer (see Appendix 7). From the results of 
the Granger causality tests, there is no significant pattern for the GIIPS and the 
non-GIIPS countries. For example, in the case of Austria, the private-to-public and 
public-to-private causality results are all significant before and after the first Greek 
bailout. Thus, it is necessary to take impulse response functions (IRFs) to see the 
responses to the shocks in each lagged term. 
Noted that a VEC model with (p-1) lags can be represented as a VAR structure with 
p lags, this study uses impulse response functions (IRFs) of VAR models using CDS 
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spreads in log-levels. Impulse response functions (IRFs) are used to depict the 
impacts of one-time shock to a variable within one standard deviation not only on 
itself but also on other endogenous variables of current and future periods; in other 
words, IRFs trace the reactions of endogenous variables according to the changes of 
other exogenous variables in different periods. The variables generated (innovations 
or impulses) are correlated according to the above correlations of residuals for the 
bivariate VAR models, and these innovations ought to be orthogonalised. 
3.5. Empirical Findings 
3.5.1. Classification of Sub-Periods of EFSF Bailouts 
In this section, the tests (as described in section 3.4.1) by Gregory and Hansen 
(1996a and 1996b) are applied to detect structural breaks in the log-CDS series. For 
exposition purpose, the log-CDS series of gr (Greek sovereign debt) and aca (Alpha 
Bank) are used, and Table 3.1 shows the results. The results in the Zt and Zα tests 
using the C/S/T model (significant at 5% level) suggest that there is a breakpoint on 
12 May 2010, and the result in the ADF test using the C/S model (significant at 10% 
level) indicates that the breakpoint is on 21 September 2011. The date of the first 
breakpoint is very close to the first Greek bailout issued on 9 May 2010. 
[Insert Table 3.1] 
Similarly breakpoints are also examined in the CDS series of Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, and Italy using the Gregory and Hansen (1996a and 1996b) models. Table 3.2 
shows the summary of the earliest and latest breakpoints for the GIIPS countries. 
The findings show that these significant breakpoints are close to the four bailouts 
(G1, I, P G2) issued by the EFSF, indicating that the bailouts change the pattern of 
interdependencies of the default risk between the sovereign and financial sectors, 
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and it is proper to set sub-periods according to the timing of the EFSF bailouts. 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
Given that the actual bailout dates are close to the breakpoints of the CDS series, for 
the time period of the first Greek bailout, the G1 issue date (9 May 2010) is used as 
the breakpoint for the ten countries (GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries). For later EFSF 
bailouts (I, P and G2), sub-periods are set for Greece, Ireland and Portugal according 
to the country’s application and/or bailout dates, respectively. 
Five sub-periods are set for Greece (see Appendix 8). The first period, pre-bailout 
period, ends on 9 May 2010, which is the settlement date of the first tranche of the 
bailout worth €20 billion. The official request for rescue from the Greek government 
was issued on 23 April 2010, and a three-year financial aid programme (loan 
commitments) worth €110 billion was agreed on 2 May 2010 by the European Union 
(EU), European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF).9 As 
the application period before the first bailout is too short, the study includes this 
period into the pre-bailout period. The first bailout period starts from 10 May 2010 
and ends on 21 July 2011, which is the approval date of the second rescue package 
agreed by the 17 EFSF guarantees. The application period of second bailout ends on 
the date of the final agreement by the EFSF (20 February 2012), and the second 
bailout period is between the date of the final agreement and the settlement of the 
last tranche (28 June 2012). The post-bailout period follows the second bailout 
period.
10
 These breakpoints for the sub-periods are also chosen according to the 
regime shifts as shown in Table 3.2. 
                                                             
9
 The first Greek bailout programme has been discontinued, and the remaining amount (€24.4 billion 
to be disbursed by the Eurozone countries) has been transferred to the EFSF. 
10
 The sovereign CDS spread of Greece has remained unchanged due to Greek debt restructuring in 
early March 2012, thus there is no further analysis of Greek risk transfer for the bailout and 
post-bailout periods during the second Greek bailout. 
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The programme for Ireland (see Appendix 9) has been separated into four 
sub-periods. The pre-bailout period is separated into the period before application 
and the application period. The application period starts after 21 November 2010, 
which is the date of the official request by the government of Ireland, and ends 
before 25 January 2011, which is the issue date of the first tranche worth €5 billion. 
The bailout period is between the issue date of the first tranche and the settlement 
date of the final tranche on 03 April 2012, and the post-bailout period afterwards. 
The rescue programme for Portugal (see Appendix 10) is also set into four 
sub-periods, and the methodology to set sub-periods is similar to which of Ireland. 
Spain is not included in this section. Although the Spanish government issued the 
official request for financial bailout to the EFSF on 25 June 2012, the EFSF has not 
confirmed the settlement dates of bailouts. 
Tables in Appendices 8, 9 and 10 show summary statistics of daily CDS spreads of 
the sovereign debts and banking debts in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, respectively, 
before, during and after the bailout events. The Greek sovereign CDS spreads (gr) 
have kept increasing from 354.77 bps to 14904.36 bps, and on the other hand, the 
CDS spreads of banking debts (aca) have started to decrease since the second bailout 
period. This difference in the sovereign and banking CDS spreads suggests as in the 
last section, that the financial sector might have transferred part of the credit default 
risk to the sovereign balance sheets in Greece. In the research of Acharya et al. 
(2011), similar results have also been found that the sovereign CDS spreads increase, 
meanwhile the banking CDS spreads decrease in the post-bailout period of the 
previous financial crisis, using the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as the break of 
the whole period. 
The summary statistics of Ireland and Portugal (see Appendices 9 and 10) are 
different from the results of Greece. Both the banking and sovereign CDS spreads 
have kept increasing from the period of before application to the post-bailout period 
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in Ireland. For Portugal, both the banking and sovereign CDS spreads have dropped 
significantly in the post-bailout period. 
3.5.2. Default Risk Transfer during the First Greek Bailout 
Table 3.3 reports the cointegration analysis results of the GIIPS countries before and 
after the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF, respectively.  
[Insert Table 3.3] 
According to the VEC model (Equation (3.6)), βSov and βFi reveal the long-term 
relationship between the sovereign and the financial institution’s default risks. 
Normalizing βSov to 1 then get: 
0,,   tFiFitSov cdscds                                             (3.7) 
Thus a negative βFi indicates that the relationship between the two sectors is positive. 
The findings show that the βFi coefficients are significantly negative except the pair 
of ES and SAB before the bailout (see Panel A of Table 3.3), for periods before and 
after the first Greek bailout. The coefficients αSov and αFi measure the speed of 
adjustment towards the long-term relationship. The coefficients are significant and 
have opposite signs to their respective β coefficients, thus the CDS series are 
attracted back to the long-run equilibrium. Comparing Panel A and B of Table 3.3, it 
has been noticed that some α coefficients have changed from insignificant to 
significant after the first Greek bailout, i.e., the financial institutions mdb from Italy 
and bkt, pop and sab from Spain, which indicates that the CDS series of the financial 
institutions are moving towards their long-run equilibrium relationships. This 
provides some evidence to the argument that compared with the period before the 
bailout, the risk has transferred from the financial sector to the government after the 
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bailout, and the default risk of the financial institutions are more influenced by the 
sovereign default risk. 
Table 3.4 provides the results of cointegration analysis for non-GIIPS countries 
before and after the first Greek bailout, and the situation of non-GIIPS countries is 
similar that most of the βFi coefficients are significantly negative, suggesting a 
positive relationship between the sovereign and financial sectors in the long run. 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
Then the study analyses the results of impulse responses of all the countries. Table 
3.5 shows the impulse responses of the GIIPS countries in both periods before and 
after the first Greek bailout. The responses after 1, 2 and 5 days represent the 
short-term effects, and the responses after 22 days show the long-run effects. For 
example, before the first Greek bailouts, the responses of aca to the impulse in gr 
after 1, 2 and 5 days are 0.09, 0.13 and 0.18, respectively, and the response after 22 
days is 0.39. The responses of gr to the impulse in aca after 1, 2 and 5 days are 0.01, 
0.01 and 0.02, respectively, and the response after 22 days is 0.06. This pattern is 
similar across countries. Thus it is observed that, before the bailout, a two-way 
feedback effect exists between the two sectors, as most of the responses of financial 
institutions to the sovereign CDS shocks are significantly positive, and vice versa, in 
both the short and long run. The results indicate that prior to the first Greek bailout, 
changes in the sovereign default risk affect the credit default risk of the domestic 
financial institutions, and vice versa. 
[Insert Table 3.5] 
In the period after the first Greek bailout, significant effect of default risk transfer is 
observed that, in both the short and long run, the responses of the financial 
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institutions to the sovereign CDS shocks are significantly positive, and the responses 
are even larger than before. The results show that the domestic financial institutions 
are affected stronger by the shocks in sovereign default risk after the bailout. 
On the other hand, the responses of the sovereign CDS to the domestic financial 
institutions become either insignificant or significantly negative for most variables 
after the bailout. Continuing with the example, while the response of aca to the 
impulse in gr remains positive (0.08) after the first Greek bailout, the response of gr 
to the impulse in aca becomes negatively significant (-0.21). This indicates that the 
default risk transfers from the financial sector to the government after the EFSF 
interventions, and the relieved default risk of the financial institutions becomes 
heavier debt burdens to the government instead. Changes in the default risk of the 
financial institutions have negative impacts on the sovereign default risk. 
[Insert Figure 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5] 
The graphs of impulse responses between each pair of variables in Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal (see Figure 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) show the results more clearly, that after the 
first Greek bailout, in the short run, the responses of the sovereign default risks to 
their financial institutions become either close to very small values or negative. 
Table 3.6 is the results of impulse responses for the non-GIIPS countries, which have 
contributed the most of the bailout package towards the GIIPS countries. Before the 
first Greek bailout, the two-way feedback effect is not significant for some countries 
such as France and Germany, and after the first Greek bailout, the responses of the 
financial sector to the sovereign default risk are still in the same direction. This 
indicates that the governments and their domestic financial sectors are not facing 
severe debt crisis, so the governments do not have to take over the default risk from 
the financial sector. The different results of GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries provide 
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evidence to the argument that the heterogeneity of the rescue packages across the 
countries translates into the asymmetric interdependent relationship between the 
default risk of the sovereign and financial sectors. 
[Insert Table 3.6] 
The empirical results indicate that the default risk transfer might occur based on the 
current financial situations of the governments and their domestic financial sectors, 
and the capital injection directly to the financial sector might not relieve the 
sovereign debt crisis, but further magnify the impacts of sovereign default risk on 
financial sector through increasing the government debt burdens. 
The results of this study are different from the results of Acharya et al. (2011). 
Acharya et al. (2011) use the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of the Eurozone 
countries for 2007-2010 and use the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as the break of 
the whole period. They use and OLS regression to analyse the sovereign-to-banking 
risk transfer. During the pre-bailout periods, there is no sovereign-to-banking risk 
transfer, but after the bailout, there is positive risk transfer. 
In this study, however, before the first Greek bailout, the sovereign-to-financial and 
the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer have been positive, indicating that the 
countries have been entered into the feedback loop. However, after the bailout, the 
financial-to-sovereign risk transfer for the GIIPS countries becomes insignificant or 
negatively significant. Such results indicate that the GIIPS countries are the main 
beneficiaries of the bailouts, and the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer in the GIIPS 
countries breaks down after the bailouts, while the other bailout guarantees are still 
in the two-way feedback loop. Although these results are different from Acharya et 
al. (2011), they are not contrary. The data set in this research covers the periods after 
early 2011, and uses G1 (May 2010) as the breakpoint, which is after the breakpoint 
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Acharya et al. (2011) used. Thus the results of pre-bailout periods in this research is 
to some content consistent to Acharya et al. (2011), and the results make 
contributions to the period during and after the European sovereign debt crisis. 
3.5.3. Results of Bailouts of Greece (Second Bailout), Ireland and Portugal 
Table 3.7 shows the result of the impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Greek 
sovereign and banking CDS series. The results for the periods of the first bailout are 
similar to the results in Section 3.5.2, in which the responses of the financial sector 
to the shocks in the sovereign default risk are positively significant in the period 
before the first Greek bailout, and vice versa. In contrast, the responses of the 
sovereign default risk to the shocks in the financial sector become either 
insignificant or negatively significant in the short run, indicating that risk had been 
transferred from the financial sector to the government balance sheet. However, 
when analysing the results in the application period of the second Greek bailout, the 
responses of the financial sector default risk to the shocks in the sovereign default 
risk are insignificant, and so are the responses of the sovereign default risk to the 
shocks in the financial sector. Such results indicate that the risk transfer only 
happens in the period of the first Greek bailout. 
[Insert Table 3.7] 
The “Greek effect” indicates that the default risk for other countries such as Ireland 
and Portugal has been priced or perceived by the bond investors during the first 
bailout of Greece, and such default risk transfer becomes insignificant when other 
countries issue their own bailouts. Table 3.8 exhibits the result of the IRFs for the 
government and banking default risks in Ireland for the four sub-periods. The results 
are ambiguous compared to the results of Greece. In the period before the bailout 
application of Ireland, the responses of the financial sector to the shocks in the 
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government default risk are positively significant, but the responses of the 
government to the shocks in the financial sector are insignificant. However, in the 
periods of application and bailout, the responses of the financial default risk to the 
shocks in the government become either insignificant or negatively significant, while 
the responses of the government to the shocks in the financial sector remain 
insignificant, which indicate the increased debt burden to the government should 
have decreased to some extent the default risk of the financial sector. But since the 
CDS spreads of both the sovereign and banking debts have been increasing, the 
results show that the crisis in the financial sector has not been relieved after the 
bailout to the government of Ireland. In the period after bailout, the IRF results are 
similar to the results before the application period. 
[Insert Table 3.8] 
Table 3.9 is the results of the IRFs for the sovereign and banking CDS series in 
Portugal. In the period of before bailout application and the post-bailout period, the 
responses of banking default risk to the shocks in the government default risk are 
positively significant, while the responses of the government default risk to the 
shocks in the financial sector are all insignificant. However, in both the application 
and bailout periods, the responses of the financial sector to the shocks in the 
sovereign default risk become insignificant, and vice versa. 
[Insert Table 3.9] 
When sub-periods are reset for Ireland and Portugal according to their own bailouts 
received, respectively, the default risk transfer from the banking sector to the 
government is not significant, compared to the results in Section 3.5.2, in which 
section the analysis set the same two sub-periods for all the countries based on the 
first Greek bailout. The risk transfer from the financial sector to the sovereign 
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default risk is significant to the countries that have potential defaults, only when the 
first Greek bailout is issued. Such difference indicates that the risk of default had 
already been priced for Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Given the Greek experience, 
bond investors have perceived that for these countries in the future, might also 
request and sequentially receive the bailouts from the EFSF guarantees. For Ireland, 
Portugal, the transfer of risk of default in the banking sector to the government 
default risk was priced after the Greek bailout approved. Thus by the time these 
countries requested their own bailouts, such effect disappears. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the default risk transfer between the sovereign and the 
financial institutions’ CDS series during the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. 
The results show that before the first Greek bailout by the EFSF in May 2010, 
two-way feedback effects exist between the two sectors in both the short and the 
long runs. After the first Greek bailout, the shocks in the financial institutions’ CDS 
spreads either exert significantly negative impacts on the sovereign CDS spreads or 
lose their influences. 
The study further analyses the effect of default risk transfer in Greece (second 
bailout), Ireland and Portugal, and set sub-periods according to the bailouts to these 
three countries by the EFSF. The findings show that the transmissions of default risk 
from the financial sector to sovereign debt in each of the three countries are 
insignificant both before and after each of the bailouts. The default risk transfer is 
significant only when the first Greek bailout was issued. The transmission of default 
risk disappeared when the other countries requested for their own bailouts. This is 
called the “Greek effect”. The implication of the findings is that the first bailout by 
the EFSF to Greece helps alleviate the financial systemic risk and break the 
private-to-public risk transfer. Since the investors perceived the forthcoming bailouts 
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to the GIIPS countries, the EFSF has actually become the central bank of the whole 
Eurozone, and the default risk dropped in one single country will be shared in the 
long run by all the Eurozone countries. 
There are limitations to the EFSF bailout programme, as the EFSF only raises funds 
after an official aid request is made by a country. The EFSF funds are given to the 
governments, which in turn bailout individual institutions in the country, leading 
increases in the government default risk. The EFSF has been improved to the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a permanent bailout funding programme, and 
the current Spanish bailout has been passed on to the ESM in early 2013. The funds 
by the ESM are transferred in the form of ESM notes to individual banks through 
FROB, and these banks have been confirmed to receive certain amounts according to 
the bailout scheme. Further research could also be focused on the Spanish case in 
order to make comparison of different bailout policies. 
53 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Sovereign CDS Spreads for Ten Countries 
Four settlement dates of bailouts by the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as G1, I, P, and G2. 
The first Greek bailout is on 9 May 2010 (G1), and Greece officially requested for the second bailout on 21 
July 2011 (G2). The settlement date of the tranche of Irish bailout is on 25 January 2011 (I), and for Portugal 
is on 15 June 2011 (P). Since Greek debt restructuring triggered approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection 
payouts on Greek sovereign debt in early March 2012, the sovereign CDS spread of Greece has remained 
unchanged. 
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Panel A. CDS Spreads of Greek Sovereign Debt and Domestic Financial Institution 
 
Panel B. CDS Spreads of Irish Sovereign Debt and Domestic Financial Institutions 
 
Panel C. CDS Spreads of Portugal Sovereign Debt and Domestic Financial Institutions 
 
Figure 3.2. CDS Spreads for Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
Four settlement dates of EFSF bailouts to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as G1, I, P, and G2. The 
first Greek bailout is on 9 May 2010 (G1), and Greece officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 
2011 (G2). The settlement date of the tranche of Irish bailout is on 25 January 2011 (I), and for Portugal is on 
15 June 2011 (P). Since Greek debt restructuring triggered approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection 
payouts on Greek sovereign debt in early March 2012, the sovereign CDS spread of Greece has remained 
unchanged. The three-letter variables represent domestic financial institutions in the corresponding country. 
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Panel A. IRFs for Greek before the First Greek Bailout 
 
Panel B. IRFs for Greek after the First Greek Bailout 
 
Figure 3.3. Impulse Response Function for Greece before and after the First Greek Bailout 
The solid blue lines are impulse responses of the financial institution to the shocks in its country sovereign 
debt, and the solid red lines are impulse responses of the sovereign debt to the shocks in the domestic 
financial institutions. Dotted lines are the 95% confident intervals. Upper graph shows the impulse responses 
between the pair before the first Greek bailout, and the lower graph shows the impulse responses after the 
first Greek bailout. The two-letter variable indicates the sovereign debt, and the three-letter variable is a 
domestic financial institution. 
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Panel A. IRFs for Ireland (ie-aib) before and after the First Greek Bailout 
 
Panel B. IRFs for Ireland (ie-bki) before and after the First Greek Bailout 
 
 
Panel C. IRFs for Ireland (ie-ipm) before and after the First Greek Bailout 
 
Figure 3.4. Impulse Response Function for Ireland before and after the First Greek Bailout 
The solid blue lines are impulse responses of the financial institution to the shocks in its country sovereign 
debt, and the solid red lines are impulse responses of the sovereign debt to the shocks in the domestic 
financial institutions. Dotted lines are the 95% confident intervals. Left graphs show the impulse responses 
between the pair before the first Greek bailout, and the graphs on the right side show the impulse responses 
after the first Greek bailout. The two-letter variable indicates the sovereign debt, and the three-letter variable 
is a domestic financial institution. 
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Panel A. IRFs for Portugal (pt-bcp) before and after the First Greek Bailout 
 
Panel B. IRFs for Portugal (pt-bes) before and after the First Greek Bailout 
 
Figure 3.5. Impulse Response Function for Portugal before and after the First Greek Bailout 
The solid blue lines are impulse responses of the financial institution to the shocks in its country sovereign 
debt, and the solid red lines are impulse responses of the sovereign debt to the shocks in the domestic 
financial institutions. Dotted lines are the 95% confident intervals. Left graphs show the impulse responses 
between the pair before the first Greek bailout, and the graphs on the right side show the impulse responses 
after the first Greek bailout. The two-letter variable indicates the sovereign debt, and the three-letter variable 
is a domestic financial institution. 
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Table 3.1. Testing Cointegration of gr and aca with Regime Shifts 
The table shows an example of test for cointegration of two variables, the Greek sovereign debt (gr) and 
Alpha Bank (aca). The test statistics with 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. The breakpoints show the positions of the smallest test statistics in the whole time period, and 
the exact dates are shown if the estimates are significant. C, C/T, C/S, and C/S/T are tests for models with 
level shift, level shift with trend, regime shift, and regime shift with trend, respectively. 
Model 1: Level shift (C) 
.,,1,,21, ntecdscds ttSovttFi 
                        
Model 2: Level shift with trend (C/T) 
.,,1,,21, ntecdstcds ttSovttFi 
   
Model 3: Regime shift (C/S) 
.,,1,,2,121, ntecdscdscds tttSovtSovttFi 

   
Model 4: Regime and trend shift (C/S/T) 
.,,1,,2,12121, ntecdscdsttcds tttSovtSovtttFi 

   
  Test stat. Breakpoint Date 
ADF 
   
C -4.06 (0.27)  
C/T -3.97 (0.27)  
C/S -4.85
*
 (0.85) 21-09-2011 
C/S/T -5.02 (0.81) 
 
Zt 
  
 
C -3.8 (0.85)  
C/T -4.1 (0.85)  
C/S -4.49 (0.85)  
C/S/T -5.55
**
 (0.37) 12-05-2010 
Za 
  
 
C -28.65 (0.85)  
C/T -35.22 (0.85)  
C/S -31.04 (0.85)  
C/S/T -60.6
**
 (0.37) 12-05-2010 
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Table 3.2. Summary of Earliest and Latest Breakpoints for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy 
The table shows the exact dates of the significant breakpoints tested by the C, C/T, C/S, and/or C/S/T models. 
The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
corresponding domestic financial institutions. 
Model 1: Level shift (C) 
.,,1,,21, ntecdscds ttSovttFi 
                        
Model 2: Level shift with trend (C/T) 
.,,1,,21, ntecdstcds ttSovttFi 
   
Model 3: Regime shift (C/S) 
.,,1,,2,121, ntecdscdscds tttSovtSovttFi 

   
Model 4: Regime and trend shift (C/S/T) 
.,,1,,2,12121, ntecdscdsttcds tttSovtSovtttFi 

   
Variables Earliest breakpoint Latest breakpoint 
gr aca 12-05-2010 21-09-2011 
ie aib 09-12-2010 09-12-2010 
ie bki 25-11-2010 29-12-2010 
ie ipm 29-12-2010 09-08-2011 
pt bcp 21-12-2009 21-12-2009 
pt bes 11-12-2009 04-01-2010 
es bkt 30-11-2009 10-03-2011 
es pop 06-11-2009 11-01-2011 
es sab 06-11-2009 06-11-2009 
es san 21-01-2010 12-01-2011 
it bci 20-12-2010 11-01-2011 
it pii 11-01-2011 24-01-2011 
it bmp 23-06-2010 17-08-2010 
it gas 21-01-2010 20-12-2010 
it mdb 17-12-2010 24-01-2011 
it ubi 29-04-2010 13-09-2010 
it uni 27-12-2010 11-01-2011 
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Table 3.3. Cointegration Analysis of GIIPS Countries 
The table shows the results from the following cointegration model: 
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The table only presents the cointegration analysis for the bi-variables that are tested to be cointegrated in the 
Johansen’s trace tests. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. Sov indicates a sovereign debt, 
and Fi indicates a financial institution from the country. The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of 
sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic financial institutions. β_Sov is set as 1. β 
coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, and the α coefficients are 
adjustment speeds of the two variables towards their long-term relationships. 
 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
Country Sov Fi α_Sov α_Fi β_Fi Constant 
Greece gr aca -0.00 0.02* -0.83* -0.24 
Ireland 
ie aib - - - - 
ie bki 0.00 0.01* -3.30* 13.81 
ie ipm 0.00* 0.00* -10.03* 51.93 
Italy 
it bci - - - - 
it mdb -0.01* 0.00 -0.89* -0.79 
it bmp - - - - 
it pii 0.00* 0.00* -21.98* 96.60 
it uni - - - - 
it ubi - - - - 
it gas - - - - 
Portugal 
pt bcp 0.00 0.02* -1.41* 2.45 
pt bes 0.00 0.01* -1.56* 3.47 
Spain 
es bbv - - - - 
es bkt -0.03* 0.02 -0.42* -6.25 
es pop -0.02* 0.00 -0.29* -1.99 
es sab -0.00* -0.00 3.59* -24.48 
es san - - - - 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
Panel B. After first Greek bailout 
Country Sov Fi α_Sov α_Fi β_Fi Constant 
Greece gr aca -0.01 0.01* -2.08* 7.13 
Ireland 
ie aib 0.01 0.02* -1.30* 2.83 
ie bki - - - - 
ie ipm - - - - 
Italy 
it bci -0.01 0.02* -0.85* -0.99 
it mdb -0.01 0.04* -0.90* -0.66 
it bmp 0.00 0.02* -1.13* 0.97 
it pii -0.03* -0.01 -0.68* -1.83 
it uni -0.01 0.01 -0.92* -0.50 
it ubi -0.03* 0.02 -0.95* -0.28 
it gas 0.00 0.02* -1.08* 0.25 
Portugal 
pt bcp -0.00 0.02* -1.05* 0.63 
pt bes 0.01* 0.01* -1.99* 6.84 
Spain 
es bbv - - - - 
es bkt -0.04* 0.05* -0.58* -2.18 
es pop -0.06* 0.05* -0.58* -2.10 
es sab -0.03 0.03* -0.61* -1.98 
es san - - - - 
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Table 3.4. Cointegration Analysis of Non-GIIPS Countries 
The table shows the results from the following cointegration model: 
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The table only presents the cointegration analysis for the bi-variables that are tested to be cointegrated in the 
Johansen’s trace tests. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. Sov indicates a sovereign debt, 
and Fi indicates a financial institution from the country. The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of 
sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic financial institutions. β_Sov is set as 1. β 
coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, and the α coefficients are 
adjustment speeds of the two variables towards their long-term relationships. 
 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
Country Sov Fi α_Sov α_Fi β_Fi Constant 
Austria 
at rzb -0.00 0.01* -2.83* 10.84 
at ers 0.00* 0.00* -6.91* 31.67 
Belgium be kbc -0.00 0.01* -1.27* 2.54 
France 
fr bnp - - - - 
fr car 0.00* 0.00* -14.52* 62.95 
fr sge 0.00 0.01* -5.01* 19.58 
fr cnt 0.00 0.00* -7.47* 36.78 
fr axa -0.00 -0.00* 7.02* -37.67 
fr sco -0.00* -0.00 5.26* -28.00 
fr gfc -0.00* -0.00 0.90 -9.70 
fr wed 0.00* 0.00* -3.02* 15.92 
Germany 
de ikb -0.00 -0.00* 1.90* -15.64 
de dbk 0.00 0.01* -3.94* 14.99 
de cbg 0.00* 0.00* -21.42* 93.45 
de muv - - - - 
de alv 0.00 0.00* -7.21* 28.65 
de hnr 0.00 0.00* -13.22* 53.22 
Netherlands 
nl abn -0.00 0.00* -12.40* 52.82 
nl aen -0.01* -0.00 0.16 -4.69 
nl ina 0.00 0.00* -3.57* 14.30 
nl inb -0.00 0.00* -9.54* 39.08 
nl sns -0.00 0.01* -2.20* 8.65 
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Table 3.4 (continued) 
Country Sov Fi α_Sov α_Fi β_Fi Constant 
Austria 
at rzb 0.001 0.03* -1.52* 3.437 
at ers -0.031 0.04* -1.05* 0.900 
Belgium be kbc 0.005 0.04* -0.82* -0.730 
France 
fr bnp -0.04* 0.003 -0.83* -0.318 
fr car -0.024 0.03* -1.24* 1.981 
fr sge -0.05* 0.011 -0.80* -0.250 
fr cnt -0.014 0.04* -1.47* 3.260 
fr axa -0.04* 0.014 -0.88* 0.142 
fr sco -0.03* 0.011 -1.05* 0.705 
fr gfc -0.012 0.006 -0.463 -1.979 
fr wed -0.02* 0.001 -0.75* 0.103 
Germany 
de ikb -0.004 0.01* -4.42* 22.622 
de dbk 0.001 0.02* -1.50* 3.260 
de cbg -0.015 0.02* -1.10* 1.563 
de muv 0.001 0.01* -3.94* 12.816 
de alv 0.005 0.03* -1.72* 3.732 
de hnr 0.000 0.00* -30.31* 139.550 
Netherlands 
nl abn 0.001 0.00* -27.55* 134.414 
nl aen -0.002 0.01* -2.98* 11.751 
nl ina -0.005 -0.01* 2.57* -17.709 
nl inb -0.02* 0.013 -1.60* 3.823 
nl sns -0.018 0.04* -2.12* 7.601 
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Table 3.5. Impulse Responses of GIIPS Countries before and after the First Greek 
Bailout 
The table shows the impulse responses from the following model: 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) 
increase in the level of the impulse variable. 1, 2, 5, and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test 
statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. The IRF results of bi-variables not cointegrated are also 
presented for comparisons. 
Country Impulse Response 
Before Bailout After Bailout 
1 2 5 22 1 2 5 22 
Greece 
gr aca 0.09 0.13 0.18* 0.39* 0.08* 0.07* 0.10* 0.19* 
aca gr 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.21* -0.13 -0.06 0.29 
Ireland 
ie aib -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.40* 
aib ie 0.16* 0.19* 0.26* -0.15 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.02 
ie bki 0.05* 0.06* 0.08* 0.17* 0.28* 0.32* 0.46* 0.82* 
bki ie 0.14* 0.14* 0.12* -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 
ie ipm 0.08* 0.07* 0.08* 0.12* 0.25* 0.33* 0.53* 1.01* 
ipm ie 0.17* 0.14* 0.12* -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Italy 
it bci 0.15* 0.15* 0.18* 0.27* 0.38* 0.47* 0.53* 0.68* 
bci it 0.19* 0.17* 0.14* -0.02 -0.11* -0.13* -0.11 -0.02 
it mdb 0.15* 0.15* 0.16* 0.20* 0.22* 0.35* 0.41* 0.65* 
mdb it 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.11 -0.13* -0.24* -0.18 0.02 
it bmp 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.18* 0.25* 0.35* 0.39* 0.53* 
bmp it 0.16* 0.16* 0.10 -0.16 -0.16* -0.34* -0.37* -0.28 
it pii 0.07* 0.07* 0.09* 0.15* 0.23* 0.39* 0.30* 0.07 
pii it 0.20* 0.19* 0.15* -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 0.31* 
it uni -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.31* 0.21* 0.33* 0.34* 0.38 
uni it 0.18* 0.13* 0.11* -0.04 -0.07 -0.13 -0.09 0.12 
it ubi 0.02* 0.04* 0.08* 0.24* 0.22* 0.41* 0.40* 0.40* 
ubi it 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.19 -0.11 0.25 
it gas 0.08* 0.09* 0.11* 0.18* 0.25* 0.40* 0.45* 0.60* 
gas it 0.15* 0.15* 0.10* -0.12 -0.16* -0.30* -0.30* -0.24 
Portugal 
pt bcp 0.24* 0.32* 0.38* 0.52* 0.24* 0.35* 0.32* 0.45* 
bcp pt 0.11* 0.14* 0.11 -0.09 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 
pt bes 0.22* 0.30* 0.36* 0.48* 0.20* 0.25* 0.19* 0.34* 
bes pt 0.10* 0.11* 0.07 -0.18 0.11 0.00 -0.12 -0.39 
Spain 
es bbv 0.17* 0.18* 0.21* 0.26* 0.35* 0.42* 0.42* 0.62* 
bbv es 0.21* 0.20* 0.15* -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.19 -0.45* 
es bkt 0.02* 0.04* 0.10* 0.31 0.19* 0.24* 0.33* 0.53* 
bkt es 0.01* 0.02* 0.04* 0.14* -0.09* -0.07 -0.01 0.17 
es pop 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10* 0.18* 0.35* 0.61* 
pop es 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.31* 
es sab 0.09* 0.10* 0.11* 0.18* 0.15* 0.23* 0.34* 0.46* 
sab es 0.17* 0.16* 0.12* -0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.11 0.14 
es san 0.16* 0.16* 0.19* 0.23* 0.25* 0.42* 0.34* 0.55* 
san es 0.18* 0.16* 0.11* -0.09 0.13* 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 
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Table 3.6. Impulse Responses of non-GIIPS Countries before and after the First 
Greek Bailout 
The table shows the impulse responses from the following model: 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) 
increase in the level of the impulse variable. 1, 2, 5, and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test 
statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. The IRF results of bi-variables not cointegrated are also 
presented for comparisons. 
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Country Impulse Response 
Before Bailout After Bailout 
1 2 5 22 1 2 5 22 
Austria 
at rzb 0.18* 0.20* 0.12* 0.21* 0.11* 0.19* 0.25* 0.44* 
rzb at 0.23* 0.31* 0.32* 0.17 0.17* 0.01 -0.17 -0.15 
at ers 0.14* 0.17* 0.41* 0.35* 0.06 0.22* 0.26* 0.47* 
ers at 0.08 -0.02 0.10* -0.01 0.18* 0.18 -0.03 0.34 
Belgium 
be kbc -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.31* 0.14* 0.27* 0.35* 0.67* 
kbc be 0.08 0.10* 0.23* 0.15 0.15* 0.04 -0.23* -0.23 
France 
fr bnp 0.06 0.08 0.11* 0.20* 0.09* 0.21* 0.09 0.09 
bnp fr 0.09* 0.11* 0.06 -0.17 0.28* 0.36* 0.20 0.41* 
fr car 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12* 0.11* 0.19* 0.10 0.29 
car fr 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.37* 0.33* 0.42* 0.31* 0.31 
fr sge 0.06* 0.08* 0.11* 0.18* 0.09* 0.19* 0.11 0.18 
sge fr 0.18* 0.21* 0.16* -0.14 0.32* 0.44* 0.33* 0.49* 
fr cnt 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.09* 0.14* 0.24* 0.46* 
cnt fr 0.10* 0.10* 0.09* 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.09 
fr axa 0.07* 0.19* 0.22* 0.16* 0.07* 0.09* 0.14* 0.24 
axa fr 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.20* 0.28* 0.35* 0.51* 
fr sco 0.09* 0.10* 0.11* 0.12* 0.05* 0.07* 0.11* 0.21 
sco fr 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.15 0.15 0.20* 0.28* 0.47* 
fr gfc 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06* 0.09* 0.11* 0.19* 
gfc fr 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.09 
fr wed 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.27* 0.10* 0.13* 0.13* 0.12 
wed fr 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.24* 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.24 
Germany 
de ikb 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07* 0.07* 0.09* 0.15* 
ikb de 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.18 
de dbk 0.08* 0.11* 0.14* 0.20* 0.06 0.09 0.14* 0.31* 
dbk de 0.07* 0.09* 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 
de cbg 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.14* 0.17* 0.21* 0.31 
cbg de 0.10* 0.11* 0.05 -0.25 0.08* 0.11* 0.15* 0.29 
de muv 0.12* 0.16* 0.17* 0.11 0.09 0.23* 0.09 0.13 
muv de 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.04 -0.14 -0.10 
de alv 0.10* 0.14* 0.15* 0.16* 0.06 0.21* 0.09 0.36* 
alv de 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.17 0.09* 0.11 0.00 -0.07 
de hnr 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.15 -0.10 
hnr de 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.18* 0.14 0.01 0.03 
Netherlands 
nl abn 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07* 0.10* 0.10* 0.07 
abn nl 0.09* 0.09* 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.09 -0.21 
nl aen 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04* 0.07* 0.10* 0.20* 
aen nl 0.14* 0.17* 0.20* 0.31* 0.25* 0.34* 0.36* 0.32 
nl ina 0.11* 0.10* 0.12* 0.16* 0.18* 0.20* 0.17* -0.01 
ina nl 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.21 
nl inb 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.04 0.16* 0.20* 0.21* 0.19 
inb nl 0.16* 0.18* 0.20* 0.27 0.09 0.15* 0.26* 0.64* 
nl sns 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.09* 0.19* 0.40* 
sns nl 0.09* 0.12* 0.25* 0.23* 0.23* 0.26* 0.31* 0.38* 
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Table 3.7. Impulse Responses of Greece for the First and Second Greek Bailouts 
The table shows the impulse responses from the following model: 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) 
increase in the level of the impulse variable. 1, 2, 5, and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test 
statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. The IRF results of bi-variables not cointegrated are also 
presented for comparisons. 
 
Panel A. Whole period 
  
days 
impulse response 1  2  5  22  
gr aca 0.09* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 
aca gr -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.06  
Panel B. First Greek bailout 
Before bailout (19/11/2009-07/05/2010) 
impulse response 1  2  5  22  
gr aca 0.06* 0.12* 0.24* 0.50* 
aca gr 0.10  0.19  0.40  0.82  
Bailout period (10/05/2010-20/07/2011) 
impulse response 1  2  5  22  
gr aca 0.19* 0.18* 0.27* 0.54* 
aca gr -0.02  -0.05  -0.13  -0.42  
Panel C. Second Greek bailout 
Application period (21/07/2011-20/02/2012) 
impulse response 1  2  5  22  
gr aca 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.06  
aca gr -0.59* -0.15  -0.10  0.38  
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Table 3.8. Impulse Responses of Ireland for the Irish Bailout 
The table shows the impulse responses from the following model: 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) 
increase in the level of the impulse variable. 1, 2, 5, and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test 
statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. The IRF results of bi-variables not cointegrated are also 
presented for comparisons. 
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Panel A. Whole period 
  
days 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
ie aib 0.01* 0.03* 0.07* 0.28* 
aib ie -0.01* -0.02* -0.05* -0.18  
      ie bki 0.19* 0.22* 0.33* 0.74* 
bki ie 0.02  0.02  0.01  -0.02  
      ie ipm 0.18* 0.21* 0.31* 0.71* 
ipm ie -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.04  
Panel B. Irish Bailout 
Before application (19/11/2009-19/11/2010) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
ie aib 0.07* 0.14* 0.33* 0.97* 
aib ie -0.03  -0.06  -0.13  -0.38  
      ie bki 0.09* 0.17* 0.38* 0.94* 
bki ie -0.05  -0.09  -0.21  -0.51  
      ie ipm 0.09* 0.18* 0.39* 0.96* 
ipm ie -0.01  -0.02  -0.06  -0.14  
Application period (22/11/2010-24/01/2011) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
ie aib -0.37* -0.60* -0.85* -0.34  
aib ie 0.05* 0.09* 0.12* 0.05  
      ie bki 0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  
bki ie 0.04  0.06  0.08  0.01  
      ie ipm 0.89* 0.49* 0.41  0.01  
ipm ie -0.08  -0.05  -0.05  0.00  
Bailout period (25/01/2011-01/04/2012) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
ie aib -0.41* -0.76* -1.46* -1.84  
aib ie -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  
      ie bki -0.30  -0.47  -0.53  -0.01  
bki ie 0.08  0.12* 0.13* 0.00  
      ie ipm -0.16  -0.26  -0.36  -0.07  
ipm ie 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.01  
After bailout (04/04/2012-08/10/2012) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
ie aib -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  
aib ie 0.27  0.14  0.03  -0.09  
      ie bki 0.28* 0.32* 0.42* 0.76* 
bki ie 0.03  0.03  0.04  0.06  
      ie ipm 0.10  0.12  0.18* 0.43* 
ipm ie 0.03  0.03  0.04  0.05  
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Table 3.9. Impulse Responses of Portugal for the Portugal Bailout 
The table shows the impulse responses from the following model: 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) 
increase in the level of the impulse variable. 1, 2, 5, and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test 
statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. The IRF results of bi-variables not cointegrated are also 
presented for comparisons. 
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Panel A. Whole period 
  
days 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
pt bcp 0.20* 0.27* 0.33* 0.50* 
bcp pt -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  -0.05  
      pt bes 0.20* 0.30* 0.26* 0.38* 
bes pt -0.07  -0.06  -0.10  -0.31  
Panel B. Portugal bailout 
Before application (19/11/2009-06/04/2011) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
pt bcp 0.26* 0.38* 0.51* 0.74* 
bcp pt -0.17  -0.20  -0.13  0.09  
      pt bes 0.23* 0.32* 0.43* 0.67* 
bes pt -0.17  -0.21  -0.19  -0.06  
Application period (07/04/2011-14/06/2011) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
pt bcp 0.07  0.13  0.25  0.30  
bcp pt 0.08  0.14  0.27  0.33  
      pt bes 0.15  0.25  0.40  0.30  
bes pt 0.05  0.09  0.14  0.10  
Bailout period (15/06/2011-17/07/2012) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
pt bcp 0 0 0 0 
bcp pt 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.1 
      pt bes 0.13* 0.15* 0.1 -0.08 
bes pt 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.07 
After bailout (18/07/2012-08/10/2012) 
impulse response 1 2 5 22 
pt bcp 0.12* 0.22* 0.45* 0.76* 
bcp pt -0.07 -0.13 -0.28 -0.47 
      pt bes 0.10* 0.19* 0.40* 0.72* 
bes pt -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.15 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE GREEK EXCEPTION: CHANGES IN DEFAULT RISK 
TRANSFER BETWEEN SOVEREIGN DEBTS AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS DURING 'ATIPICAL' REGIMES 
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4. The Greek Exception: Changes in Default Risk Transfer between Sovereign 
Debts and Financial Institutions during ‘Atypical’ Regimes 
4.1. Introduction 
This study focuses on the relationship between default risk of sovereign debt and the 
debt of domestic financial institutions in Europe. It endogenously identifies typical 
and atypical regimes where these relationships differ, and whether the atypical 
regimes are prelude to financial crisis. Hansen and Seo's (2002) methodology is 
applied to identify a two regime threshold cointegration in bivariate vector 
error-correction (VEC) models of sovereign default risk and default risk of domestic 
financial institutions for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). The 
regime containing higher percentage of observations is defined as the typical regime, 
and the other one as the atypical regime. The aim is to understand how the default 
risk is transferred, if any, between the sovereign and domestic financial institutions 
in different regimes, i.e., typical and atypical regimes. The study also examines the 
dynamic short- and long-term interdependencies between the credit default swap 
(CDS) series of the sovereign debts and financial institutions in the two regimes by 
using impulse response functions (IRFs) from bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models as proposed by Alter and Schüler (2012). Daily CDS spreads are applied to 
capture default risk, and analyse the risk transfer between the sovereign debts and 
the domestic financial institutions in the GIIPS countries from June 2007 to July 
2013. 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, the findings show that there exists a 
threshold effect in the cointegration relationship between the default swap rates of 
the sovereign and financial sectors. The atypical regimes identified are mainly 
located around the global credit crunch period (2007-2008) and the European 
sovereign debt crisis (Eurozone crisis since early 2010) for the GIIPS countries. The 
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approach of detecting regime change is robust, since the regime shifts are suggested 
by data rather than by subjective time-period selections. Importantly, the findings 
indicate that the responses between the sovereign and the financial sectors change 
from one regime to the other. Previous research, Alter and Schüler (2012) for 
example, does not detect regime changes and find mixed results with their 
hypotheses.
11
 
Second, in the typical regime for the countries except Greece, the results show that 
positive interdependencies exist between the default risk of the sovereign and 
financial sectors. Specifically, a shock in the sovereign daily CDS spread of a 
country is followed by increases in the daily CDS spread of the financial institutions 
in that country, and vice versa. Importantly, in the atypical regime, the impacts 
magnitude in positive interdependencies between the default risk of the public and 
financial sectors are generally much larger than that in the typical regime. This is 
consistent with the intuition that during the credit crunch and the Eurozone crisis 
periods, the financial sectors are more sensitive to the credit health of their 
governments. A decline in the default risk of the financial sector often leads to 
declines in the sovereign CDS spreads. The sensitivity of the sovereign default risk 
to the financial institutions’ default risk is also increased. 
In a sharp contrast, the interdependent relationship between the sovereign and 
financial sectors is different for Greece. In the typical regime, only the impacts of 
sovereign default risk on the default risk of the domestic financial sector are 
positively significant, the impacts of the other way are insignificant. In the atypical 
regime for Greece however, the impacts of the sovereign default risk on the default 
risk of the financial institutions are reduced to either zero or negative. More 
importantly, the default risk of the financial sector exhibits strong and negative 
impacts on the sovereign default risk during the credit crunch or the Eurozone crisis.  
                                                             
11 It is important to note that setting sample sub-periods by events is different from the approach identifying 
structural breaks. 
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The remaining part of this study is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains the 
mechanism of risk transfer between the sovereign and banking sectors. Section 4.3 is 
the data description. Section 4.4 explains the estimation methodology. Section 4.5 
analyses the results. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. Mechanism of Risk Transfer 
When a country faces financial distress, for example, high public deficit or heavy 
debt burdens, the sovereign default risk of this country raises and the sovereign debt 
devalues. In the short run, (i) for the domestic financial institutions the cost of 
holding the sovereign debt is higher, which changes the balance sheet of the financial 
institutions; (ii) for other governments that support the financially distressed country 
by providing bailout packages, the sovereign and financial sectors of the supporting 
countries also faces higher default risk for holding the devaluated sovereign debt. 
The financial systemic risk, which is the impacts of macroeconomic factors on 
banking credit risk, is pro-cyclical with the business cycle or macroeconomic 
environment (Borio et al. (2002), Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009) and Festic et al. 
(2011)). In the long run, sovereign debt crises are followed by reduction in foreign 
capital inflows as investors’ awareness to the sovereign default risk increase, and the 
domestic credit becomes more expensive, which negatively affect the domestic 
economy and hence increase the default risk of the domestic financial institutions.  
When a financial institution faces financial distress, the default risk of the financial 
institution is higher. This increases the probability that it cannot fulfil the obligations 
to other financial counterparties, thus the financial counterparties could face funding 
difficulties, and their default risk is higher. Thereafter, a systemic financial crisis 
might arise and hamper the whole economy, which also deteriorate public finances, 
thus the sovereign default risk is higher. 
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Acharya et al. (2011) document a “two-way feedback” effect between the financial 
sector and the sovereign sector, suggesting positive interdependences between the 
default risks of the two sectors. In the research the results also show that, in general 
for all the countries except Greece in the atypical regime, the responses of sovereign 
default risk to the shocks in the financial sectors are positive, and vice versa.  
In the atypical regime such as during the global credit crunch period (2007-2008) or 
the Eurozone crisis (since 2010), it is expected that in general, responses between the 
default risk of the public and financial sectors are stronger than that in the typical 
regime.  
During financial crises, government guarantees to the financial sector increase, thus 
changes in the sovereign default risk have direct impact on the perceived default risk 
of the financial sector. Also because the financial institutions may receive rescue 
capital from their governments, the financial sector is more sensitive to the credit 
health of their governments. Hence, the sensitivity of the financial institutions’ 
default risk to the sovereign default risk is expected to increase.  
The impacts of the financial sector on the government sector are divided into two 
ways.  On one hand, a decline in the default risk of the financial sector results in 
healthier economy and improve the public finances, which decreases the default risk 
of the sovereign debts. On the other hand, when the government takes over the debt 
burdens of the financial sector, the default risk declined in the financial sector is 
directly transferred to the government, indicating the relieved default risk of the 
financial institutions leads to higher probability of government default in the future. 
The overall impact of the default risk of the financial sector on the sovereign default 
risk depends on which force is stronger.    
Thus it expected that the outcome of the private-to-public risk transfer in the atypical 
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regime is heterogeneous among the GIIPS countries. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) 
report that the states of the financial system at the beginning of the financial crisis 
have strong explanatory power for the private-to-public risk transfer, and that an 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member is more sensitive to the health of its 
pre-crisis financial system. So for example in Greece, before and at the beginning of 
the credit crunch period, the government debt is already relatively high. In the later 
Eurozone crisis, the Greek government has to issue more sovereign debts to relieve 
the stress in the domestic financial sector, thus the sensitivity of the sovereign default 
risk to a shock in the domestic financial sector is exaggerated. 
4.3. Data Description 
The study uses CDS spreads to capture credit default risk of an institution, or the 
government. Studies have shown that CDS spreads can measure investors’ risk 
preference. According to Hull et al. (2004), both changes and levels of CDS spread 
contain significant information in estimating the probability of rating events, but 
CDS spread changes conditional on rating events, and downgrade announcement and 
negative outlooks do not have helpful information. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
analyse the relationship between the sovereign CDS spreads and the sovereign credit 
ratings, and show that investors can make decisions according to the same public 
information that would lead to the changes in CDS spreads prior to a rating 
announcement. Düllmann and Sosinska (2007) analyse the CDS spreads of banks, 
and document that banks’ CDS spreads indicate banking credit risk from three risk 
sources including idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and liquidity risk. 
Daily data of CDS spreads is collected from DataStream. The selection of financial 
institution and sovereign CDS series was restricted by data availability. The study 
analyses 5 Eurozone countries, including Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), 
Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES) (see Panel A of Appendix 11), together with their 
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domestic financial institutions (19 financial institutions in total, see Panel B of 
Appendix 11). These countries have requested for the bailout funding from the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or have been facing severe default risk 
during the Eurozone crisis. The CDS series of the financial institutions are chosen 
according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of the institutions 
(major groups 60-67, including Finance, Insurance, and Real Estates), respectively.  
The study use five-year CDS, since it is the largest and the most liquid constituent of 
the CDS markets. The restructuring types for the sovereign CDS series are all 
Complete Restructuring (CR), as it is the only restructuring clause applied by the 
sovereign CDS series. The restructuring types for the financial institutions are all 
“Modified-Modified” (MM) Restructuring. The former restructuring clause, 
Modified Restructuring (MR), had been too severe in its limitation of 60-month 
deliverable obligations, and the MM restructuring clause has been introduced and 
applied by the European market participants since 2003. 
The data set starts from 29 June 2007 until 31 July 2013. The Greek CDS series 
stops on 8 March 2012, after Greek debt restructuring triggered approximately 
$3.2bn CDS credit protection payouts on Greek sovereign debt. Particularly, the 
CDS series of National Bank of Greece (nbg) starts from 18 November 2008, and 
the CDS series of Allied Irish Bank (aib) ends on 27 April 2011 due to data 
availability. 
[Insert Figure 4.1] 
Figure 4.1 shows the sovereign CDS spreads for each of the GIIPS countries in the 
sample. The EFSF bailouts during the Eurozone crisis for Greece (Greek first bailout 
(1) and second bailout (4)), Ireland (2) and Portugal (3) are displayed. Before 
February 2010, the sovereign CDS spreads of all the countries remain low and stable. 
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The sovereign CDS spreads of the GIIPS countries continue to increase after the 
Greek first bailout. But since the second Greek bailout, except the Greek sovereign 
CDS spreads remaining high, the sovereign CDS spreads of the other four countries 
have started to come down. 
 [Insert Table 4.1] 
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of the CDS spreads of the GIIPS countries. The 
maximum values of the Greek CDS series are generally much larger than the CDS 
series in other countries, and the standard deviations are also larger, indicating the 
short-run default risk transfer in Greece might be different from that in other 
countries. 
4.4. Estimation Methodology 
This part first explains the model by Hansen and Seo (2002), which is used in the 
research to define regimes for the whole dataset. Next the impulse response 
functions (IRFs) of the two regimes are applied to examine the dynamic short- and 
long-run interdependency of the sovereign and financial institution CDS series. 
4.4.1. Determining Typical and Atypical Regimes 
The study carries out the impulse response functions (IRFs) analysis of the bivariate 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model in two regimes: typical and atypical regimes. 
Prior to the dynamic short- and long-run analyses, the model by Hansen and Seo 
(2002) is applied to test for the two-regime threshold cointegration in the bivariate 
vector error-correction (VEC) model. 
Let tx  be a p-dimensional I(1) time series which is cointegrated with one 12  
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cointegrating vector  . Let tt xw  )(  denote the I(0) error-correction term. A 
bivariate VECM of order 1l  can be compactly written as 
ttt uXAx   )(1  ,                                              (4.1) 
where 
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As an extension of model (1), the two-regime threshold cointegration model by 
Hansen and Seo (2002) takes the form 
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where   is the threshold parameter. The model uses maximum likelihood 
estimation of the complete threshold cointegration, and applies a SupLM test for the 
threshold. The threshold model has two regimes, which examines the structural 
changes in unknown cointegration with a threshold effect. Let cdsSov,t be the 
sovereign CDS spreads in log-level (in short ‘Sov’), and cdsFi,t be the CDS spreads in 
log-level of a domestic financial institution (in short ‘Fi’) at day t. The following 
bivariate VAR and VEC models are estimated:  
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where 1,1,1   tFitSovt cdscdsw  , which is the estimated cointegrating relationship 
between the two CDS series. ν and μ are vectors of constants. A VEC model with 
(p-1) lags can be converted to a VAR structure with p lags, i.e., eq. (4.2) is equal to 
eq. (4.3). A VEC model is able to capture the long-run relationship which indicated 
by the α and the ß coefficients. When the threshold condition   orwt )(1  (e.g. 
γ = -1.001) is found, it means the cointegrating relationship in the long run is 
001.11,1,1   orcdscdsw tFitSovt   in different regimes. The value of γ is 
different for different pairs of variables, as )ˆ,ˆ(   is picked according to the model 
to minimise the likelihood function (Hansen and Seo (2002)). After the threshold is 
estimated and conditioned, the regime with smaller α coefficients and higher 
percentage of observations is defined as ‘typical’ regime which has minimal 
error-corrections effects and minimal dynamics, and the other one as the ‘atypical’ 
regime. In the atypical regime the two series deviate more from the long-term 
cointegration, and the force correcting both variables back towards their long-run 
equilibrium is stronger. 
[Insert Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4] 
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the cointegration results of the linear VEC model 
without threshold, typical regime and atypical regime, respectively. For exposition 
purpose, the example takes gr (Greek sovereign debt) and aca (Alpha Bank) 
log-CDS series (see Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The estimated VEC without a threshold 
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effect is given below 
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where the cointegrating relationship is 235.0418.1 .,  tFitSov cdscds . Then the 
model by Hansen and Seo (2002) is used, the estimated cointegration is 
tFitSovt cdscdsw ., 451.1 , and the estimated threshold is -1.001 (the p-values of the 
Sov  coefficients suggests the significance of the threshold cointegration).  
The estimated threshold VEC is shown below: 
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Thus relatively usual regime occurs when 001.1451.1 .,  tFitSov cdscds , with 94% 
of the observations in this regime, and this is defined as the ‘typical’ regime. The 
other regime (with 6% of the observations) is defined as the ‘atypical’ regime when 
001.1451.1 .,  tFitSov cdscds . The threshold condition is the same for the typical and 
the atypical regimes (   orwt )(1 ), however as the   coefficients are not the 
same for the different regimes, the cointegrating vectors are different for the typical 
and the atypical regimes. 
4.4.2. Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) or VAR Model 
After determination of the typical and atypical regimes according to the threshold 
condition estimated in the threshold cointegration, the impulse response functions 
(IRFs) of the VAR model (4.2) is estimated using CDS spreads in log-levels, and 
noted that a VEC model with (p-1) lags can be represented as a VAR structure with p 
lags. Impulse response functions (IRFs) are used to depict the impacts of one-time 
shock to a variable within one standard deviation not only on itself but also on other 
endogenous variables of current and future periods; in other words, IRFs trace the 
reactions of endogenous variables according to the changes of other exogenous 
variables in different periods. The variables generated (innovations or impulses) are 
correlated according to the above correlations of residuals for the bivariate VAR 
models, and these innovations ought to be orthogonalised. 
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4.5. Empirical Findings 
4.5.1. Cointegration in Typical and Atypical Regimes 
This section uses the model by Hansen and Seo (2002) (as described in Section 4.4.1) 
to detect typical and atypical regimes and to test for cointegrating relationship 
between the default risk of the sovereign debts and financial institutions. The 
analysis continues with the example of gr (Greek sovereign debt) and aca (Alpha 
Bank) log-CDS series (see Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). 
The estimated threshold VEC is shown below: 
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The coefficient of tSovcds ,  in the atypical regime is 0.500, which is much larger 
than the coefficient in the typical regime (0.105). The other coefficients of tSovcds ,  
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and tFicds ,  in the atypical regime are insignificant in this case, but comparing the 
results of Table 4.3 and 4.4, the findings indicate that in general the absolute values 
of the coefficients of tSovcds ,  and tFicds ,  in the atypical regime are much larger 
than those in the typical regime. The estimated results indicate that in the typical 
regime, tSovcds ,  and tFicds ,  have minimal error-correction effects and minimal 
dynamics, and in the atypical regime, the error-correction effect is stronger. 
Figures 4.2-4.6 visually show the CDS spreads of sovereign debts and financial 
institution in the GIIPS countries, respectively, and typical and atypical regimes 
suggested by the estimated threshold VEC model. For example, Figure 4.2 shows the 
co-movements of CDS spreads of Greek sovereign debt and Alpha Bank. The grey 
parts indicate the typical regime, and the white parts (in early 2008 and March 2012) 
show the atypical regime of the two CDS series. The four vertical lines indicate the 
four bailouts issued to Greece (two bailouts), Ireland and Portugal by the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) during the Eurozone crisis. The findings show 
that the atypical regime usually happens when the co-moving trend of the 
bi-variables changes, indicating the cointegration relationship between the 
bi-variables changes. Moreover, the atypical regime is mainly located around the 
global credit crunch period (2007-2008) and the Eurozone crisis.  
[Insert Figures 4.2-4.6] 
The concept of 'regime shifts' in this chapter is different from the 'structural breaks' 
in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, hypothesis is made that there is a structural break in the 
intercept or the slope for each pair of variables for the whole time period, and most 
breakpoints detected are closed to certain bailout events, then the bailout events are 
used as breakpoints in order to examine the changes in the default risk transfer. 
However, in this chapter, the method is to use a threshold condition for the whole 
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time periods that covers all the financial crises and those bailout events, so it is not 
contrary to have breaks in certain regime. Further comparison is made for Figures 
4.2-4.6 to the breakpoint dates in Table 3.2, and most breakpoints are exactly the 
time when regime shifts. 
4.5.2. Default Risk Transfer in Typical and Atypical Regimes 
After displaying the typical and atypical regimes of each pair of bi-variables, this 
part analyses the results of impulse responses of all the GIIPS countries in different 
regimes. Table 4.5 shows the impulse responses of the five countries in the two 
regimes. The responses after 1, 2, and 5 days represent the short-term effect, and the 
responses after 22 days show the long-run effect. For example, in the typical regime, 
the responses of aca to the impulse in gr after 1, 2 and 5 days are 0.04, 0.06 and 0.09, 
respectively, and the response after 22 days is 0.27. The responses of gr to the 
impulse in aca after 1, 2 and 5 days are -0.01, -0.02 and -0.04, respectively, and the 
response after 22 days is -0.11. 
[Insert Table 4.5] 
It is observed that, in the typical regime for the countries except Greece, a two-way 
feedback effect exists between the default risk of the sovereign and financial sectors, 
as most of the responses of financial institutions to the sovereign CDS shocks are 
significantly positive, and vice versa, in both the short and long run. Importantly, in 
the atypical regime, it is found that while the positive interdependencies between the 
sovereign and financial sectors remain significant, the responses to the changes in 
the impulse variables become much larger generally than that in the typical regime. 
Such results indicate as explained in Section 4.2 that the sensitively of the financial 
institutions’ default risk to the sovereign default risk increase for these countries, and 
vice versa. 
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Comparing the results of Greece with other countries, the results show that the 
interdependent relationship between the sovereign and financial sectors is different. 
In the typical regime, only the impacts of sovereign default risk on the default risk of 
the domestic financial sector are positively significant, and the impacts of the other 
way are insignificant. In the atypical regime for Greece, the impacts of the sovereign 
default risk on the default risk of the financial institutions are reduced to either zero 
or negative. In a shock contrast, the sovereign default risk exhibits strong and 
negative responses to the shock in the default risk of the financial institutions, for 
example, in the atypical regime, the responses of gr to the impulse in aca after 1, 2 
and 5 days are -34.99, -33.03 and -24.83, respectively. Such heterogeneous results in 
Greece indicate that in the atypical regime the negative force of the impact of the 
financial sector on the sovereign default risk is much stronger than the positive force. 
This is because that the state of the financial system of a country since the beginning 
of the financial crisis has strong explanatory power for the private-to-public risk 
transfer. For Greece, as the government debt has been already relatively high before 
and at the beginning of the credit crunch period, the sensitivity of the sovereign 
default risk to a shock in the domestic financial sector is exaggerated when Greece 
has to issue more sovereign debt in later crisis. 
The graphs of impulse responses between each pair of variables in the GIIPS 
countries (see Appendices 12-16) show the results more clearly, that in the atypical 
regime, except Greece, the responses of the sovereign default risks to their financial 
institutions are larger than that in the typical regime, and vice versa. For Greece, 
however, in the atypical regime, the responses of the sovereign default risks to their 
financial institutions are significantly negative. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter applies the bivariate VEC model with a threshold effect to test the 
cointegration of the default risk of the sovereign and financial sectors for the GIIPS 
countries in two regimes, i.e., typical and atypical regimes. The findings show that 
this model is able to detect regime shifts in the cointegration relationship between 
the sovereign and the financial sectors, and the atypical regimes is mainly found 
around the global credit crunch period (2007-2008) and the Eurozone crisis (since 
early 2010). 
The study further analyse the impulse responses between the sovereign default risk 
and the default risk of the financial institutions in the typical and atypical regimes. 
The results indicate that for the countries except Greece, positive interdependencies 
exist between the default risk of the sovereign and financial sectors. Importantly, the 
positive responses between the two sectors become stronger in the atypical regime, 
which implies that the sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to the default risk of 
the financial institutions is higher, and vice versa. For Greece, however, the results 
indicate that in the typical regime, only the impacts of the sovereign default risk on 
the default risk of the domestic financial sectors are positively significant. In the 
atypical regime, the public-to-private impacts become insignificant, and more 
importantly, the default risk of the financial institutions has negatively significant 
impact on the sovereign default risk. The implication of the findings is that the 
different pattern of the results across countries is due to the financial situation of the 
countries at the beginning of the financial crisis. For Greece, since the negative force 
is stronger than the positive force in the default risk transfer from the financial sector 
to the sovereign sector in the atypical regime, the overall sensitivity of the sovereign 
default risk to a shock in the financial institutions is negative. 
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Figure 4.1. Sovereign CDS Spreads for GIIPS Countries 
The Figure plots the sovereign CDS spreads for the GIIPS countries. Four settlement dates of bailouts by 
the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 as follows. The Greek first 
bailout issued by the EFSF is on 9 May 2010 (1), and the Greece officially requested for the second bailout 
on 21 July 2011 (4). The settlement date of the tranche of the Irish bailout by the EFSF is on 25 January 
2011 (2), and the settlement date of the tranche of the Portugal bailout is on 15 June 2011 (3). The Greek 
sovereign CDS spreads has remained unchanged, since Greek debt restructuring triggered approximately 
$3.2bn CDS credit protection payouts on Greek sovereign debt in early March 2012.  
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Figure 4.2. CDS Spreads of Sovereign Debt and Financial Institutions in Typical and Atypical 
Regimes for Greece 
Four settlement dates of bailouts by the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as periods 1, 2, 3 
and 4 as follows. The Greek first bailout issued by the EFSF is on 9 May 2010 (1), and the Greece 
officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 2011 (4). The settlement date of the tranche of the 
Irish bailout by the EFSF is on 25 January 2011 (2), and the settlement date of the tranche of the Portugal 
bailout is on 15 June 2011 (3). The Greek sovereign CDS spreads has remained unchanged, since Greek 
debt restructuring triggered approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection payouts on Greek sovereign debt 
in early March 2012. The grey parts indicate the typical regime, and the white parts show the atypical 
regime.  
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Figure 4.3. CDS Spreads of Sovereign Debt and Financial Institutions in Typical and Atypical 
Regimes for Ireland 
Four settlement dates of bailouts by the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as periods 1, 2, 3 
and 4 as follows. The Greek first bailout issued by the EFSF is on 9 May 2010 (1), and the Greece 
officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 2011 (4). The settlement date of the tranche of the 
Irish bailout by the EFSF is on 25 January 2011 (2), and the settlement date of the tranche of the Portugal 
bailout is on 15 June 2011 (3). The grey parts indicate the typical regime, and the white parts show the 
atypical regime.  
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Figure 4.4. CDS Spreads of Sovereign Debt and Financial Institutions in Typical and Atypical 
Regimes for Italy 
Four settlement dates of bailouts by the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as periods 1, 2, 3 
and 4 as follows. The Greek first bailout issued by the EFSF is on 9 May 2010 (1), and the Greece 
officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 2011 (4). The settlement date of the tranche of the 
Irish bailout by the EFSF is on 25 January 2011 (2), and the settlement date of the tranche of the Portugal 
bailout is on 15 June 2011 (3). The grey parts indicate the typical regime, and the white parts show the 
atypical regime. 
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Figure 4.4 (continued) 
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Figure 4.4 (continued) 
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Figure 4.5. CDS Spreads of Sovereign Debt and Financial Institutions in Typical and Atypical 
Regimes for Portugal 
Four settlement dates of bailouts by the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as periods 1, 2, 3 
and 4 as follows. The Greek first bailout issued by the EFSF is on 9 May 2010 (1), and the Greece 
officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 2011 (4). The settlement date of the tranche of the 
Irish bailout by the EFSF is on 25 January 2011 (2), and the settlement date of the tranche of the Portugal 
bailout is on 15 June 2011 (3). The grey parts indicate the typical regime, and the white parts show the 
atypical regime.  
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Figure 4.6. CDS Spreads of Sovereign Debt and Financial Institutions in Typical and Atypical 
Regimes for Spain 
Four settlement dates of bailouts by the EFSF to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as periods 1, 2, 3 
and 4 as follows. The Greek first bailout issued by the EFSF is on 9 May 2010 (1), and the Greece 
officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 2011 (4). The settlement date of the tranche of the 
Irish bailout by the EFSF is on 25 January 2011 (2), and the settlement date of the tranche of the Portugal 
bailout is on 15 June 2011 (3). The grey parts indicate the typical regime, and the white parts show the 
atypical regime. 
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Figure 4.6 (continued) 
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics for GIIPS Countries 
Note: The table shows the summary statistics of CDS spreads, EUR denomination, in basis points. The time 
series start from 13 November 2007 until 17 February 2012. The two-letter variables indicate the CDS 
spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic financial institutions. 
Market Variable Obs. Mean Min Max S.d. 
  gr 1225 1373.00 4.40 37081.00 3378.00 
Greece aca 1589 868.90 25.00 2587.00 744.40 
  nbg 1227 1097.00 135.00 2648.00 723.60 
  ie 1589 274.40 2.00 1191.00 241.10 
Ireland aib 1589 734.30 9.80 1813.00 567.70 
 
bki 1589 519.60 9.50 2299.00 445.30 
 ipm 1589 580.50 14.79 2499.00 527.90 
  it 1589 194.80 5.30 586.70 148.80 
 
bci 1589 183.50 8.50 607.90 144.40 
 
mdb 1589 178.40 7.20 598.60 132.20 
Italy bmp 1589 265.90 9.50 874.50 224.10 
 
pii 1589 247.20 13.50 803.80 217.00 
 
uni 1589 208.30 10.00 678.30 150.00 
 
ubi 1589 202.20 13.00 661.00 148.40 
 gas 1589 162.30 6.70 441.40 106.80 
  pt 1589 390.60 3.60 1601.00 397.60 
Portugal bcp 1589 473.00 11.60 1876.00 451.50 
  bes 1589 416.40 12.00 1285.00 336.00 
 
es 1589 210.40 11.50 634.40 145.80 
 
bbv 1589 196.10 11.00 510.40 120.90 
Spain bkt 1589 296.30 14.79 820.10 207.40 
 
pop 1589 344.10 14.79 908.90 240.60 
 
sab 1589 348.60 19.60 837.90 210.40 
 san 1589 192.10 11.50 506.70 117.30 
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Table 4.2. Cointegration Analysis of Linear VECM Estimates for GIIPS Countries 
Testing for cointegration 
t
itFi
itSov
l
i iFiFiiFiSov
iSovFiiSovSov
t
Fi
Sov
tFi
tSov
u
cds
cds
w
cds
cds



































 
,
,
1 ,,
,,
1
,
,




 .                                      
The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, 
and the α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the two variables towards their long-term relationships. 
p-value in parentheses. 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi 
Cointegration 
β Constant 
Greece 
gr 
0.01 0.00 0.13 -0.01 
1.42 0.24 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
aca 
0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
Greece 
gr 
0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.02 
1.43 0.12 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) 
nbg 
0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) 
Ireland 
ie 
0.01 0.00 -0.22 0.15 
1.86 0.42 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.05) 
aib 
0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.17 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.05) 
Ireland 
ie 
0.03 0.00 -0.19 0.10 
2.13 0.44 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.04) 
bki 
0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.04 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.04) 
Ireland 
ie 
0.04 0.00 -0.19 0.06 
2.71 1.25 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.03) 
ipm 
0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.08 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.10) (0.03) 
Italy 
it 
0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.17 
1.67 0.52 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) 
bci 
0.03 0.01 0.10 0.07 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) 
Italy 
it 
0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 
1.80 0.38 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) 
mdb 
0.04 0.01 0.11 0.00 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.01 0.10 
-5.22 33.84 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
bmp 
0.02 0.00 0.03 0.13 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi 
Cointegration 
β Constant 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.02 0.14 
-0.03 1.23 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
pii 
0.01 0.00 0.08 0.11 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
Italy 
it 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.13 
1.67 0.22 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
uni 
0.05 0.01 0.02 0.12 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
Italy 
it 
-0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.03 
1.16 0.08 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) 
ubi 
0.02 0.02 0.11 0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 
1.90 0.30 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
gas 
0.05 0.01 0.07 0.11 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
Portugal 
pt 
0.01 0.00 0.10 0.11 
1.43 0.17 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) 
bcp 
0.03 0.01 0.12 0.13 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) 
Portugal 
pt 
0.02 0.00 0.10 0.11 
1.62 0.13 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) 
bes 
0.05 0.01 0.09 0.19 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) 
Spain 
es 
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.15 
1.25 0.09 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
bbv 
0.03 0.02 0.11 0.10 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
Spain 
es 
0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.00 
0.44 0.12 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
bkt 
0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi 
Cointegration 
β Constant 
Spain 
es 
0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.01 
0.36 0.24 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
pop 
0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
Spain 
es 
0.01 0.00 0.08 0.08 
1.45 0.23 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) 
sab 
0.03 0.01 0.10 0.02 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) 
Spain 
es 
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.10 
1.33 0.12 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
san 
0.04 0.02 0.13 0.05 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
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Table 4.3. Cointegration Analysis of Typical Regime for GIIPS Countries 
Testing for cointegration 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, 
and the α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the two variables towards their long-term relationships. 
p-value in parentheses. 
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Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Greece 
gr 
0.00 0.01 0.13 -0.01 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.45 cdsFi,t+( -1.00 ) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
aca 
0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
Greece 
gr 
0.02 0.01 0.18 0.03 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.18 cdsFi,t+( -0.68 ) 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) 
nbg 
0.03 0.02 0.14 0.03 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) 
Ireland 
ie 
0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.10 
cdsSov,t> 1.42 cdsFi,t+( -4.10 ) 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) 
aib 
0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.16 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
Ireland 
ie 
0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.09 
cdsSov,t> 1.57 cdsFi,t+( -4.71 ) 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
bki 
0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.11) 
Ireland 
ie 
0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.05 
cdsSov,t> 1.63 cdsFi,t+( -5.35 ) 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03) 
ipm 
0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.10 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.11 0.13 
cdsSov,t≤ 2.04 cdsFi,t+( -4.21 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) 
bci 
0.01 0.00 0.14 0.05 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.06) 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.11 0.03 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.77 cdsFi,t+( -2.78 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) 
mdb 
0.02 0.01 0.13 0.00 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.18 0.03 
cdsSov,t> -8.62 cdsFi,t+( 40.79 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
bmp 
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.10 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Italy 
it 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.16 
cdsSov,t≤ 0.69 cdsFi,t+( 1.83 ) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
pii 
0.00 0.00 0.06 0.14 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) 
Italy 
it 
0.02 0.00 0.13 0.05 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.76 cdsFi,t+( -3.65 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) 
uni 
0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.07) (0.06) 
Italy 
it 
0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.03 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.11 cdsFi,t+( -0.22 ) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) 
ubi 
0.01 0.01 0.09 0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) 
Italy 
it 
0.03 0.00 0.08 0.11 
cdsSov,t≤ 2.37 cdsFi,t+( -5.22 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) 
gas 
0.03 0.00 0.11 0.06 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) 
Portugal 
pt 
0.02 0.01 0.12 0.09 
cdsSov,t> 1.37 cdsFi,t+( -3.05 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) 
bcp 
0.03 0.01 0.16 0.14 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) 
Portugal 
pt 
0.02 0.01 0.12 0.08 
cdsSov,t> 1.42 cdsFi,t+( -3.33 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) 
bes 
0.04 0.01 0.13 0.18 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05) 
Spain 
es 
0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.18 
cdsSov,t> 1.22 cdsFi,t+( -1.44 ) 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) 
bbv 
0.04 0.04 0.15 0.07 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) 
Spain 
es 
0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.04 
cdsSov,t> 0.25 cdsFi,t+( 2.86 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) 
bkt 
0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.04 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Spain 
es 
0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.01 
cdsSov,t≤ 0.63 cdsFi,t+( 2.25 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) 
pop 
0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) 
Spain 
es 
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.11 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.46 cdsFi,t+( -2.49 ) 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) 
sab 
0.01 0.00 0.10 0.07 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) 
Spain 
es 
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.11 
cdsSov,t> 1.20 cdsFi,t+( -1.27 ) 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) 
san 
0.04 0.04 0.18 0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) 
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Table 4.4. Cointegration Analysis of Atypical Regime for GIIPS Countries 
Testing for cointegration 
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The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, 
and the α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the two variables towards their long-term relationships. 
p-value in parentheses. 
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Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Greece 
gr 
-0.01 -0.02 0.50 -41.75 
cdsSov,t> 1.45 cdsFi,t+( -1.00 ) 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (14.01) 
aca 
-0.22 -0.33 -0.10 -39.96 
(0.21) (0.32) (0.20) (46.60) 
Greece 
gr 
0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.57 
cdsSov,t> 1.18 cdsFi,t+( -0.68 ) 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.14) (0.36) 
nbg 
0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.54 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.14) 
Ireland 
ie 
-0.20 -0.05 -0.91 0.46 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.42 cdsFi,t+( -4.10 ) 
(0.72) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19) 
aib 
0.60 0.14 0.04 0.25 
(0.31) (0.07) (0.03) (0.13) 
Ireland 
ie 
-0.21 -0.04 -0.58 0.09 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.57 cdsFi,t+( -4.71 ) 
(0.15) (0.03) (0.23) (0.05) 
bki 
0.26 0.06 0.06 -0.01 
(0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Ireland 
ie 
-0.17 -0.03 -0.70 0.09 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.63 cdsFi,t+( -5.35 ) 
(0.16) (0.03) (0.18) (0.07) 
ipm 
0.18 0.03 0.07 0.03 
(0.15) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) 
Italy 
it 
-0.03 -0.01 -0.29 0.18 
cdsSov,t> 2.04 cdsFi,t+( -4.21 ) 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.11) (0.07) 
bci 
0.09 0.02 0.02 0.11 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.10) 
Italy 
it 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.65 0.44 
cdsSov,t> 1.77 cdsFi,t+( -2.78 ) 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.15) (0.18) 
mdb 
0.21 0.07 -0.09 -0.23 
(0.30) (0.11) (0.11) (0.36) 
Italy 
it 
0.03 0.00 -0.26 0.15 
cdsSov,t≤ -8.62 cdsFi,t+( 40.79 ) 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.11) (0.11) 
bmp 
0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.11 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.07) (0.11) 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Italy 
it 
0.53 -0.28 0.37 0.01 
cdsSov,t> 0.69 cdsFi,t+( 1.83 ) 
(0.26) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) 
pii 
-0.23 0.12 0.18 -0.10 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Italy 
it 
0.04 0.01 -0.33 0.34 
cdsSov,t> 1.76 cdsFi,t+( -3.65 ) 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.13) (0.12) 
uni 
0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.28 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.11) (0.09) 
Italy 
it 
-0.04 -0.27 0.19 0.32 
cdsSov,t> 1.11 cdsFi,t+( -0.22 ) 
(0.03) (0.16) (0.12) (0.25) 
ubi 
0.16 0.89 0.03 0.15 
(0.12) (0.75) (0.21) (0.24) 
Italy 
it 
0.01 0.00 -0.48 0.12 
cdsSov,t> 2.37 cdsFi,t+( -5.22 ) 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.19) (0.12) 
gas 
0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.47 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.16) 
Portugal 
pt 
-0.53 -0.17 0.01 0.07 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.37 cdsFi,t+( -3.05 ) 
(0.25) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
bcp 
0.90 0.29 -0.18 0.15 
(0.22) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Portugal 
pt 
-0.72 -0.21 0.01 0.05 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.42 cdsFi,t+( -3.33 ) 
(0.30) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
bes 
0.69 0.20 -0.15 0.26 
(0.28) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) 
Spain 
es 
0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.22 cdsFi,t+( -1.44 ) 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) 
bbv 
-0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.24) 
Spain 
es 
0.02 0.01 0.11 0.00 
cdsSov,t≤ 0.25 cdsFi,t+( 2.86 ) 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.14) (0.00) 
bkt 
0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.01 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Country ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Spain 
es 
0.10 -0.04 0.06 -1.52 
cdsSov,t> 0.63 cdsFi,t+( 2.25 ) 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (1.33) 
pop 
0.49 -0.17 0.33 -5.22 
(0.46) (0.16) (0.33) (8.66) 
Spain 
es 
0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.01 
cdsSov,t> 1.46 cdsFi,t+( -2.49 ) 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.13) (0.15) 
sab 
0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.13 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.13) 
Spain 
es 
-0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.20 cdsFi,t+( -1.27 ) 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
san 
-0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) 
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Table 4.5. Impulse Responses in Typical and Atypical Regimes for GIIPS Countries 
A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse 
variable. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10%. The two-letter variables indicate the CDS 
spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic financial institutions. 
Country Imp. Resp. 
Typical Regime Atypical Regime 
1 2 5 22 1 2 5 22 
Greece 
gr aca 
0.04 0.06 0.09* 0.27* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(1.02) (1.30) (2.10) (3.85) (0.78) (0.95) (1.11) (0.98) 
aca gr 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -34.99* -33.03* -24.83* -1.93 
(-0.66) (-0.85) (-1.23) (-1.36) (-917.20) (-8.89) (-5.03) (-0.64) 
gr nbg 
0.18* 0.23* 0.31* 0.61* -0.08* -0.03* -0.05* -0.04 
(7.54) (7.93) (8.72) (7.34) (-2.64) (-1.97) (-2.16) (-0.64) 
nbg gr 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.19 -0.49* -0.42* -0.89* -2.81* 
(0.07) (0.05) (-0.40) (-0.82) (-2.13) (-2.78) (-2.80) (-1.99) 
Ireland 
ie aib 
-0.01 0.00 0.04* 0.19* -0.02 0.09 0.24* 0.21* 
(-0.71) (0.05) (1.72) (4.05) (-0.15) (0.74) (2.14) (1.93) 
aib ie 
0.16* 0.15* 0.17* 0.24* 0.62* 0.97* 1.19* 1.06* 
(3.43) (3.55) (3.56) (2.36) (2.37) (3.16) (3.08) (2.91) 
ie bki 
0.03 0.04* 0.09* 0.27* 0.14* 0.15* 0.27* 0.40* 
(1.45) (2.69) (5.05) (7.94) (2.04) (4.33) (5.83) (8.48) 
bki ie 
0.11* 0.10* 0.11* 0.13* 0.13* 0.12* 0.19* 0.27* 
(2.82) (2.87) (2.76) (1.66) (2.78) (3.11) (2.99) (2.60) 
ie ipm 
0.05* 0.05* 0.08* 0.19* 0.33* 0.34* 0.41* 0.48* 
(2.45) (3.28) (4.49) (5.66) (3.75) (4.33) (6.21) (6.28) 
ipm ie 
0.07* 0.05* 0.06* 0.09 0.15* 0.25* 0.43* 0.58* 
(2.27) (2.35) (2.32) (1.53) (2.01) (3.53) (4.15) (3.92) 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
Impulse Responses 
Country Imp. Resp. 
Typical Regime Atypical Regime 
1 2 5 22 1 2 5 22 
Italy 
it bci 
0.15* 0.19* 0.23* 0.36* 0.05 0.12* 0.25* 0.42* 
(3.96) (4.18) (4.62) (4.43) (0.85) (3.45) (6.44) (10.09) 
bci it 
0.14* 0.16* 0.16* 0.12 0.13* 0.08* 0.08 0.06 
(5.89) (5.64) (4.40) (1.27) (2.46) (1.94) (1.30) (0.66) 
it mdb 
0.13* 0.15* 0.18* 0.30* 0.09 0.11* 0.16* 0.25* 
(4.56) (4.91) (5.64) (5.34) (1.50) (1.86) (2.22) (2.59) 
mdb it 
0.05* 0.06* 0.08* 0.14 0.22 0.35* 0.66* 1.22* 
(2.01) (2.16) (2.24) (1.62) (1.56) (2.55) (3.63) (3.15) 
it bmp 
0.12* 0.16* 0.18* 0.27* -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 
(3.21) (3.30) (3.44) (2.58) (-1.44) (-1.28) (-0.82) (0.54) 
bmp it 
0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.16* 0.14* 0.14* 0.11 
(0.52) (0.48) (0.32) (0.20) (2.95) (2.76) (2.14) (0.81) 
it pii 
0.06* 0.07* 0.07* 0.08 0.38* 0.48* 0.45* 0.39* 
(2.42) (2.43) (2.34) (1.38) (5.25) (5.29) (3.36) (3.24) 
pii it 
0.15* 0.17* 0.19* 0.25 0.28* 0.47* 0.59* 0.51* 
(4.64) (4.72) (4.81) (3.63) (3.33) (5.14) (7.52) (6.56) 
it uni 
0.08* 0.12* 0.19* 0.41* -0.02 0.08 0.28* 0.56* 
(2.25) (2.83) (4.29) (6.13) (-0.28) (1.45) (5.23) (8.82) 
uni it 
0.08* 0.09* 0.10* 0.13 0.30* 0.26* 0.18* 0.06 
(2.86) (2.87) (2.39) (1.19) (5.99) (4.71) (2.48) (0.52) 
it ubi 
0.15* 0.17* 0.23* 0.40* 0.08* 0.14* 0.19* 0.18* 
(4.56) (5.11) (6.24) (6.77) (1.72) (2.10) (1.98) (1.87) 
ubi it 
0.04* 0.06* 0.12* 0.30* 0.70* 1.08* 1.23* 1.17* 
(2.00) (2.82) (4.13) (4.56) (4.20) (5.17) (6.86) (5.92) 
it gas 
0.12* 0.14* 0.17* 0.28* -0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.39* 
(3.67) (3.91) (4.44) (4.40) (-0.64) (-0.08) (1.30) (4.16) 
gas it 
0.11* 0.13* 0.12* 0.07* 0.12 0.11 0.09 -0.02 
(4.35) (4.17) (3.20) (0.76) (0.84) (0.72) (0.42) (-0.05) 
 (Continued) 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
Country Imp. Resp. 
Typical Regime Atypical Regime 
1 2 5 22 1 2 5 22 
Portugal 
pt bcp 
0.15* 0.21* 0.27* 0.50* 0.30* 0.54* 0.52* 0.47* 
(5.62) (6.01) (6.86) (6.86) (3.11) (7.61) (8.11) (7.58) 
bcp pt 
0.10* 0.12* 0.12* 0.07* 0.32* 0.38* 0.33* 0.30* 
(3.30) (3.19) (2.54) (0.65) (3.40) (3.87) (3.80) (3.79) 
pt bes 
0.14* 0.19* 0.26* 0.49* 0.11 0.29* 0.39* 0.35* 
(4.97) (5.41) (6.56) (7.50) (1.19) (3.75) (5.71) (5.29) 
bes pt 
0.08* 0.10* 0.09* 0.01 0.44* 0.57* 0.57* 0.52* 
(2.71) (2.57) (1.84) (0.06) (4.27) (4.64) (4.49) (4.47) 
Spain 
es bbv 
0.20* 0.25* 0.38* 0.80* -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09 
(5.56) (6.48) (7.37) (6.43) (-0.16) (0.16) (0.61) (0.78) 
bbv es 
0.14* 0.13* 0.06 -0.18 0.24 0.48* 0.90* 1.10* 
(3.61) (2.94) (1.05) (-1.13) (1.47) (3.15) (4.49) (2.56) 
es bkt 
0.08* 0.08* 0.09* 0.14* 0.27 0.36 0.55 0.71* 
(5.01) (5.09) (5.08) (3.31) (0.82) (1.15) (1.63) (1.71) 
bkt es 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05* 0.11* 0.16* 
(-0.91) (-0.81) (-0.50) (0.97) (0.96) (1.94) (3.12) (2.52) 
es pop 
0.11* 0.13* 0.16* 0.27* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 0.00 
(3.55) (3.75) (4.16) (3.61) (-4.55) (-3.93) (-2.08) (0.11) 
pop es 
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.22* 0.60* 
(0.54) (0.59) (0.71) (0.73) (1.60) (1.62) (1.67) (1.85) 
es sab 
0.12* 0.14* 0.17* 0.27* 0.05 0.10 0.20* 0.42 
(7.04) (7.22) (7.54) (5.57) (0.57) (1.08) (1.90) (2.20) 
sab es 
0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.24 
(1.81) (1.81) (1.67) (0.84) (0.88) (1.07) (1.34) (1.31) 
es san 
0.22* 0.28* 0.41* 0.84* 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.22* 
(5.67) (6.62) (7.72) (6.97) (0.33) (0.86) (1.54) (1.86) 
san es 
0.09* 0.06 -0.01 -0.29* 0.12 0.33* 0.72* 1.19 
(2.19) (1.47) (-0.24) (-1.87) (0.94) (2.67) (4.24) (3.35) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
FUNCTIONAL COINTEGRATION OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT RISK 
VIA INVESTMENT SENTIMENT 
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5. Functional Cointegration of Sovereign Default Risk via Investor Sentiment 
5.1. Introduction 
Default probabilities and recovery capability of economies vary through business 
cycles (Acharya et al. (2011)). Changes in sovereign default risk of countries could 
have contagious influence on each other via changing the supply and demand of 
foreign credit, since investors' perceptions are responsive to market instability (Drudi 
and Giordano (2000), Dooley and Verma (2001) and Tomz and Wright (2008)). It is 
essential to investigate the interactions of countries' default risk so that to foresee the 
risk transmission cross-country and to prevent further deterioration. 
The main objective in this study is to investigate the functional cointegrated 
relationship between two series of sovereign default risk of the Eurozone countries 
via a functional coefficient, which is the investor sentiment in the two countries, 
since investor sentiment is the most important determinant of default risk (Tang and 
Yan (2010)). The findings show that, investor sentiment predicts jumps or regimes in 
countries' default risk. The long-run relationship of countries' default risk changes in 
different regimes. When the economic environment is stable, the gap between two 
countries' default risk is small, and it is easier for one country to close the gap of 
default risk towards the other. During crisis time, however, the trench of default risk 
between countries is larger, and the elasticity of the countries' default risk is smaller, 
indicating more difficulties to drive the two countries' default risk back towards the 
normal status. 
Recent literature on the dynamics of countries' default risk and other financial 
variables has focused on nonlinear regime models with parametric specifications 
such as threshold models and others with structural breaks. This study however, uses 
an alternative model by allowing the coefficients of linear structures to be functional 
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following the methodology by Banerjee and Pitarakis (2013). Such models with 
semiparametric specifications are generally referred as functional coefficient models, 
which can avoid the problematic nature of the nonparametric structures such as 
spurious correlation (see Granger and Newbold (1974)). 
The meaning of cointegration is that the linear combination of the non-stationary 
variables is stationary, which indicates that the variables involved in the regression 
do not drift apart through time, and that the cointegrating vector reveals the long-run 
relationship of the variables (see Engle and Granger (1987)). Furthermore, it is 
possible that there are shifts in the cointegrating vector, which means the long-run 
relationship changes, and non-linear regime models have been introduced with one 
or more structural breaks in cointegration (see Gregory and Hansen (1996a) and 
Hatemi-J (2008)). However, for the semiparametric model, the functional 
coefficients within the simple linear structure are able to capture more specifications 
such as regime shifts. 
To capture the sovereign default risk, the study uses sovereign credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads of ten European countries, including Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), 
Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Netherland (NL), Spain 
(ES), Sweden (SE), and the United Kingdom (UK) from January 2004 to September 
2013. Germany CDS spreads are used as the benchmark default risk, since German 
financial performance has been relatively more stable than other European countries, 
especially than other Eurozone countries, and German government has been the 
main contributor of the bailouts during the global financial crisis and the recent 
European sovereign debt crisis. The cointegration of sovereign default risk between 
Germany and one of the other European countries is examined, and the functional 
coefficients are regressions of investor sentiment. For countries' investor sentiment, 
the study applies three measures, which are Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), 
put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) and put-call open interest ratio (PCO). 
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Behavioural theories suggest that market optimism or pessimism or fluctuations in 
the economic environment could make asset prices deviate from their intrinsic values 
(see Chung et al (2012), De Long et al (1990) and Kumar and Lee (2006)). Recent 
financial economists have indicated that investor sentiment is an important factor 
which affects the returns and volatility of assets, especially for the stock market. 
Previous research has shown that the mispricing is corrected when the economic 
fundamental are revealed and is reflected in sentiment directly. This suggests the 
predictive power of investor sentiment for pricing correction. 
When recent European sovereign debt crisis develops, more and more attention has 
been concentrated at the pricing correction power on credit spreads, as credit default  
swap spreads measure the default risk of an entity. Tang and Yan (2010) have 
concluded through empirical analysis on corporate CDS spreads that investor 
sentiment is the most important determinant of default risk. 
The investigation in this chapter contributes to the application of investor sentiment 
in analysing the pricing correction of sovereign default risk. More specifically, for 
the application of the model, the gap of the default risk between the benchmark 
country and the other European country changes during the crises, and the functional 
coefficients of investor sentiment measure the mispricing of the default risk of the 
underlying country and the adjustment speed for the country to close this gap. The 
results show that, during crisis periods, the pricing correction power of the sovereign 
default risk is weaker for most countries towards a relatively stable level. 
The remaining part of this study is organised as follows. Section 5.2 is the data 
description. Section 5.3 explains the estimation methodology. Section 5.4 analyses 
the results, and section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2. Data Description 
5.2.1. Sovereign Default Risk 
The study uses CDS spreads to capture credit default risk of the government. Studies 
have shown that CDS spreads can measure investors' risk preference. According to 
Hull et al. (2004), both changes and levels of CDS spreads contain significant 
information in estimating the probability of rating events, but CDS spread changes 
conditional on rating events, and downgrade announcement and negative outlooks 
do not have helpful information. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) analyse the 
relationship between the sovereign CDS spreads and the sovereign credit rating, and 
show that investors can make decisions according to the same public information 
that would lead to the changes in CDS spreads prior to a rating announcement. 
The daily data of CDS spreads is collected from DataStream. The selection of 
sovereign CDS series was restricted by data availability. Ten European countries is 
included, namely Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), 
Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Netherland (NL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), and the 
United Kingdom (UK). Five-year CDS is used, since it is the largest and the most 
liquid constituent of the CDS markets, and the restructuring types for the sovereign 
CDS series are all Complete Restructuring (CR). 
[Insert Figure 5.1] 
The data set starts from January 2004 to September 2013. Figure 5.1 shows the 
sovereign CDS spreads for the ten countries in the sample. The CDS spreads for the 
European countries increase in 2009 which is the period of global financial crisis. 
The CDS spreads also increase sharply after 2010 which is the Eurozone crisis, 
especially for Italy and Spain. Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of the CDS 
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spreads of the countries. The table shows that the mean and standard deviation of 
CDS spreads are especially high for Italy and Spain, indicating their sovereign 
default risk is high and unstable. 
[Insert Table 5.1] 
5.2.2. Investor Sentiment 
Previous research has been using the composite index of investor sentiment firstly 
introduced by Baker and Wurgler (2006), the Conference Board Consumer 
Confidence Index or the University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Index when 
analysing the U.S. market (see Chung et al. (2012), Ho and Hung (2012), Mclean 
and Zhao (2012) and Tang and Yan (2010)). Ho and Hung (2012) firstly apply 
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) developed by the European Commission for 
the European countries, and this study also uses CCI as one of the sentiment 
measures. The CCI is based on harmonised surveys for different sectors of the 
countries in the European Union (EU). For analysing high frequency data of 
sovereign default risk of each country, the monthly CCI data is transferred into daily 
data by applying the same value in a month. 
For the high frequency data, the put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) and the put-call 
open interest ratio (PCO) are also used, which are introduced in Wang et al. (2006). 
PCV is the ratio of trading volume of put options to call options, and PCO is the 
ratio of open interest of put to call options. Since market participants buy put options 
when they are pessimistic of the market, the PCV or the PCV ratio goes up 
indicating higher mispricing of the assets. The continuous series of option data is 
chosen from Thomson Financial for the European countries (see Appendix 17), and 
the trading volume and the open interest are the total trading volume and the open 
interest of all puts or calls for the day for all expiry months, respectively.  
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[Insert Table 5.2] 
Table 5.2 show the summary statistics of the CCI, PCV and PCO indices. The table 
shows that the mean of CCI indices for Italy and Spain are low, -25 and -24, 
respectively, while no obvious difference are found when checking the PCO and 
PCV ratios.  
5.3. Estimation Methodology 
The methodology applies the model by Banerjee and Pitarakis (2013) to examine the 
functional cointegration of two countries' default risk via the investor sentiment as 
the functional coefficient. The following functional coefficient model is considered:  
ttdetttSov ucdssentfsentfcds   ,1110, )()( ,                             (5.1) 
ttdetde vcdscds  1,, .                                               (5.2) 
where tSovcds ,  is sovereign CDS spread in log-level of the European countries at 
day t, and tdecds , , German CDS spreads in log-level, is taken as I(1) process. tsent  
is the residuals generated from the linear regression of the two countries' CCI, PCV 
or PCO, and )(0 tsentf  and )(1 tsentf  are the unknown functional regressions of 
tsent . The functional coefficients can be specialised to parametric specifications 
such as threshold effects, or polynomial expressions, i.e., 

 
n
j
j
tjiti sentsentf
0
1,1)(   
among others. 
To explore the reliable estimates of the functional coefficients and to test their 
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consistency, the piecewise local linear estimation method (PLLE) method by 
Banerjee (2007) is applied in the context of average derivative estimation. The full 
range of tsent  is separated in to k disjoint bins of equal length. The optional k is 
selected via a standard selection based approach. Lower bound kmin and upper bound 
kmax are set for the number of bins, and the optimal k is chosen according to the 
minimisation of an AIC type of criterion. For every tsent  falling in a certain bin, 
the corresponding tSovcds ,  and tdecds ,  are connected to fit the least square line in 
that bin. As these bins are disjoint, there is no overlapping data of tSovcds ,  and 
tdecds ,  for different locations of tsent  under the PLLE method. 
Fluctuations in the economic environment may cause the fact that the combination of 
two countries' default risk derives from their long-run equilibrium, and in the 
functional cointegration model, )( 10 tsentf  measures the mispricing of the two 
countries' default risk, which is the gap of sovereign default risk between tSovcds ,  
and tdecds , , while tdecds ,  is considered as the benchmark of European default risk. 
)( 11 tsentf  reflects how the default risk of other European country responds when 
the default risk of Germany changes. )( 11 tsentf  is the adjustment speed of the two 
countries closing the gap of default risk. In other words, )( 11 tsentf  is the driving 
force of Sovcds  to the more stable decds .  
When the optimal number of bins k is larger than 2, the estimates of the functional 
coefficients )(0 tsentf  and )(1 tsentf  is considered to be polynomial regression of 
tsent  in the following expressions:  
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ttttt vsentsentsentsentf ,0
3
12,0
2
12,011,00,010 )(
ˆ    ,                (5.3) 
ttttt vsentsentsentsentf ,1
3
12,1
2
12,111,10,111 )(
ˆ    .                  (5.4) 
If the optimal number of bins k is 2, the model suggests that the functional 
coefficients )( 10 tsentf  and )( 11 tsentf  are specialised to the two-regime shifts. In 
the two-regime semiparametric model, )( 10 tsentf  and )( 11 tsentf  shift in opposite 
directions, i.e., when )( 10 tsentf  has the lower value, )( 11 tsentf  has the higher 
value. The regime, in which )( 10 tsentf  has the lower value, and )( 11 tsentf  has 
the higher value, is defined as typical regime or common regime, and the opposite 
regime as the atypical regime or crisis regime. During the typical regime, the gap of 
default risk between the underlying country and Germany is small, which indicates 
that the underlying country has lower default probability, and the adjustment speed is 
higher suggesting that it is easier for the underlying country to move closer to its 
long-run level. During the atypical regime or in the crisis, the default risk of the 
underlying country rises and causes bigger gap between the two countries, and on 
the other hand, since the response of the underlying country is slow, lower 
adjustment speed suggesting that it is more difficult to move back to its long-run 
equilibrium. 
5.4. Empirical Findings 
This section analyses the linkages of sovereign default risk between the European 
countries via investor sentiment by applying Banerjee and Pitarakis (2013) 
Piecewise Local Linear estimation (PLLE) method. 
First, the results of the model are examined using the put-call open interest ratio 
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(PCO) as investor sentiment. PCO is daily data and covers data of all the ten 
European countries. Table 5.3 shows the results of cointegration tests of sovereign 
default risk using PCO. Panel A of Table 5.3 shows the countries that can be linear 
cointegrated, since their ADF p-values are smaller than 0.1, which means that they 
do not have unit roots significantly. The ADF p-values for Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE) and Sweden (SE) are 0.01, 0.05 and 0.08, respectively. Then the linear 
coefficients α0 and α1 are checked for each pair of countries 
(Austria/Belgium/Sweden and Germany). The linear coefficients α0 and α1 are all 
significant at 0.1 level. Despite the signs of the α0 coefficients, the absolute α0 value 
for the linkage between Belgium and Germany is 26.37, which is the largest 
suggesting relatively largest gap of default risk between the underlying country and 
Germany. On the other hand, the α1 coefficient of the linkage between Belgium and 
Germany (4.45) is also the largest among three, indicating that the adjustment speed 
of Belgium is also higher in order to close the gap towards the benchmark country, 
Germany. 
[Insert Table 5.3] 
Panel B and Panel C in Table 5.3 show the countries that cannot be linear 
cointegrated, but the linear coefficients α0 and α1 are still displayed for comparison 
purpose. In Panel B and Panel C, the linear ADF p-values are all larger than 0.1, 
suggesting that they statistically cannot reject the null hypothesis of having unit 
roots. 
Panel B lists the countries which cointegration with German default risk has optimal 
k=2 bins, and these countries are France (FR), Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). The right side of Panel B shows the ADF p-values in the 
semiparametric model and the values of functional coefficients f0 and f1. The ADF 
p-values for all the countries are all 0, indicating that the variables can be functional 
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cointegrated. Since the optimal number of bins k is 2, the functional coefficients f0 
and f1 are two piecewise functions of sentt-1, which means the functional coefficients 
f0 and f1 are bivalued and fall into two regimes. From the results of the functional 
coefficients when k=2, an interesting phenomenon for all the countries (FR, NL, ES 
and UK) is that when the value of f0(sentt-1) is lower, f1(sentt-1) is higher, and vice 
versa. The cointegration of default risk between Spain and Germany is showed as an 
example. When f0(sentt-1) is 14.75, f1(sentt-1) is 5.20; when f0(sentt-1) is 21.31, 
f1(sentt-1) is 1.80. The former situation with lower f0 and higher f1 is defined as 
typical regime or common regime, and the latter one with higher f0 and lower f1 as 
atypical regime or crisis regime. Since in the typical regime, the default risk of the 
underlying country is lower and more stable, suggesting lower gap to the default risk 
of the benchmark country; the response of the underlying country is quick in order to 
close the gap between the two countries. During the atypical regime or during crisis 
period in other words, however, the CDS spread of the underlying country can rise 
sharply in the short term, causing the trench of default risk further widen between the 
country and the benchmark. On the other hand, the adjustment speed f1 is higher 
compared to that in the typical regime, indicating that the problem is getting worse 
and it is more difficult for the country to close this gap.  
The red dots in Figures 5.2-5.4 show the distribution of functional coefficients with 
time. If the countries can be functional cointegrated, and the optimal number of bins 
is 2, then the red dots are bi-valued; if the number of bins is larger than 2, the layers 
of red dots show the number of bins, and the smoothed curves of their polynomial 
regressions would be shown below. Figure 5.2 illustrates the functional coefficients 
of PCO when k=2 for France, Netherlands, Spain and UK. For example, in the case 
of France, k=2 which means the series of CDS spreads of France can be functional 
cointegrated with German CDS spreads with two optimal bins. When f0(sentt-1) is 
lower (-3.51), f1(sentt-1) is higher (2.15); When f0(sentt-1) is higher (16.72), f1(sentt-1) 
is lower (1.45). It is obvious from the figure that each of the functional coefficients is 
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bivalued, and the atypical regime with higher f0 and lower f1 is mainly located 
around late 2009 and the period from 2010 to 2012, and these periods are the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis from May 
2010. The figure provides further evidence that the functional coefficients of sentt-1 
are capable to capture the structural features and to position the regime shifts. 
[Insert Figure 5.2] 
Panel C in Table 5.3 shows the results of countries that can be functional 
cointegrated with optimal k larger than to 2. The linear ADF p-values for Denmark 
and Italy are 0.51 and 0.24, respectively, indicating that they cannot be linear 
cointegrated. In the right side of the table, the AIC ADF p-values are all 0, which 
means the countries are functional cointegrated. Polynomial regressions are applied 
for the functional coefficients for the f0(sentt-1) and f1(sentt-1). For Italy, the 
polynomial coefficients are all significant at 0.1 level, and for Denmark, of ß0,1 of 
f0(sentt-1) and ß1,0 and ß1,1 of f1(sentt-1) are significant. Such results suggest that the 
coefficients are non-linear, and the data is more suitable with functional 
cointegration. Figure 5.3 shows the results of functional coefficients of PCO when k 
is larger than 2, and Panel A and B are Denmark and Italy, respectively. The first two 
charts in each panel are the distribution of functional coefficients f0(sentt-1) and 
f1(sentt-1) with time, and the other two are the polynomial regressions of the 
functional coefficients. From the first two charts, it shows that when f0 is lower, f1 is 
higher, and vice versa. The points with high f0 and low f1 are mainly located after 
2010 for Denmark and late 2009 for Italy, suggesting that in these periods, the 
countries are in the atypical regime that their gaps of default risk are larger, and it is 
more difficult for them to respond, especially for Italy. 
[Insert Figures 5.3 and 5.4] 
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Table 5.4 shows the results of cointegration tests of sovereign default risk using the 
put-call volume ratio (PCV). PCV is also daily data, but due to data availability of 
trading volume of put/call options, only the data of Austria (AT), Sweden (SE), Italy 
(IT), Netherland (NL) and the United Kingdom (UK) is available. Panel A of Table 
5.4 shows that Austria and Sweden cannot be linear cointegrated, and Panel B shows 
that the other three countries are functional cointegrated. The optimal k is 2 for the 
functional cointegration, and the results of all the countries in Panel B show the 
same results as using PCO as investor sentiment that when f0 is lower, f1 is higher, 
and vice versa. For example, when the functional coefficient f0 is 31.13, f1 is 4.03, 
and when f0 is 24.57, f1 is 5.03. Figure 5.4 is the charts of the functional coefficients 
with time for Italy, Netherland and UK when optimal k is 2. For example, in the case 
of Italy, k=2 means the series of CDS spreads of Italy can be functional cointegrated 
with German CDS spreads with two optimal bins. When f0(sentt-1) is lower (24.57), 
f1(sentt-1) is higher (5.03); When f0(sentt-1) is higher (31.13), f1(sentt-1) is lower (4.03). 
Such results provide similar evidence that functional cointegration can measure the 
regime shifts. 
[Insert Tables 5.4 and 5.5] 
Table 5.5 is the results of cointegration of sovereign default risk using Consumer 
Confidence Indicator (CCI) as the investor sentiment. Since CCI is monthly data, the 
monthly CCI is transferred into daily data by applying the same value in a month, 
and the functional cointegration model is used to see whether similar results can be 
found. The findings show that the optimal k is larger than 2 for the countries which 
cannot be linear cointegrated (see Panel B). The right side of Panel B shows the 
results of polynomial regressions for the functional coefficients f0 and f1, and most of 
the polynomial coefficients are significant, suggesting that the coefficients are not 
constant. But the ß0,0 coefficients are very large, for example, for Italy and Spain are 
84.56 and 93.80, respectively. ß0,0 coefficients are the constant terms in the 
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polynomial regressions of f0, and larger ß0,0 coefficients suggests that the CDS 
spread level gap between the underlying country and the benchmark Germany is 
larger. The results of CCI show similar results as PCO and PCV, suggesting that 
when the variables are not linear cointegrated, the functional cointegration tests can 
be applied on the variables, which reveal more features of the relationship. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the semiparametric models introduced by Banerjee and Pitarakis 
(2013) are used to analyse the cointegrated relationship of sovereign default risk of 
the European countries, and the functional coefficients of the relationship are 
regressions on an investor sentiment variable. The study uses three measures of 
investor sentiment, which are Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), put-call trading 
volume ratio (PCV) and put-call open interest ratio (PCO). 
The results show that when the variables cannot be linear cointegrated, the functional 
cointegration are more suitable for the data. The functional coefficients are able to 
capture the structural features or the regimes shifts. The findings indicate that in the 
typical regime, the default risk of the underlying country is lower and more stable, 
suggesting lower gap to the default risk of the benchmark country; the response of 
the underlying country is quick in order to close the gap between the two countries. 
During the crisis periods, however, the CDS spread of the underlying country can 
rise sharply in the short term, causing the trench of default risk further widen 
between the country and the benchmark; the adjustment speed is slower compared to 
that in the typical regime, indicating that it is more difficult for the country to close 
this gap. 
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Figure 5.1. Sovereign CDS spreads for ten European countries 
The figure plots the daily five-year senior CDS spreads in basis points of the ten European countries, 
including Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Netherlands 
(NL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK), from 07 January 2004 to 30 September 2013. 
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Panel A. France 
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Panel B. Netherlands 
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Panel C. Spain 
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Panel D. UK 
  
Figure 5.2. Functional Coefficients of PCO in Cointegration of Sovereign Default Risk when k=2 
The figure plots the estimates of the functional coefficients of investor sentiment using PCO under the optimal bins (k=2). The red dots show the distribution of functional coefficients with 
time. If the countries can be functional cointegrated, and the optimal number of bins is 2, then the red dots are bi-valued. For example, in the case of France, k=2 means the series of CDS 
spreads of France can be functional cointegrated with German CDS spreads with two optimal bins. When f0(sentt-1) is lower (-3.51), f1(sentt-1) is higher (2.15); When f0(sentt-1) is higher 
(16.72), f1(sentt-1) is lower (1.45). 
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Panel A. Denmark 
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Panel A. Denmark (continued) 
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Panel B. Italy 
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Panel B. Italy (continued) 
 
Figure 5.3. Functional Coefficients of PCO in Cointegration of Sovereign Default Risk when k>2 
The figure plots the estimates of the functional coefficients of investor sentiment using PCO under the optimal bins (k>2). If the countries can be functional cointegrated, and the optimal 
number of bins is larger than 2, the layers of red dots show the number of bins, and the smoothed curves of their polynomial regressions would be shown below. 
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Panel A. Italy 
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Panel B. Netherlands 
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Panel C. UK 
 
Figure 5.4. Functional Coefficients of PCV in Cointegration of Sovereign Default Risk when k=2 
The figure plots the estimates of the functional coefficients of investor sentiment using PCV under the optimal bins (k=2). The red dots show the distribution of functional coefficients with 
time. If the countries can be functional cointegrated, and the optimal number of bins is 2, then the red dots are bi-valued. For example, in the case of Italy, k=2 means the series of CDS 
spreads of Italy can be functional cointegrated with German CDS spreads with two optimal bins. When f0(sentt-1) is lower (24.57), f1(sentt-1) is higher (5.03); When f0(sentt-1) is higher 
(31.13), f1(sentt-1) is lower (4.03).
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Table 5.1. Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads of Ten European Countries 
This table shows the means, minimum values, maximum values, standard deviations and numbers of 
observations of the sovereign CDS spreads with Euro denomination in basis points. The time series start from 
07 January 2004 until 30 September 2013. 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
Austria 38.57  0.50  273.00  46.45  2539 
Belgium 54.59  1.00  341.98  66.51  2539 
Denmark 31.84  1.60  200.56  36.62  2539 
France 41.53  0.50  171.56  39.14  2120 
Germany 18.92  0.60  92.50  18.75  2538 
Italy 108.80  5.30  498.66  121.80  2530 
Netherlands 45.68  1.00  133.84  34.78  1811 
Spain 149.50  2.25  492.07  119.04  1811 
Sweden 27.99  1.00  160.80  27.75  2539 
UK 55.50  4.50  165.00  28.86  1535 
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Table 5.2. Summary Statistics of CCI, PCO and PCV 
This table shows the means, minimum values, maximum values, standard deviations and numbers of 
observations of the CCI, PCO and PCV indices for the European countries. Consumer Confidence Indicator 
(CCI) is developed by the European Commission based on harmonised surveys for different sectors of the 
EU members. The time series of CCI start from 01 November 2006 until 30 September 2013. Put-call open 
interest ratio (PCO) is the ratio of open interest of put to call options, and put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) 
is the ratio of trading volume of put to call options. The time series of PCO and PCV starts from 07 January 
2004 until 30 September 2013. The variables of PCO and PCV are chosen according to data availability, and 
the number of observations in each regression is decided by variable having less observations. 
Panel A. CCI 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
Austria -1.27  -23.00  16.30  10.04  1803 
Belgium -10.28  -26.50  2.90  7.94  1803 
Denmark 8.37  -7.40  19.00  6.34  1803 
France -20.82  -37.00  1.80  8.76  1803 
Germany -5.20  -32.90  10.90  10.99  1803 
Italy -25.00  -41.50  -13.80  7.20  1803 
Netherlands -6.03  -30.20  20.30  14.05  1803 
Spain -24.18  -47.60  -10.00  9.83  1803 
Sweden 12.04  -10.00  28.00  9.75  1803 
UK -15.23  -35.20  -1.00  8.18  1803 
Panel B. PCO 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
Austria 2.07  0.28  11.57  1.65  2526 
Belgium 1.78  0.00  19.50  2.83  684 
Denmark 1.30  0.34  3.60  0.64  274 
France 1.16  0.12  1.85  0.18  2186 
Germany 1.29  0.88  1.69  0.19  2534 
Italy 1.01  0.55  1.84  0.18  1679 
Netherlands 1.09  0.79  1.75  0.11  2532 
Spain 1.10  0.00  157.82  5.46  1655 
Sweden 1.09  0.45  1.85  0.32  1634 
UK 1.26  0.90  1.55  0.14  2536 
Panel C. PCV 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Obs 
Austria 3.54  0.00  323.00  13.52  1674 
Germany 1.33  0.31  7.27  0.48  2482 
Italy 1.09  0.22  4.87  0.39  1635 
Netherlands 1.18  0.07  3.19  0.29  2494 
Sweden 1.28  0.14  8.39  0.78  1576 
UK 1.52  0.19  10.75  0.82  2458 
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Table 5.3. Linear and Non-Linear Cointegration Tests of Sovereign Default Risk via 
PCO 
This table shows results of linear and non-linear cointegration tests of the sovereign default risk via 
functional coefficients of investment sentiment using PCO. Each regression tests the relationship of 
sovereign default risk between Germany and one of other European countries. Panel A shows the variables 
that can be linear cointegrated, and the ADF p-values and the linear coefficients are displayed with t-values in 
parentheses.  
Panel B uses the following functional coefficient model: 
ttdetttSov ucdssentfsentfcds   ,1110, )()( , 
ttdetde vcdscds  1,, . 
In Panel B, variables cannot be linear cointegrated while their optimal k is two in the semiparametric 
specifications. The linear coefficients are showed for comparison. The functional coefficients of investor 
sentiment under the two bins (k=2) are showed separately. 
Panel C shows the variables that cannot be linear cointegrated while their optimal k is larger than two. 
Polynomial regressions of investor sentiment with the following expressions are applied: 
ttttt vsentsentsentsentf ,0
3
12,0
2
12,011,00,010 )(
ˆ    , 
ttttt vsentsentsentsentf ,1
3
12,1
2
12,111,10,111 )(
ˆ    . 
The polynomial coefficients of the functional specifications are displayed with t-values in parentheses. 
Panel A: Linear Cointegrated 
Country Linear 
adf 
Linear coefficients 
 p-value α0 α1 
Austria 0.01  -5.41*** 2.33*** 
 
  (-11.96) (136.82) 
Belgium 0.05  -26.37*** 4.45*** 
   (-12.94) (80.89) 
Sweden 0.08  9.85*** 0.99*** 
    (9.97) (33.34) 
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
Panel B: Functional Cointegrated with Optimal k=2             
 
Linear Non-linear 
      
Country Linear adf Linear coefficients Optimal k AIC adf  Functional coefficients 
      
 p-value α0 α1 
 
p-value f0 f1 
      
France 0.14  1.41** 1.82*** 2 0.00  -3.51  2.15  
      
   (2.37) (89.28) 
  
16.72  1.45  
      
Netherlands 0.34  5.22*** 1.59*** 2 0.00  7.20  1.59  
      
 
  (7.18) (68.91) 
  
21.71  1.28  
      
Spain 0.26  63.49*** 3.61*** 2 0.00  14.75  5.20  
      
   (14.80) (27.72) 
  
21.31  1.80  
      
UK 0.18  12.08*** 1.47*** 2 0.00  18.68  1.09  
      
 
  (17.16) (71.34) 
  
5.92  1.74  
      
Panel C: Functional Cointegrated with Optimal k>2 
  Linear Non-linear 
Country Linear adf Linear coefficients 
Optimal k AIC adf  
Polynomial coeff. of f(0) 
t-stats. in parentheses 
Polynomial coeff. of f(1) 
t-stats. in parentheses 
 p-value α0 α1 
 
p-value β0,0 β0,1 β0,2 β0,3 β1,0 β1,1 β1,2 β1,3 
Denmark 0.51  -2.83** 1.46 47 0.00  5.88 20.20* 20.01 -47.55 0.86*** -1.58** -0.61 4.72 
   (-2.06) (18.66) 
  
(1.19) (1.78) (0.37) -0.52 (2.64) (-2.10) (-0.17) (0.78) 
Italy 0.24  43.99*** 4.23*** 22 0.00  58.70*** 354.33*** -246.59 -16,137.18*** 3.86*** -8.28*** 19.68* 290.17*** 
    (10.54) (33.15)     (13.42) (4.70) (-0.55) (-3.90) (33.37) (-4.15) (1.67) (2.65) 
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Table 5.4. Linear and Non-Linear Cointegration Tests of Sovereign Default Risk 
via PCV 
This table shows results of linear and non-linear cointegration tests of the sovereign default risk via 
functional coefficients of investment sentiment using PCV. Each regression tests the relationship of 
sovereign default risk between Germany and one of other European countries. Panel A shows the 
variables that can be linear cointegrated, and the ADF p-values and the linear coefficients are 
displayed with t-values in parentheses.  
Panel B uses the following functional coefficient model: 
ttdetttSov ucdssentfsentfcds   ,1110, )()( , 
ttdetde vcdscds  1,, . 
In Panel B, variables cannot be linear cointegrated while their optimal k is two in the semiparametric 
specifications. The linear coefficients are showed for comparison. The functional coefficients of 
investor sentiment under the two bins (k=2) are showed separately. 
Panel A: Linear Cointegrated 
Country Linear 
adf 
Linear coefficients 
 p-value α0 α1 
Austria 0.01  -5.41*** 2.33*** 
 
  (-11.96) (136.82) 
Sweden 0.08  9.85*** 0.99*** 
 
  (9.97) (33.34) 
Panel B: Functional Cointegrated with Optimal k=2 
 
Linear Non-linear 
Country Linear adf Linear coefficients 
Optimal k AIC adf  
Functional 
coefficients 
 p-value α0 α1   p-value f0 f1 
Italy 0.24  43.99*** 4.23*** 2 0.00  31.13  4.03  
 
  (10.54) (33.15)   
 
24.57  5.03  
Netherlands 0.34  5.22*** 1.59*** 2 0.00  5.83  1.56  
 
  (7.18) (68.91)   
 
7.97  1.57  
UK 0.18  12.08*** 1.47*** 2 0.00  13.66  1.40  
    (17.16) (71.34)     14.25  1.30  
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Table 5.5. Linear and Non-Linear Cointegration Tests of Sovereign Default Risk 
via CCI 
This table shows results of linear and non-linear cointegration tests of the sovereign default risk via 
functional coefficients of investment sentiment using PCO. Each regression tests the relationship of 
sovereign default risk between Germany and one of other European countries. Panel A shows the 
variables that can be linear cointegrated, and the ADF p-values and the linear coefficients are 
displayed with t-values in parentheses.  
Panel B uses the following functional coefficient model: 
ttdetttSov ucdssentfsentfcds   ,1110, )()( , 
ttdetde vcdscds  1,, . 
In Panel B, variables cannot be linear cointegrated while their optimal k is two in the semiparametric 
specifications. The linear coefficients are showed for comparison. The functional coefficients of 
investor sentiment under the two bins (k=2) are showed separately. 
Panel C shows the variables that cannot be linear cointegrated while their optimal k is larger than two. 
Polynomial regressions of investor sentiment with the following expressions are applied: 
ttttt vsentsentsentsentf ,0
3
12,0
2
12,011,00,010 )(
ˆ    , 
ttttt vsentsentsentsentf ,1
3
12,1
2
12,111,10,111 )(
ˆ    . 
The polynomial coefficients of the functional specifications are displayed with t-values in 
parentheses. 
Panel A: Linear Cointegrated 
Country Linear 
adf 
Linear coefficients 
 p-value α0 α1 
Austria 0.05  -6.78*** 2.36*** 
 
  (-8.94) (98.10) 
Sweden 0.03  10.87*** 0.97*** 
    (12.69) (35.69) 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
Panel B: Functional Cointegrated with Optimal k>2 
  Linear Non-linear 
Country Linear 
adf 
Linear coefficients 
Optimal k AIC adf  
Polynomial coeff. of f(0) 
t-stats. in parentheses 
Polynomial coeff. of f(1) 
t-stats. in parentheses 
 p-value α0 α1 
 
p-value β0,0 β0,1 β0,2 β0,3 β1,0 β1,1 β1,2 β1,3 
Belgium 0.19  -4.97*** 3.16*** 47 0.00  29.59*** -1.86 -0.22 -0.10** 2.23*** 0.29*** -0.01*** -0.01** 
   (-3.52) (70.70) 
  
(12.54) (-1.47) (-1.54) (-2.04) (35.29) (8.61) (-2.63) (-5.91) 
Denmark 0.33  -3.55*** 1.74*** 47 0.00  -11.21*** 0.59 0.54*** -0.01 2.13*** -0.14*** -0.04*** 0.00*** 
   (-4.42) (68.39) 
  
(-10.63) (1.61) (12.30) (-1.36) (41.53) (-7.60) (-17.71) (6.53) 
France 0.15  2.88*** 1.79*** 42 0.00  18.35*** -4.36*** -0.18*** 0.05*** 1.36*** 0.12*** 0.01*** -0.00*** 
   (3.71) (72.65) 
  
(16.37) (-13.03) (-4.17) (6.94) (29.29) (8.58) (4.64) (-7.26) 
Italy 0.25  35.34*** 4.45*** 47 0.00  84.56*** -15.20*** -0.52*** 0.13*** 3.05*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.00 
 
  (9.59) (38.06) 
  
(20.42) (-10.45) (-3.75) (4.61) (15.48) (-0.11) (9.46) (0.58) 
Netherlands 0.34  5.30*** 1.59*** 47 0.00  13.66*** -1.41*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 1.28*** 0.01 -0.00** -0.00*** 
 
  (7.23) (68.44) 
  
(18.65) (-7.94) (2.91) (5.56) (54.53) (1.57) (-2.16) (-4.89) 
Spain 0.24  48.46*** 3.99*** 47 0.00  93.80*** 0.03 -0.85*** 0.00 5.29*** -0.04 -0.01 0.00*** 
   (13.00) (33.72) 
  
(14.52) (0.02) (-5.44) (0.07) (24.57) (-0.77) (-1.61) (2.76) 
UK 0.18  12.11*** 1.47*** 47 0.00  23.53*** 1.63*** -0.33*** -0.01 1.18*** -0.04*** 0.01*** -0.00 
            (23.38) (5.12) (-11.49) (-1.61) (27.62) (-2.67) (11.15) (-1.16) 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
CONCLUSION 
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis investigates how credit default risk as reflected in credit default swap 
(CDS) spread is transferred in the European countries. The first empirical section 
analyses the default risk transfer between the sovereign and the financial institutions’ 
CDS series during the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. The results show that 
before the first Greek bailout by the EFSF in May 2010, two-way feedback effects 
exist between the two sectors in both the short and the long runs. After the first 
Greek bailout, the shocks in the financial institutions’ CDS spreads either exert 
significantly negative impacts on the sovereign CDS spreads or lose their influences. 
The study further analyses the effect of default risk transfer in Greece (the second 
bailout), Ireland and Portugal, and set sub-periods according to the bailouts to these 
three countries by the EFSF. The findings show that the transmissions of default risk 
from the financial sector to sovereign debt in each of the three countries are 
insignificant both before and after each of the bailouts. The default risk transfer is 
significant only when the first Greek bailout was issued. The transmission of default 
risk disappeared when the other countries requested for their own bailouts. This is 
defined as the “Greek effect” in this study. The implication of the findings is that the 
first bailout by the EFSF to Greece helps alleviate the financial systemic risk and 
break the private-to-public risk transfer. Since the investors perceived the 
forthcoming bailouts to the GIIPS countries, the EFSF has actually become the 
central bank of the whole Eurozone, and the default risk dropped in one single 
country will be shared in the long term by all the Eurozone countries. 
There are limitations to the EFSF bailout programme, as the EFSF raises funds only 
after an official aid request is made by a country. The EFSF funds are given to the 
governments, which in turn bailout individual institutions in the country, leading 
increases in the government default risk. The EFSF has been improved to the 
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European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a permanent bailout funding programme, and 
the current Spanish bailout has been passed on to the ESM in early 2013. The funds 
by the ESM are transferred in the form of ESM notes to individual banks through 
FROB, and these banks have been confirmed to receive certain amounts according to 
the bailout scheme. Further research could also be focused on the Spanish case in 
order to make comparison of different bailout policies. 
Following the study in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 applies the bivariate VEC model with a 
threshold effect to test the cointegration of the default risk of the sovereign and 
financial sectors for the GIIPS countries in two regimes, i.e., typical and atypical 
regimes. The results show that this model is able to detect structural breaks in the 
cointegration relationship between the sovereign and the financial sectors, and the 
structural breaks (atypical regime) are mainly found around the global credit crunch 
period (2007-2008) and the Eurozone crisis (since early 2010). 
The study further analyses the impulse responses between the sovereign default risk 
and the default risk of the financial institutions in the typical and atypical regimes. 
For the countries except Greece, positive interdependencies exist between the default 
risk of the sovereign and financial sectors. Importantly, the positive responses 
between the two sectors become stronger in the atypical regime, which implies that 
the sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to the default risk of the financial 
institutions is higher, and vice versa. For Greece, however, the results indicate that in 
the typical regime, only the impacts of the sovereign default risk on the default risk 
of the domestic financial sectors are positively significant. In the atypical regime, the 
public-to-private impacts become insignificant, and more importantly, the default 
risk of the financial institutions has negatively significant impact on the sovereign 
default risk. The implication of the findings is that the different pattern of the results 
across countries is due to the financial situation of the countries at the beginning of 
the financial crisis. For Greece, since the negative force is stronger than the positive 
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force in the default risk transfer from the financial sector to the sovereign sector in 
the atypical regime, the overall sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to a shock in 
the financial institutions is negative. 
Chapter 5 uses the semiparametric models introduced by Banerjee and Pitarakis 
(2013) to analyse the cointegrated relationship of sovereign default risk of the 
European countries, and the functional coefficients of the relationship are regressions 
on an investor sentiment variable. Three measures of investor sentiment are applied, 
which are Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), put-call trading volume ratio (PCV) 
and put-call open interest ratio (PCO). 
The results show that when the variables cannot be linear cointegrated, the functional 
cointegration are more suitable for the data. The functional coefficients are able to 
capture the structural features or the regimes shifts. The results indicate that in the 
typical regime, the default risk of the underlying country is lower and more stable, 
suggesting lower gap to the default risk of the benchmark country; the response of 
the underlying country is quick in order to close the gap between the two countries. 
During the crisis periods, however, the CDS spread of the underlying country can 
rise sharply in the short term, causing the trench of default risk further widen 
between the country and the benchmark; the adjustment speed is slower compared to 
that in the typical regime, indicating that it is more difficult for the country to close 
this gap. 
The implication of this thesis is twofold. First, the thesis provides a robust 
methodology for researchers and analysts in this area such as stress tests of 
institutions to test the default risk transfer between the public and private sectors, or 
among countries. The results from this thesis show that for the European countries, 
especially for the Eurozone countries, targeted bailout policies are cable to break the 
two-way feedback effect between sectors and realise the transfer of default risk. 
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Second, it is possible to observe or to predict the regime shift in the cointegration 
relationship of the sovereign default risk of the two countries by using investor 
sentiment indices of two countries, for example, one stable market (Germany), and 
one riskier country. Although this prediction is in the short run, since the thesis uses 
daily data, the methodology of using functional coefficients of investor sentiment is 
applicable for the analysis of data with low frequency (for example, annual data with 
longer period) or other markets rather than the Europe. 
152 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
EFSF Guarantee Commitments 
The commitments are made in accordance with the share of the guarantee countries in the paid-up capital of 
the European Central Bank. 
  
New EFSF 
Guarantee 
Commitments (€m) 
New EFSF 
contribution key (%) 
EFSF Amended 
Guarantee 
Commitments (€m) 
EFSF amended 
contribution key (%) 
Austria 21,639 2.78  21,639 2.99  
Belgium 27,032 3.47  27,032 3.72  
Cyprus 1,526 0.20  1,526 0.21  
Estonia 1,995 0.26  1,995 0.27  
Finland 13,974 1.79  13,974 1.92  
France 158,488 20.31  158,488 21.83  
Germany 211,046 27.06  211,046 29.07  
Greece 21,898 2.81  - 0.00  
Ireland 12,378 1.59  - 0.00  
Italy 139,268 17.86  139,268 19.18  
Luxembourg 1,947 0.25  1,947 0.27  
Malta 704 0.09  704 0.10  
Netherlands 44,446 5.70  44,446 6.12  
Portugal 19,507 2.50  - 0.00  
Slovakia 7,728 0.99  7,728 1.06  
Slovenia 3,664 0.47  3,664 0.51  
Spain 92,544 11.87  92,544 12.75  
Total 779,738 100 726,000 100 
Source: The EFSF FAQ Update 2012. http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf 
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Appendix 2 
EFSF Lending Operations to Greece (Second Bailout), Ireland and Portugal 
Beneficiary country 
Date of  
disbursement 
Amount disbursed Maturity 
Ireland 01/02/2011 €3.6 billion 18/07/2016 
 
10/11/2011 €3 billion 04/02/2022 
 
15/12/2011 €1 billion 23/08/2012 
 
12/01/2012 €1.2 billion 04/02/2015 
 
19/01/2012 €0.5 billion 19/07/2012 
 
03/04/2012 €2.7 billion 03/04/2037 
    
Portugal 22/06/2011 €3.7 billion 05/07/2021 
 
29/06/2011 €2.2 billion 05/12/2016 
 
20/12/2011 €1 billion 23/08/2012 
 
12/01/2012 €1.7 billion 04/02/2015 
 
19/01/2012 €1 billion 19/07/2012 
 
30/05/2012 €5.2 billion 30/05/2032 
 
17/07/2012 €2.6 billion 17/07/2038 
    
Greece 
   
PSI various dates €29.7 billion 24/02/2042 
Accrued interest various dates €4.8 billion 28/08/2037 
2nd progr. - Tranche 1 19/03/2012 €5.9 billion 19/03/2032 
2nd progr. - Tranche 2 10/04/2012 €3.3 billion 10/04/2027 
2nd progr. - Tranche 3  
(Bank recapitalisation) 
19/04/2012 €25 billion 19/04/2032 
2nd progr. - Tranche 4 10/05/2012 €4.2 billion 10/05/2027 
2nd progr. - Tranche 5 28/06/2012 €1 billion 28/06/2027 
Source: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/operations/index.htm 
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Appendix 3 
The CDS series of both the sovereign debts and the financial institutions are issued in Euro. In Panel B, CDS 
series in bold are the financial sector constituents of the iTraxx Europe index. 
Panel A. List of CDS Series of Sovereign Debts 
No Market Code Name 
1 Austria at REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA 
2 Belgium be KINGDOM OF BELGIUM 
3 France fr FRENCH REPUBLIC 
4 Germany de FEDERAL REP GERMANY 
5 Greece gr HELLENIC REPUBLIC 
6 Ireland ie IRELAND 
7 Italy it REPUBLIC OF ITALY 
8 Netherlands nl KINGDOM OF NETHERLANDS 
9 Portugal pt REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL 
10 Spain es KINGDOM OF SPAIN 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
Panel B. List of CDS Series of Financial Institutions 
No Market Code Name 
1 Austria rzb RAIF. ZNTRLBK. OSTER AG 
2 Austria ers ERSTE GROUP BANK AG  
3 Belgium kbc KBC GROUP NV  
4 France bnp BNP PARIBAS  
5 France car CREDIT AGRICOLE SA  
6 France sge SOCIETE GENERALE SA  
7 France cnt NATIXIS  
8 France axa AXA  
9 France sco SCOR SA  
10 France gfc GECINA SA 
11 France wed WENDEL INVESTI  
12 Germany ikb ALLIANZ SE  
13 Germany dbk COMMERZBANK AG  
14 Germany cbg DEUTSCHE BANK AG 
15 Germany muv HANNOVER RUCK.AG 
16 Germany alv IKB DT.INDUSTR.BANK AG 
17 Germany hnr MUNICH REINSURANCE CO 
18 Greece aca ALPHA BANK A.E.  
19 Ireland aib ALLIED IRISH BANKS  
20 Ireland bki BANK OF IRELAND  
21 Ireland ipm IRISH LIFE & PERM  
22 Italy bci INTESA SANPAOLO SPA 
23 Italy mdb MEDIOBANCA SPA  
24 Italy bmp BANCA MDP DI SIENA SPA  
25 Italy pii BCA PPO MILANO SOCO ARL 
26 Italy uni UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA 
27 Italy ubi UNIONE DI BANCHE 
28 Italy gas ASSIC GENI - SO PER AZN 
29 Netherlands abn ABN AMRO BANK NV 
30 Netherlands aen AEGON NV 
31 Netherlands ina ING VERZEKERINGEN NV 
32 Netherlands inb ING BANK NV 
33 Netherlands sns SNS BANK 
34 Portugal bcp BANCO COMR.PORTUGUES 
35 Portugal bes BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO SA 
36 Spain bbv BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARG 
37 Spain bkt BANKINTER SA 
38 Spain pop BANCO POPOLAR ESPN. SA 
39 Spain sab BANCO SABADELL SA 
40 Spain san BANCO STDR.CTL.HISP. SA 
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Appendix 4 
Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads of Ten EFSF Guarantee Countries 
This table shows the means, minimum values, maximum values and standard deviations of the CDS spreads 
with Euro denomination in basis points. The time series start from 13 November 2007 until 17 February 
2012.The two-letter variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. 
Market Variable Mean Min Max SD 
Austria 
at 66.63 2.50 265.00 56.66 
rzb 190.70 75.00 525.00 93.51 
ers 163.60 13.70 475.00 86.35 
Belgium 
be 48.95 5.60 158.00 32.22 
kbc 154.30 41.00 350.00 78.18 
France 
fr 31.67 4.50 96.50 21.49 
bnp 65.61 27.00 139.20 19.18 
car 87.35 35.00 217.30 22.69 
sge 88.52 29.00 197.80 23.40 
cnt 180.50 49.00 350.00 82.83 
axa 116.40 50.60 271.60 50.69 
sco 86.11 34.00 202.50 39.02 
gfc 553.60 172.40 1722.00 368.10 
wed 532.20 59.20 1198.00 278.30 
Germany 
de 26.01 3.30 92.50 19.14 
ikb 537.20 78.20 1400.00 348.80 
dbk 94.63 37.00 180.40 27.48 
cbg 84.37 39.10 165.50 24.40 
muv 53.43 25.50 126.50 17.60 
alv 79.06 43.00 192.50 27.29 
hnr 67.43 31.00 146.70 22.12 
Greece 
gr 158.70 10.00 1012.00 140.30 
aca 264.60 28.39 946.50 204.60 
(Continued) 
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Appendix 4 (continued) 
Market Variable Mean Min Max SD 
Ireland 
ie 125.30 7.60 390.00 90.44 
aib 222.00 60.00 675.00 125.30 
bki 231.00 60.00 662.50 129.40 
ipm 224.70 71.20 575.00 99.07 
Italy 
it 85.37 10.10 235.00 49.55 
bci 74.59 30.54 200.00 31.37 
mdb 85.06 35.00 170.70 36.51 
bmp 85.97 41.50 207.60 26.76 
pii 82.92 41.60 168.30 31.18 
uni 99.48 42.00 280.00 39.15 
ubi 91.19 13.00 185.00 33.99 
gas 82.69 43.00 203.30 30.96 
Netherlands 
nl 36.54 3.90 130.00 30.44 
abn 92.88 44.80 187.50 27.75 
aen 200.50 52.00 563.30 115.50 
ina 129.80 8.10 370.00 74.79 
inb 89.92 38.30 185.50 30.75 
sns 232.40 11.50 575.00 151.10 
Portugal 
pt 77.12 9.00 466.50 57.64 
bcp 108.50 40.50 534.10 54.98 
bes 125.30 48.00 562.10 57.65 
Spain 
es 76.08 6.80 260.40 42.82 
bbv 93.68 37.00 256.70 30.81 
bkt 148.80 14.79 309.00 101.70 
pop 166.00 14.79 369.10 94.31 
sab 203.60 76.40 403.80 73.49 
san 96.25 38.80 242.80 30.17 
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Appendix 5 
Unit Root Test for the Ten Countries before and after the First Greek Bailout 
This table shows the results of the ADF tests for the series of CDS spreads in log-level, and difference in 
log-level. 12 lags are included for all the series. 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
    ln(var) Δln(var) 
  var t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
Austria 
at -1.27 0.89 -6.33 0.00 
rzb -1.72 0.74 -7.15 0.00 
ers -3.08 0.11 -7.56 0.00 
Belgium 
be -2.04 0.58 -6.12 0.00 
kbc -1.65 0.77 -5.96 0.00 
Greece 
gr -1.88 0.67 -5.23 0.00 
aca -1.56 0.81 -7.06 0.00 
Ireland 
ie -1.70 0.75 -6.54 0.00 
aib -2.31 0.43 -5.97 0.00 
bki -2.39 0.39 -6.17 0.00 
ipm -2.53 0.31 -6.24 0.00 
Italy 
it -2.10 0.55 -5.91 0.00 
bci -1.91 0.65 -7.14 0.00 
mdb -1.64 0.78 -6.16 0.00 
bmp -2.38 0.39 -6.93 0.00 
pii -2.00 0.60 -6.34 0.00 
uni -2.28 0.44 -6.91 0.00 
ubi -4.57 0.00 -6.88 0.00 
gas -2.19 0.50 -6.23 0.00 
Portugal 
pt -1.65 0.77 -5.33 0.00 
bcp -1.71 0.75 -5.67 0.00 
bes -2.51 0.32 -5.42 0.00 
Spain 
es -2.12 0.54 -6.95 0.00 
bbv -2.47 0.35 -7.08 0.00 
bkt -1.82 0.70 -6.95 0.00 
pop -1.68 0.76 -6.81 0.00 
sab -2.22 0.48 -5.21 0.00 
san -2.43 0.36 -7.12 0.00 
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    ln(var) Δln(var) 
  var t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
France 
fr -1.91 0.65 -6.32 0.00 
bnp -2.99 0.13 -6.30 0.00 
car -3.14 0.10 -5.46 0.00 
sge -3.26 0.07 -5.31 0.00 
cnt -2.18 0.50 -5.83 0.00 
axa -2.20 0.49 -5.78 0.00 
sco -2.13 0.53 -6.07 0.00 
gfc -1.51 0.83 -5.90 0.00 
wed -2.85 0.18 -5.54 0.00 
Germany 
de -1.58 0.80 -6.48 0.00 
ikb -1.95 0.63 -5.84 0.00 
dbk -2.56 0.30 -6.79 0.00 
cbg -2.90 0.16 -5.94 0.00 
muv -2.40 0.38 -6.71 0.00 
alv -2.34 0.41 -7.35 0.00 
hnr -2.38 0.39 -6.83 0.00 
Netherlands 
nl -1.47 0.84 -6.05 0.00 
abn -3.48 0.04 -6.49 0.00 
aen -2.24 0.47 -5.93 0.00 
ina -3.14 0.10 -6.15 0.00 
inb -2.85 0.18 -6.19 0.00 
sns -3.49 0.04 -6.27 0.00 
 
Panel B. After first Greek bailout 
    ln(var) Δln(var) 
  var t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
Austria 
at -1.49 0.83 -6.11 0.00 
rzb -1.59 0.80 -5.20 0.00 
ers -1.58 0.80 -5.48 0.00 
Belgium 
be -2.17 0.51 -6.20 0.00 
kbc -2.57 0.29 -5.15 0.00 
Greece 
gr -1.83 0.69 -5.59 0.00 
aca -2.04 0.58 -4.14 0.00 
Ireland 
ie -0.64 0.98 -6.82 0.00 
aib -1.60 0.79 -6.66 0.00 
bki -1.08 0.93 -6.12 0.00 
ipm -0.39 0.99 -6.18 0.00 
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    ln(var) Δln(var) 
  var t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
Italy 
it -1.88 0.67 -6.69 0.00 
bci -1.97 0.62 -5.63 0.00 
mdb -2.01 0.60 -5.02 0.00 
bmp -2.03 0.59 -5.67 0.00 
pii -1.74 0.73 -5.36 0.00 
uni -2.21 0.49 -5.39 0.00 
ubi -1.66 0.77 -5.33 0.00 
gas -2.30 0.43 -5.43 0.00 
Portugal 
pt -2.78 0.20 -6.38 0.00 
bcp -2.10 0.54 -5.14 0.00 
bes -2.61 0.27 -5.47 0.00 
Spain 
es -2.61 0.28 -6.71 0.00 
bbv -2.88 0.17 -6.16 0.00 
bkt -1.12 0.93 -5.56 0.00 
pop -1.94 0.64 -4.32 0.00 
sab -1.85 0.68 -4.32 0.00 
san -2.87 0.17 -6.85 0.00 
France 
fr -1.76 0.72 -6.54 0.00 
bnp -1.90 0.65 -6.92 0.00 
car -2.44 0.36 -6.82 0.00 
sge -2.05 0.57 -6.28 0.00 
cnt -1.87 0.67 -6.54 0.00 
axa -2.34 0.41 -4.97 0.00 
sco -1.80 0.71 -6.22 0.00 
gfc -1.82 0.69 -5.23 0.00 
wed -1.86 0.68 -4.80 0.00 
Germany 
de -2.03 0.58 -5.92 0.00 
ikb -2.02 0.59 -7.14 0.00 
dbk -2.34 0.41 -6.20 0.00 
cbg -2.60 0.28 -6.27 0.00 
muv -3.41 0.05 -6.17 0.00 
alv -2.68 0.25 -6.34 0.00 
hnr -2.06 0.57 -6.43 0.00 
Netherlands 
nl -1.48 0.84 -5.36 0.00 
abn -2.72 0.23 -7.50 0.00 
aen -2.30 0.44 -5.74 0.00 
ina -1.86 0.68 -5.74 0.00 
inb -2.17 0.50 -5.62 0.00 
sns -1.91 0.65 -5.75 0.00 
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Appendix 6 
Cointegration Tests for the Ten Countries before and after the First Greek Bailout 
This table shows the results from the Johansen tests statistics. The respective null hypothesis is that the 
maximum cointegrating rank is 0 or 1. The optimal lag length is shown. 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
country variables lags r=0 r=1 
        eigenvalue trace stat eigenvalue trace stat 
Austria 
at rzb 6 . 14.79 0.02 4.04 
at ers 5 . 13.73 0.02 1.84 
Belgium be kbc 10 . 13.04 0.01 5.78 
Greece gr aca 2 . 6.82 0.01 1.00 
Ireland 
ie aib 9 . 29.73 0.04 4.50 
ie bki 2 . 14.42 0.02 4.05 
ie ipm 2 . 11.64 0.01 4.04 
Italy 
it bci 2 . 19.21 0.02 7.58 
it mdb 2 . 11.33 0.01 4.22 
it bmp 2 . 20.50 0.02 7.55 
it pii 2 . 13.69 0.01 5.50 
it uni 3 . 26.23 0.03 6.21 
it ubi 1 . 26.53 0.03 3.82 
it gas 2 . 16.40 0.01 6.71 
Portugal 
pt bcp 2 . 12.22 0.02 2.31 
pt bes 2 . 11.82 0.01 3.11 
Spain 
es bbv 2 . 20.86 0.02 8.22 
es bkt 1 . 19.00 0.03 2.52 
es pop 1 . 11.89 0.01 3.04 
es sab 2 . 13.86 0.01 5.86 
es san 2 . 19.43 0.02 7.71 
France 
fr bnp 2 . 16.43 0.02 3.96 
fr car 2 . 13.99 0.02 3.41 
fr sge 2 . 13.61 0.02 3.47 
fr cnt 2 . 6.75 0.01 2.49 
fr axa 3 . 7.16 0.01 1.96 
fr sco 2 . 6.64 0.01 1.61 
fr gfc 2 . 4.54 0.01 0.86 
fr wed 5 . 17.25 0.02 1.65 
Germany 
de ikb 2 . 8.11 0.01 0.94 
de dbk 2 . 15.03 0.02 2.84 
de cbg 2 . 13.23 0.02 2.93 
de muv 2 . 10.48 0.01 2.77 
de alv 2 . 12.22 0.02 2.25 
de hnr 3 . 10.64 0.01 2.72 
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country variables lags r=0 r=1 
        eigenvalue trace stat eigenvalue trace stat 
Netherlands 
nl abn 2 . 12.47 0.01 3.76 
nl aen 2 . 9.24 0.01 4.41 
nl ina 2 . 13.71 0.02 2.77 
nl inb 2 . 12.39 0.01 4.14 
nl sns 4 . 20.91 0.03 3.17 
 
Panel B. After first Greek bailout 
country variables lags r=0 r=1 
        eigenvalue trace stat eigenvalue trace stat 
Austria 
at rzb 4 . 14.20 0.03 1.11 
at ers 4 . 22.43 0.05 0.53 
Belgium be kbc 4 . 18.67 0.03 3.50 
Greece gr aca 2 . 6.66 0.01 0.21 
Ireland 
ie aib 8 . 14.59 0.02 5.17 
ie bki 2 . 20.90 0.03 6.61 
ie ipm 2 . 28.32 0.05 6.46 
Italy 
it bci 2 . 10.29 0.02 1.52 
it mdb 3 . 19.16 0.04 1.31 
it bmp 3 . 8.69 0.01 1.96 
it pii 3 . 8.99 0.02 1.12 
it uni 3 . 7.93 0.01 1.56 
it ubi 3 . 10.91 0.02 1.72 
it gas 3 . 8.97 0.02 1.90 
Portugal 
pt bcp 4 . 7.67 0.01 2.10 
pt bes 4 . 8.19 0.01 1.54 
Spain 
es bbv 4 . 21.53 0.03 6.39 
es bkt 2 . 24.16 0.05 2.60 
es pop 2 . 45.47 0.09 2.12 
es sab 6 . 12.15 0.02 2.31 
es san 4 . 18.68 0.03 5.33 
France 
fr bnp 4 . 9.84 0.02 1.54 
fr car 4 . 14.11 0.02 2.49 
fr sge 4 . 12.65 0.02 1.47 
fr cnt 2 . 27.34 0.05 3.44 
fr axa 2 . 18.45 0.03 2.25 
fr sco 2 . 13.49 0.02 1.94 
fr gfc 2 . 10.63 0.02 2.52 
fr wed 2 . 6.97 0.01 1.38 
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country variables lags r=0 r=1 
        eigenvalue trace stat eigenvalue trace stat 
Germany 
de ikb 2 . 15.07 0.03 1.14 
de dbk 2 . 8.80 0.02 1.21 
de cbg 2 . 10.63 0.02 1.38 
de muv 4 . 8.40 0.02 0.79 
de alv 4 . 12.82 0.03 0.77 
de hnr 4 . 9.44 0.02 0.77 
Netherlands 
nl abn 2 . 11.59 0.02 0.88 
nl aen 2 . 15.06 0.03 1.05 
nl ina 2 . 9.90 0.02 0.00 
nl inb 2 . 13.93 0.03 1.94 
nl sns 2 . 24.01 0.05 0.98 
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Appendix 7 
Granger Causality Tests for the Countries before and after the First Greek Bailout 
This table shows the results from the Granger causality tests after the estimated VEC models (if the variables 
can be cointegrated). The null hypothesis is that the dependant variable is Granger caused by the indipendant 
variable. 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
country 
sovereign-to-financial financial-to-sovereign 
dep.var indep.var p-value dep.var indep.var p-value 
Austria 
at rzb 0.00  rzb at 0.00  
at ers 0.00  ers at 0.00  
Belgium be kbc 0.04  kbc be 0.00  
Greece gr aca 0.78  aca gr 0.29  
Ireland 
ie aib - aib ie - 
ie bki 0.00  bki ie 0.13  
ie ipm 0.00  ipm ie 0.01  
Italy 
it bci - bci it - 
it mdb 0.00  mdb it 0.00  
it bmp - bmp it - 
it pii 0.00  pii it 0.11  
it uni - uni it - 
it ubi - ubi it - 
it gas - gas it - 
Portugal 
pt bcp 0.00  bcp pt 0.00  
pt bes 0.01  bes pt 0.00  
Spain 
es bbv - bbv es - 
es bkt - bkt es - 
es pop - pop es - 
es sab 0.00  sab es 0.00  
es san - san es - 
France 
fr bnp - bnp fr - 
fr car 0.09  car fr 0.56  
fr sge 0.00  sge fr 0.14  
fr cnt 0.01  cnt fr 0.53  
fr axa 0.80  axa fr 0.00  
fr sco 0.84  sco fr 0.01  
fr gfc 0.28  gfc fr 0.19  
fr wed 0.64  wed fr 0.54  
Germany 
de ikb 0.84  ikb de 0.14  
de dbk 0.06  dbk de 0.10  
de cbg 0.00  cbg de 0.43  
de muv 0.19  muv de 0.01  
de alv 0.32  alv de 0.02  
de hnr 0.64  hnr de 0.15  
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country 
sovereign-to-financial financial-to-sovereign 
dep.var indep.var p-value dep.var indep.var p-value 
Netherlands 
nl abn 0.10  abn nl 0.16  
nl aen 0.04  aen nl 0.77  
nl ina 0.01  ina nl 0.02  
nl inb 0.01  inb nl 0.02  
nl sns 0.00  sns nl 0.43  
 
Panel B. After first Greek bailout 
  
sovereign-to-financial financial-to-sovereign 
dep.var indep.var p-value dep.var indep.var p-value 
Austria 
at rzb 0.04  rzb at 0.04  
at ers 0.01  ers at 0.05  
Belgium be kbc 0.00  kbc be 0.01  
Greece gr aca 0.01  aca gr 0.00  
Ireland 
ie aib 0.34  aib ie 0.36  
ie bki - bki ie - 
ie ipm - ipm ie - 
Italy 
it bci 0.05  bci it 0.00  
it mdb 0.04  mdb it 0.00  
it bmp 0.01  bmp it 0.00  
it pii 0.16  pii it 0.00  
it uni 0.28  uni it 0.00  
it ubi 0.01  ubi it 0.00  
it gas 0.04  gas it 0.00  
Portugal 
pt bcp 0.05  bcp pt 0.00  
pt bes 0.15  bes pt 0.00  
Spain 
es bbv - bbv es - 
es bkt 0.04  bkt es 0.00  
es pop 0.34  pop es 0.13  
es sab 0.11  sab es 0.01  
es san - san es - 
France 
fr bnp 0.00  bnp fr 0.02  
fr car 0.00  car fr 0.01  
fr sge 0.00  sge fr 0.02  
fr cnt 0.30  cnt fr 0.03  
fr axa 0.08  axa fr 0.10  
fr sco 0.22  sco fr 0.15  
fr gfc 0.28  gfc fr 0.04  
fr wed 0.54  wed fr 0.00  
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sovereign-to-financial financial-to-sovereign 
dep.var indep.var p-value dep.var indep.var p-value 
Germany 
de ikb 0.77  ikb de 0.01  
de dbk 0.31  dbk de 0.39  
de cbg 0.15  cbg de 0.04  
de muv 0.01  muv de 0.01  
de alv 0.20  alv de 0.01  
de hnr 0.03  hnr de 0.01  
Netherlands 
nl abn 0.14  abn nl 0.00  
nl aen 0.00  aen nl 0.39  
nl ina 0.46  ina nl 0.00  
nl inb 0.27  inb nl 0.00  
nl sns 0.00  sns nl 0.73  
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Appendix 8 
Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads of Greece 
This table shows the means, minimum values, maximum values and standard deviations of the CDS spreads 
with Euro denomination in basis points. The time series start from 19 November 2009 until 08 October 2012. 
The Greek sovereign CDS spreads has remained unchanged, since Greek debt restructuring triggered 
approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection payouts on Greek sovereign debt in early March 2012. Tests are 
not proceeded for the bailout and post-bailout periods during the second Greek bailout for collinearity 
problems. The two-letter variables indicate CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are 
domestic financial institutions. 
Panel A. Whole period 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aca 1339.41 225.00 2587.48 708.61 753 
gr 4946.22 152.17 14911.74 5769.59 753 
Panel B. First bailout 
Pre-bailout (19/11/2009-07/05/2010) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aca 422.45 225.00 946.45 151.71 122 
gr 354.77 152.17 973.56 169.66 122 
Bailout period (10/05/2010-20/07/2011) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aca 936.31 648.67 1520.19 163.44 313 
gr 1038.94 486.13 2771.02 455.11 313 
Panel C. Second bailout 
Pre-bailout (21/07/2011-20/02/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aca 2186.19 1465.71 2587.48 335.16 153 
gr 5893.73 1777.32 11453.91 2796.20 153 
Bailout period (21/02/2012-28/06/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aca 1986.79 1646.87 2472.28 317.97 93 
gr - - - - - 
Post-bailout (29/06/2012-08/10/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aca 2009.84 1478.08 2298.55 281.34 72 
gr - - - - - 
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Appendix 9 
Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads of Ireland 
This table shows the means, minimum values, maximum values and standard deviations of the CDS spreads 
with Euro denomination in basis points. The time series start from 19 November 2009 until 08 October 2012. 
The two-letter variables indicate CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic 
financial institutions. 
Panel A. Whole period 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aib 1011.29 196.65 1812.99 483.75 753 
bki 813.99 172.04 2298.98 475.05 753 
ipm 936.78 154.65 2498.7 569.65 753 
ie 459.7 96.92 1191.16 222.34 753 
Panel B. Irish bailout 
Before application (19/11/2009-19/11/2010) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aib 380.1 196.65 999.72 173.64 262 
bki 316.31 172.04 795.3 127.59 262 
ipm 311.59 154.65 885.96 153.22 262 
ie 222.7 96.92 556.38 113.13 262 
Application period (22/11/2010-24/01/2011) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aib 1247.87 889.13 1461.34 229.74 46 
bki 912.07 695.8 1126.78 122.32 46 
ipm 956.49 753.21 1104.1 88.71 46 
ie 539.61 476.45 603.75 27.76 46 
Bailout period (25/01/2011-01/04/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aib 1523.6 1068.12 1812.99 193.7 49 
bki 1077.12 925 1248.84 84.39 49 
ipm 1185.84 915 1447.52 157.82 49 
ie 529.75 491.34 586.53 22.65 49 
After bailout (04/04/2012-08/10/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
aib 1338.02 872.63 1351.21 68.34 396 
bki 1099.32 594.36 2298.98 400.86 396 
ipm 1317.31 910.02 2498.7 431.48 396 
ie 598.55 222.95 1191.16 166.04 396 
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Appendix 10 
Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads of Portugal 
This table shows the means, minimum values, maximum values and standard deviations of the CDS spreads 
with Euro denomination in basis points. The time series start from 19 November 2009 until 08 October 2012. 
The two-letter variables indicate CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic 
financial institutions. 
Panel A. Whole period 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
bcp 786.15 69.73 1875.5 453.66 753 
bes 667.66 97.41 1285.43 299.04 753 
pt 606.34 61.17 1521.45 379.28 753 
Panel B. Portugal bailout 
Before application (19/11/2009-06/04/2011) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
bcp 416.94 69.73 900.55 238.85 360 
bes 432.81 97.41 906.78 228.1 360 
pt 266 61.17 521.84 116.83 360 
Application period (07/04/2011-14/06/2011) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
bcp 683.99 567.61 822.63 55.07 49 
bes 640.59 520.29 752.79 49.83 49 
pt 584.37 469.77 708.36 55.23 49 
Bailout period (15/06/2011-17/07/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
bcp 1261.22 810.12 1875.5 260.55 285 
bes 955.6 732.03 1285.43 116.87 285 
pt 1042.24 702.41 1521.45 148 285 
After bailout (18/07/2012-08/10/2012) 
Variable Mean Min Max SD Obs 
bcp 828.97 654.89 948.08 121.03 59 
bes 732.23 543.47 866.86 117.87 59 
pt 595.61 409.62 817.4 133.07 59 
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Appendix 11 
Panel A. List of Sovereign CDS Series 
No Market Code Name 
1 Greece gr HELLENIC REPUBLIC 
2 Ireland ie IRELAND 
3 Italy it REPUBLIC OF ITALY 
4 Portugal pt REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL 
5 Spain es KINGDOM OF SPAIN 
 
Panel B. List of CDS Series of Financial Institutions 
No Market Code Name 
1 Greece aca ALPHA BANK A.E.  
2 Greece nbg NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE 
3 Ireland aib ALLIED IRISH BANKS  
4 Ireland bki BANK OF IRELAND  
5 Ireland ipm IRISH LIFE & PERM  
6 Italy bci INTESA SANPAOLO SPA 
7 Italy mdb MEDIOBANCA SPA  
8 Italy bmp BANCA MDP DI SIENA SPA  
9 Italy pii BCA PPO MILANO SOCO ARL 
10 Italy uni UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA 
11 Italy ubi UNIONE DI BANCHE 
12 Italy gas ASSIC GENI - SO PER AZN 
13 Portugal bcp BANCO COMR.PORTUGUES 
14 Portugal bes BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO SA 
15 Spain bbv BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARG 
16 Spain bkt BANKINTER SA 
17 Spain pop BANCO POPOLAR ESPN. SA 
18 Spain sab BANCO SABADELL SA 
19 Spain san BANCO STDR.CTL.HISP. SA 
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Appendix 12 
IRFs in Typical and Atypical Regimes for Greece 
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Appendix 12 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 13 
IRFs in Typical and Atypical Regimes for Ireland 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 13 (continued) 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 13 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 13 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 14 
IRFs in Typical and Atypical Regimes for Italy 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 14 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 15 
IRFs in Typical and Atypical Regimes for Portugal 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 15 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 16 
IRFs in Typical and Atypical Regimes for Spain 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 16 (continued) 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 16 (continued) 
Typical Regime 
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Appendix 16 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 16 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 16 (continued) 
Atypical Regime 
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Appendix 17 
The table lists the continuous series of call or put options of the ten European countries. The 
underlying indices of the call or put options are the stock indices in the countries. 
Market Option Name Call/Put 
Austria 
Austrian Traded Index Continuous Call Call 
Austrian Traded Index Continuous Put Put 
Belgium 
Bel 20 Index (10) Continuous Call Call 
Bel 20 Index (10) Continuous Put Put 
Denmark 
OMX Copenhagen 20 Index Continuous Call Call 
OMX Copenhagen 20 Index Continuous Put Put 
France 
CAC 40 Index (10 Euro) Continuous Call Call 
CAC 40 Index (10 Euro) Continuous Put Put 
Germany 
DAX Index Continuous Call Call 
DAX Index Continuous Put Put 
Italy 
FTSE MIB Index Continuous Call Call 
FTSE MIB Index Continuous Put Put 
Netherlands 
AEX Index Continuous Call Call 
AEX Index Continuous Put Put 
Spain 
IBEX 35 Mini Index Futures Continuous Call Call 
IBEX 35 Mini Index Futures Continuous Put Put 
Sweden 
OMX Stockholm 30 Index Continuous Call Call 
OMX Stockholm 30 Index Continuous Put Put 
United Kingdom 
FTSE 100 Index (European) Continuous Call Call 
FTSE 100 Index (European) Continuous Put Put 
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